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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-114
Wednesday
12 June 1996

Daily Report
East Europe

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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Balkans: Milutinovic Arrives in Oslo for Arms Control Signing

LD1106083996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0817 GMT 11 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Oslo, June 11 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic arrived in Oslo early Tuesday [11 June] to attend the signing of an agreement on arms control in the former Yugoslavia, called for by the Dayton peace accords.

The foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Croatia and the Sarajevo Government, and officials of Bosnia's both entities, the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska and the Moslem-Croat Federation, will sign the agreement at noon on Tuesday, following five months of talks in Vienna.

The agreement will be signed in the presence of top officials of the 'Contact Group' comprising Russia, the United States, France, Britain and Germany.

Also, Switzerland, Denmark and Hungary will represent the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe that brokered the Vienna talks, while Italy will represent the European Union.

Balkans: Still No Agreeement on Definitions of Arms Accord

LD1106120896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The signing in Oslo of the disarmament accord for our region has been postponed. Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, who is in Oslo partly for the signing of the accord, met Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjoern Godal today. Croatian TV journalist Zeljko Valcic reports from Oslo:

[Valcic] Speculation that the negotiations on disarmament, with a little luck and political will, could end in Oslo at present remains just speculation. The signing of the accord, scheduled for 1100, has been postponed because there is still no agreement between the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Serbs on defining the status of the two sides.

I have learned unofficially that Belgrade has accepted the Vienna draft of the accord's text but without the possibility of changes. Several compromise suggestions on the controversial preamble of the accord—and one of them entails complete exclusion of the controversial part in exchange for a separate statement on the status of the two Bosnia-Herzegovina sides, in line with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution—have been rejected. If new proposals do exist now, nothing is known about them. For the time being, intensive bilateral meetings between the negotiating sides are taking place.

Concerning the Croatian delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Granic, it should be noted that he held talks this morning with Norwegian Foreign Minister Godal. The main topics were the situation in the region with special stress on the current negotiations, Croatia's bid for Council of Europe membership, and economic cooperation between the two countries. Croatia's contribution to the negotiations was stressed, as well as the need for the Mostar and general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina to take place as planned. Intensive economic meetings have been announced and visits by Norwegian businessmen to Croatia.

Balkans: Negotiator Views Possible Signing of Arms Accord

AU1106144496 Paris AFP in English 1413 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Oslo, June 11 (AFP)—The head negotiator for a disarmament accord on ex-Yugoslavia said he "hoped" the signing of the agreement would go ahead as planned on Tuesday in Oslo, but did not exclude a postponement.

"The chances are still great" that the signing ceremony will take place on Tuesday, but it will take the delegations time to consult their respective capitals, said Norwegian General Vigleik Eide, who presided over the negotiations on behalf of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The ceremony, originally scheduled for 11:30 a.m. (0930 GMT) had to be delayed after the Sarajevo government refused to sign the document, claiming that the two Bosnian sub-entities—the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic]—should be attached to Bosnia and not granted equal status with the state of Bosnia that it represents until the elections.

Sarajevo has refused to accept the Republika Srpska's demand that it be treated equally, in the introduction to the text, with Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Sarajevo government fears this will kickstart diplomatic recognition of the Bosnian Serbs.

If the situation is not resolved in Oslo, "it would be possible to stop the clock for two or three days without threatening the schedule" for implementation, the general said.

According to Eide, the negotiations could then continue during the international conference on Bosnia scheduled to take place in Florence, Italy on Thursday and Friday.

Several of the ministers representing signatories of the accord are scheduled to leave Oslo on Tuesday evening due to previous engagements, Eide added.

The countries of the contact group—Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States—tried Tuesday to find an "arrangement" to convince Sarajevo to sign the document, he said.

Balkans: CE Delegation Says Dayton Accord 'in Danger'

AU1106152496 Paris AFP in English 1512 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Strasbourg, June 11 (AFP)—A Council of Europe [CE] delegation to Bosnia warned Tuesday that civilian aspects of the Dayton accords were in danger if more was not done to regenerate the country's economy and establish democracy.

Speaking after a three-day visit to Bosnia from June 4 to 7, the delegation from the parliamentary assembly said boosting the economy would improve living conditions and encourage refugees to return home.

Many refugees could not return at present because of a desperate shortage of accommodation, they said.

They added it was essential for the sake of democracy and political stability that elections due to be held by mid-September go ahead, "but only in the right conditions."

The Council of Europe is a pan-European organisation based here and set up to promote human rights and democracy across the continent.

Balkans: B-H, FRY Ministers Meet on Economic, Consular Issues

AU1106145996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Within informal contacts among delegations that, following six months of talks in Vienna, should sign the agreement on armament control in the region of the former Yugoslavia in Oslo today, foreign ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, Jadranko Prlic and Milan Milutinovic, respectively, also met. It was agreed to work on arranging a visit by a Bosnia-Herzegovina business delegation in Belgrade and the arrival of a Yugoslav team of telecommunications experts in Sarajevo. It was also agreed to help citizens solve problems in the consular sphere for the time being, through the mediation of a third country, entrusting consular services to that country's embassies in Sarajevo and Belgrade.

Contacts for setting conditions to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries will also be continued.

Albania: EU Presidency Statement on Postelection Events

AU1206085996 Tirana ATA in English 2100 GMT 11 Jun 96

["EU Presidency Statement on Albania"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 11 (ATA)—The Presidency of the European Union has followed closely the latest developments of the electoral process in Albania. It has taken positive note that the appeals urging all parties to reestablish fair conditions in such a fundamental stage of the democratic life in Albania have proved helpful. Police officers who have led operations during the demonstrations of May 27, have been considered responsible for some of the incidents occurring on that occasion. Elections will be repeated in several electoral districts.

The EU Presidency reiterates the expectation that all parties would show restraint, enter into a substantial political dialogue and contribute constructively to the implementation of the electoral process aimed at consolidating the respect for European standards and the principles of international law in Albania.

Albania: Shehu Invites Opposition To Respond to EU Poll Statement

AU1206121596 Tirana ATA in English 1016 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 11 [date as received] (ATA)—The chairman of the Democratic Party [PD], Tritan Shehu, welcomed today in an interview with ATA the statement of the European Union (EU) for the continuation of the electoral process in Albania.

"I consider it a statement of understanding which aims at surpassing the obstacles created in Albania by the left leadership," said Shehu adding that: "The statement was also and appeal to the opposition to respect the people's vote and take part in the normal political battle."

Shehu expressed hopes the Albanian opposition would respond to such EU statements. "But it is true that our opposition is so much paradoxical and perverse in its attitudes and decisions. It is true that it has only one goal: to create a bad image of Albania. It has historically been doing this during the last three years and earlier, and, to accomplish this goal, it does not give up any kind of foolery", Shehu said in his interview with ATA.

Responding to the demand of the EU Presidency for "all parties to show restraint, enter into a substantial political dialogue and contribute constructively to the implementation of the electoral process aimed at consolidating the respect for European standards and the principles of international law in Albania," Shehu said: "We are open to dialogue, although I consider open the dialogue in parliament, but we also favour a dialogue at round tables."

"However, I have not yet seen a signal by the extreme left. The continuation of this road does harm to the conservative group leading the PS (the Socialist Party) but dialogue will pave the way for its reformation," Shehu said.

The left opposition parties and the Democratic Party of the Right intend to continue boycott of the vote and call for new elections. They have said they will not participate in the re-run of elections in 17 constituencies, on June 16, either.

A delegation of three left opposition parties left for Greece to urge the Greek socialist government not to recognise the election results in Albania.

The united opposition front, the so-called "Red Front" suffered a setback last week when jailed Socialist Party leader Fatos Nano said the decision to pull out of the election was "hasty" and "not at all responsible."

"It was Ceka and Gjinushi that destroyed the PS," said Shehu referring to the leader of Democratic Alliance Party [AD] and that of the Social-Democratic leader [PSD]. "They did this because they wanted to come up at the lead of the 'Red Front' and I think they accomplished their aim."

"Now Ceka is trying to eliminate Fatos Nano from the PS leadership. I hold that Ceka, too, will be out of the political ploy if the central-left reformers come to power," Shehu said.

The PSD and AD leaders stressed that Nano has not a clear image of the reality "due to his isolation in the Tepelene prison." The PS has made no comments about Nano's remarks. But on Tuesday, ZERI I POPULLIT through several error corrections to give another meaning to the letter by replacing the expressions "not at all responsible" with "wholly responsible." [sentence as received]

Asked about this Shehu said: "Today's correction of the Nano letter shows that certain segments of the former secret police control and censor Nano himself."

Albania: KQZ Head on Preparations for 16 Jun Election Rerun

AU1206111996 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Report on interview with Central Election Commission Chairman Edmir Kapidani by Reis Cico at the Palace of Congresses in Tirana; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Central Election Commission [KQZ] is continuing its work in several halls at the Palace of Congresses in Tirana in preparation for 16 June, when elections will be repeated in 17 constituencies. Asked what differences there will be between the 16 June rerun and the 26 May elections, KQZ Chairman Edmir Kapidani had this to say:

[Kapidani] The repetition of elections in 17 constituencies on 16 June will be based on the same law observed on 26 May. Of course it is clear that during this period, we have asked the groups that participated in the first round in these constituencies on 26 May and their relevant bodies to submit proposals for the commission presidency. The deadline was by 2000 last night. At a meeting today, the KQZ approved the commissions based on these proposals.

[Cico] Mr. Kapidani, you said there were major irregularities in the 17 constituencies where the elections will be held again. Will the commissions be changed in these constituencies?

[Kapidani] The irregularities verified in these 17 constituencies had one cause—the withdrawal of several political parties from elections at the end of the election day. That is why in a statement sent to the parties, we have said that new commissions will be created in these constituencies, and they, in turn, will have the prerogative of setting up new commissions at polling stations.

Albania: Dual Status 'Scandal' of OSCE Poll Observers Reported

AU1206123996 Tirana ATA in English 0946 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 12 [date as received] (ATA)—Over 30 per cent of OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observers who followed closely the development of the May 26 elections in Albania turn out to have been served by the Socialist Party of Albania, the newspaper ALBANIA says on Wednesday [12 June].

The group of nine observers from Norway and precisely: Mariane Oen, Bjorn Engesland, Age Borchgrevnik, Kare Vollan, Erlend Broli, Anne Marit Vjornflaten, Uf Tore Isaksen, Olyvind Dahl, and Trond Jensrud are representatives of the Norwegian working youth in a left political grouping that has nothing in common with the Social-Democratic Party of Norway, ALBANIA says.

On May 10, the group of Norwegian observers was attached to the Central Electoral Commission as observers invited by the Socialist Party, that its, after gaining this status 10 days later and precisely on May 20, the OSCE coordinator, Mark Power, appears before the Central Electoral Commission in Tirana and asks to attach as OSCE observers precisely nine observers from Norway invited from the Socialist Party.

After the approval of the OSCE observer status, the nine observers had a double status, first as observers invited by the PS and secondly as OSCE observers, the paper says also carrying the fax according to which the OSCE coordinator, Mark Power Stevens, attaches the nine Norwegians as OSCE observers, invited by the PS. The paper also carries the fax with the names of the nine observers of the Norwegian left who are invited in Albania by the Forum of the Euro-Socialist Youths (of the PS).

The two enigmas of this observer group also emerge based on this dualism, ALBANIA comments. "The easiest variant that can consider innocent the OSCE coordinator, also including the Swiss ambassador to Albania (Switzerland holds the current presidency of the OSCE) is that the coordinator himself might have found it hard to find a minimum number of people to come to Albania as observers. And, to fill this void, he addressed himself to the Socialist Party of Albania to lend him 9 "unbiased" observers. But there is another variant not so much easy for the OSCE coordinator, perhaps, also for the Swiss ambassador of Switzerland to Albania.

This variant has to do with the motives that have made the OSCE coordinator, Stevens, and the Swiss ambassador to openly violate the OSCE norms. And this variant, which would be a scandal of the OSCE, includes the question whether there other OSCE observers secured in the same way," the paper says.

The Norwegian group of observers invited by the PS has drafted the most negative and extreme reports on the May 26 elections.

"The OSCE observers, the Marxist Norwegians, have publicly addressed themselves to world media also including the BBC radio through which they have denounced elections in Albania as unfair, unfree, and rigged. The Organisation of the Working Youth Union and other M-L organisations from Norway have old ties, since the 60s, with the Party of Labour of Albania (PS's predecessor). These ties also continued after the death of dictator Hoxha in 1985.

ATA managed to obtain in the newspaper ALBANIA full documents on the falsification of the Norwegian observers' status, legalised by the OSCE coordinator and the Swiss ambassador in Albania.

Albania: Pellumbi Rejects Idea of Partial Elections

AU1006194896 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 8 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Servet Pellumbi, Socialist Party deputy chairman, by unidentified correspondents in Tirana: "We Found Europe Concerned About What Happened on 26 May and Left Europe Committed to Overcoming Albania's Political Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [ZERI I POPULLIT] Meanwhile, the EU and the U.S. State Department have spoken out in concern at the elections in Albania and have provided the formula of partial elections. How would you comment on this?

[Pellumbi] The formula of partial elections is not unknown to us but it demands something else first: i.e., a serious investigation to discover to what extent the elections were violated in Albania. There is a consensus not only among the opposition forces but among many international observers that the elections in Albania where not in accordance with international standards. The problem can therefore not be easily solved by increasing the number of constituencies with "serious violations" from three or four to 10 or 15. This merely deepens the suspicion, and a rerun of the elections in such a limited number of constituencies would not give parliament the proper legitimacy. The people would continue to believe that their votes had been violated and abused. It would not contribute to the social peace that the country needs so badly. In short, we think that the main concern is that Albania needs free elections. The question of repeating the elections either totally or partially must be viewed in the context of the need to save Albanian democracy and its future rather than saving one politician or another who is attempting to stay in power even without the normal confidence of the people, or the context of eliminating the opposition from the democratic process. It is difficult to achieve a consensus on this matter and still harder to make this compromise a useful one.

Albania is in fact in the first stages of democracy, but this does not mean that it cannot be allowed to hold elections according to standards different from those of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the U.S. State Department, and the European Parliament. This would pave the way for electoral farces in Albania, and there could never be either genuine democracy or peace.

We do not want this, and at our meetings in Brussels we have therefore sought support for genuine democracy and not for specific parties or politicians. In short, I would say that what happened on 26 and 28 May was not simply an Albanian problem, but a problem of all democratic countries, because we do not want the process that began in Albania to be cut short by the thirst for power of certain compromised clans.

Bulgaria: SDS Leader Kostov on No-Confidence Debate

AU1206133496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 12 Jun 96 p 4

[Interview with Ivan Kostov, chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Malina Angareva in Sofia on 11 June: "Videnov Is Groggy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Angareva] Mr. Kostov, what is your comment on the debates on the no-confidence motion in parliament yesterday?

[Kostov] The debates were extremely keen. The majority lost its nerve and debated in the style of 1993, when it defended the Berov administration. The style was absolutely the same, the speeches were the same, so was their aggressiveness. They are resorting to fascist- and Bolshevik-type tricks. This is very bad manners for a party with a ruling majority; they should not permit themselves to act like this.

[Angareva] What do you expect from the vote?

[Kostov] The mood is extremely nervous in the debating chamber. One can sense tension in the air. I do not know, we will see what happens. I cannot make any prediction. There were threats and displays of aggression. I have the feeling that they have lost control. Otherwise, the style that they adopted is that of "our pack of wolves against the opposition's flock of sheep." This is a forcible manipulation of the psychological atmosphere, and I will tell you why. It is because none of them listens to the others' arguments, but all the Socialists have to join together in defending Videnov. Premyanov certainly issued an order to this effect.

[Angareva] Many accusations were made against the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] government.

[Kostov] They were grasping at straws!

[Angareva] Did you expect Videnov to get up and say: "Sorry, I have erred."

[Kostov] No, that is not Videnov's style.

[Angareva] What is your view of the prime minister's behavior?

[Kostov] I think that he is groggy and will not withstand the opposition's punches, at least it looks that way.

[Angareva] Zhan Videnov asked you for the SDS's economic program. Will you give it to him?

[Kostov] I will hand it to him as a free gift.

[Angareva] Are you counting on the votes of Lukanov and Aleksandur Marinov, who are against the cabinet?

[Kostov] I have never made calculations like yours. The SDS simply does not make such calculations. We have never held talks with anyone and have never done what Chavdar Kyuranov and other BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] deputies are doing. This is a political crime. If we start resorting to these methods, we will be no different from them. I am not interested in what anyone says, what is important is how they will vote in the ballot.

Bulgaria: Lukanov Justifies Not Voting for Changes

AU1106184996 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 10

[Interview with Andrey Lukanov, National Assembly deputy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, answering questions from journalists in the National Assembly in Sofia on 10 June: "The Cabinet Changes Are Inadequate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [TRUD] Why did you not support the cabinet changes, Mr. Lukanov?

[Lukanov] Because nothing has changed. What we need is a cabinet that is more prepared to seek a dialogue, is more open to the other social forces, has a greater measure of goodwill, is less nervous, and seeks constructive solutions that can win the widest support among the sociopolitical structures. The true democratic society is not confrontational, but maintains a dialogue. For me personally, it costs no effort to plead for dialogue, because I have always maintained this position, even when I was being questioned at the headquarters of the National Investigation Service.

[TRUD] However, people accuse you of intensifying the crisis within the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] through your personal interests.

[Lukanov] I have no personal interests that I defend, either in the party or in parliament. My entire life is open and transparent.

[TRUD] Despite the expectations, no change has occurred in the BSP government. Do you have any explanation for that?

[Lukanov] At the plenum on Sunday, 9 June, some people declared that such a forum was not in a position to make substantial changes in the BSP's policies, and that this could only be done by a higher party forum. They maintained that this forum should consider and approve the new policies which, I stress, are unavoidable and essential. I agree with their view.

[TRUD] Do you mean that the BSP needs an extraordinary congress or a national conference?

[Lukanov] Now is hardly the time to discuss precisely what kind of forum is needed. However, in such a situation a serious party seeks an opportunity to consult its members and structures and to organize a wider debate on its future policies. This is really essential for the BSP, and I hope that the leadership is also aware of this.

[TRUD] What will happen if these changes also fail to improve the situation in the country?

[Lukanov] The situation will continue to deteriorate, and then there will be a real danger that not the BSP and its coalition partners, but other factors will dominate in effecting the changes that will be needed. Personally, I would very much like this not to happen, but I have my doubts.

[TRUD] You called Orion a group of looters, yet now no one mentions this group?

[Lukanov] The topic came up at the session on Sunday, I did not change my view one iota. Quite the contrary, the latest events, including the attempt of certain persons in Orion to seek refuge abroad from Bulgarian justice, evidently with the assistance of certain circles, only confirms the correctness of my assessment.

[TRUD] How did Zhan Videnov react to your assessment of Orion?

[Lukanov] Extremely edgily.

[TRUD] Some BSP deputies consider that by making your forthright speech at the plenum you have consolidated the party for the next three months.

[Lukanov] If that is so, I would be very glad. It all depends on what basis this consolidation takes place.

[TRUD] Why did Rumen Gechev and his Ministry of Economic Development remain in the cabinet?

[Lukanov] I was one of those who expressed the view that there are no grounds to close down the ministry. At present, we need a strong coordinating structure at the macroeconomic level. This proved to be the view of the majority, which rejected the proposal to close down this ministry, so that Mr. Gechev was left in his post.

[TRUD] However, your nomination of Konstantin Rusinov for the Ministry of the Energy Industry was not accepted.

[Lukanov] I am sorry about that. I consider that the change made is an illustration of the frequent unsuccessful personnel experiments in the government, in which the more competent man is replaced by a less competent one. I have known Mr. Rusinov for many years, and warned my colleagues that I am partial toward his candidature. He has more than 30 years of experience in the energy industry, and he managed to negotiate a reasonable price with our Russian and Ukrainian partners for our coal supplies this season. I see no reason not to confirm trust in him. Apart from this, a socialist party is a party with traditions and should not forget its notable figures who have good records. At the plenum on Sunday, I declared that I would not support the cabinet changes, because they are inadequate.

Bulgaria: 'No Change' in Cabinet's Economic Policies Seen

AU1106191096 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 11

[Commentary by Anka Filipova: "Plenum of Triumphant Economic Chaos"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For six months now, Lukanov, Lilov and other Socialists have been verbally attacking the government's economic policy and calling for radical changes in the cabinet. During this period, the country sank lower.

At the plenum on 9 June, however, the same group retained the same economic team. This means that there will be no change in economic policy, and the country will continue to sink.

Following 14 hours of discussions, Gechev—the most guilty minister—retained his post. His finance minister colleague, Dimitur Kostov, was also kept on, as was Doncho Konakchiev. True, Kliment Vuchev was relieved of his post as industry minister, but the scientist Lyubomir Dachev was chosen to replace him. While he scientifically examines industry's problems and makes quantitative and qualitative analyses, the country will stop producing anything.

On the other hand, in the general commotion surrounding the cabinet's economic policy, the composer Georgi Kostov had to pay the penalty. Now the arts professor Marazov will help in implementing the structural reform.

In fact, Zhan never had any intention of changing his cabinet's economic policy. By his latest moves, he staged a cheap but effective theatrical show.

The proposal to shut down the Ministry of Economic Development came from Videnov personally. Thus, he converted those who were most dissatisfied with his team into his most zealous supporters. Those who wanted Gechev to go did not envision closing down the ministry. By declaring their support for the ministry, they in fact supported Gechev in person. The form of Videnov's proposal deprived them of the opportunity to seek Gechev's replacement. In throwing themselves into a defense of the Ministry of Economic Development, they forgot that they did not want Gechev. For their part, Gechev's opponents did not enter into a life and death struggle, which prompts the thought that, in fact, the entire commotion about the failure of the cabinet's economic policy was dictated by purely internal party squabbling.

Zhan Videnov's opponents probably do not care at all about the penury in the country, the high taxes, the unaffordable prices, and the ill-considered closures of companies, but they do care that someone else is in charge of the country.

The purpose of the 9 June plenum may well have been not to change the government's policies, but to overthrow Videnov's government itself, to allow some other wing of the party to assume power and start improvising at the state's expense.

Changes in the cabinet have been made. Videnov has responded to the party's ultimatum. Within the BSP, people know who is fighting for what. The country has obtained a few new ministers, with whose help it will continue on the same downward path.

Bulgaria: Editorial Criticizes Videnov's Style, Strategy

AU1106114596 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by Reni Neshkova: "Zhivkov and Lilov Warned Him, but He Failed To Grasp the Point"]

[FBIS Translated Text] How can one make changes without changing anything? Zhan Videnov solved this riddle, without, however, applying any modern touches. He merely demonstrated that he had mastered Zhivkov's lessons by learning them by rote, without considering the requirements of the new times. By his arrogant conduct, Zhan even infuriated people from this own party, who could have pretended to support a course toward changes, defusing the tension within the party structures by slight maneuvers and a few sacrifices. General Secretary Zhivkov did this, as did Mao Zedong and Ceausescu. Zhivkov was also fond of restructuring various ministries and committees and shuffling personnel when his authority in the party was under threat. However, he knew how to organize this as the people's displeasure with corrupt individuals. With his exterminator techniques, Videnov has even succeeded in turning the official party daily against him. In fact, the appeal that the former Number One ostensibly made to the nation was really addressed to the present Number One in the party and the state. It is no coincidence that Zhivkov's statement came at the same time as the expected government changes. He hinted to the youthful prime minister that these tricks were not performed in this manner; at such moments one wears sackcloth and ashes and seeks broad cooperation both within and outside the party, after which one can do what one thought of in the first place.

Following these so-called changes, it emerged yesterday that the only problem facing the country is the Ministry of Culture, to which Videnov will later bequeath his errors. According to Zhivkov's strategists, it would have been better if Videnov had acted as if he were offended and had pretended to replace certain ministers "under pressure," declaring that it would have been better if those replaced had been allowed to finish their jobs. By acting in this manner, he would both have won the support of the "dissidents" in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and have reduced his own guilt when the reform once again proves to be stalled, which is absolutely certain to happen, as it did following the last plenum.

Both Aleksandur Marinov and Andrey Lukanov have realized this.

By recklessly forging ahead, without listening to experienced and practiced politicians, Videnov is shortening his term as prime minister and also dragging the party with him toward a long period in opposition.

Lilov and Zhivkov, and even blind men have realized this. However, the blue-eyed boy has failed to take the hints, both heavy and gentle, and will go down in history as the prime minister who was slowest to grasp reality in the party's 100 years of evolution.

Bulgaria: Former BNB Chief on Banking, Cabinet Crises

AU0906144696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] I will not assume my post as ambassador to Bern as long as all issues related to my presumed guilt for the banking system crisis are not clarified, Todor Vulchev, former Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank [BNB] said today. He explained the attack against him as the result of the activity of a center, which controls some of the newspapers. He presented a document which confirms that his daughter, Elena Vulcheva, has not received any loan from the BNB.

Certain Socialists who twice urged me to become prime minister, and until recently kept trying to convince me to become their presidential candidate, have now decided to name me as the culprit for the banking crisis, Vulchev said. He rejected the accusation of indiscriminate dispensation of licenses to new banks when he was BNB governor. He admitted that there probably were mistakes, and pointed out also other reasons for the undermined confidence in our banking system, including the postponement in signing the agreement with the IMF.

According to our former first banker, the cabinet should not be replaced at present, but if this is imperative, then it should be done very rapidly, because otherwise the agreements with the IMF and the World Bask will be jeopardized. I am convinced that we cannot exist without an agreement with the IMF. If in June we are still able to make our payments on the foreign debt, in July, August, and September we must pay $480 million, which we will not be able to pay without foreign help.

No government in the world undermines the people's confidence in the National Bank, Todor Vulchev said, and recommended avoiding the election of a single-party membership of the new BNB Board of Directors when the new governor of the BNB and his deputies are elected, because in such a case the president will not sign the decree, and because if the cabinet is replaced, the BNB Board of Directors will follow the cabinet.

Bulgaria: Energy Chief Sees Role for Nuclear Power

AU0406112996 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 3 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Konstantin Rusinov, chairman of the Energy Industry Committee, by Bistra Varneva; place and date not given: "Electricity Prices Do Not Have To Be Altered Every Time by Political Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Varneva] Mr. Rusinov, how do you think electricity prices should be changed to avoid drastic increases, while enabling the energy industry at long last to operate at market prices?

[Rusinov] I would recommend adopting the scheme used for fuel prices and to update the prices every month. It is abnormal and unnecessary that electricity price increases should be effected every time by political decision.

[Varneva] How is the rise in the dollar rate affecting the energy industry?

[Rusinov] We use foreign currency to import nuclear fuel, coal, and spare parts, so the rise naturally increases production costs. The government will decide how this is to be compensated, either through subsidies or by increasing prices. However, in a market economy it is normal for this to be done by increasing prices, with the state providing assistance for the socially disadvantaged. In this way, our energy industry will remain competitive in the world market and we will not have to export our national product for a song.

[Varneva] For some time now, the West has been pressuring us to shut down reactors at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. What will happen to this plant?

[Rusinov] The Energy Industry Committee had a clear program for the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant that has been approved by the government. The plant should continue to operate at least to the end of its design life. This means that the Nos. 1 and 2 Reactor Units will produce electric power until 2004, while the Nos. 3 and 4 Units will operate until 2010-12. At present no reasons exist to contemplate closing the units down. I would like to stress that last year the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant produced about 45 percent of Bulgaria's electricity, and at prices among the lowest in the country.

The closure of power plants is a complex technological and economic problem, leaving aside the fact that it involves putting people out of work. In the case of a rich country like France, for example, it is envisioned for the European Union to cover about 30 percent of the costs of closing down companies, whereas they want us to shut down our nuclear energy industry, or two-thirds of it, in return for some miserable amounts of money.

Under the Nuclear Safety Agreement of 1993, in return for ECU24 million, we are supposed to shut down the Nos. 1 and 2 Reactor Units in 1996, and the Nos. 3 and 4 Units in 1998. This means that we are to close down half of the country's energy production capacities and import electricity that costs three or four times as much. Let them give us a billion dollars to build new reactor units, then we will decommission the reactors at the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant.

[Varneva] What will be the fate of the Belene nuclear plant?

[Rusinov] Belene is one of the plants for which additional investments are needed at the very least, and in real terms it is possible to construct the plant by the year 2004. Then we will be able to close down Kozloduy's Nos. 1 and 2 Reactor Units within their design service life and to replace them with new reactors that will generate electricity more efficiently with complete nuclear safety.

[Varneva] Are there any foreign offers relating to our nuclear energy industry?

[Rusinov] At the moment we have no concrete proposals, although we are holding talks with French, U.S., and Russian companies. However, I would like to emphasize that what we have to do is to seek investments to build new production capacities, instead of selling what we have for a song.

[Varneva] Will nuclear power plants be the backbone of Bulgaria's energy industry in the future?

[Rusinov] They will be one of the main elements. We will also increase coal production. At the moment we produce about 28 million metric tons annually, which will rise to 35 million tons by the year 2010, but this will not be enough.

[Varneva] Will you sell the Varna Thermoelectric Power Plant?

[Rusinov] I always ask people who want to invest in the energy industry why they try to buy plants that are already in operation, and at a low price at that. The offers for the Varna Thermoelectric Power Plant amount to about $500 million, whereas the plant is really worth $1.4 billion. It would be much better for us to grant concessions to build new power plants and buy the electricity they produce. This would be one way to attract real new investments. Otherwise, it only means a change of ownership, in which the gain for the state is doubtful. Privatization is not a panacea, especially in a sector like energy. Even in the West many of the companies in this sector have remained under state control. I do not agree to selling power plants merely to be able to claim that we have changed something.

Bulgaria: Financial Cuts Threaten Nuclear Plant

AU0306132796 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 1 Jun 96 p 14

[Article by Irina Kuneva: "Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant Without Money for Repair?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday it became apparent that the National Electricity Company could remain without money for the repair of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant.

The collegium of the Committee on Power Supply decided to decrease the expenditures of the National Electricity Company by 20 percent. The National Electricity Company will have to cut the amount of money it intended to spend for repair, fuels, spare parts, wages, and amortization.

The frugality was necessary because the company's name was placed on the isolation list, and it therefore no longer has the right to bank credits. The entire crediting of the National Electricity Company will pass to the hands of the state funds, and will be controlled by the Council of Ministers. [passage omitted]

After including the name of the National Electricity Company on the isolation list, problems will emerge with the implementation of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant's safety program. Kozloduy is a part of the National Electricity Company, and its expenses must also decrease.

The associations of our nuclear power engineering branch need a total of $344,000,000 in 1996. However, the beginning of the structural reform curbed this amount.

According to experts of the nuclear power engineering branch, cutting the branch's expenditures is impossible because of the dollar rate increase. The branch is purchasing fuels and spare parts with dollars, and every cut will block its work. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Interior Minister Visits Nuclear Plant

AU0506072796 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 5 Jun 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Interior Minister Visits Kozloduy Secretly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nikolay Dobrev, minister of internal affairs, visited secretly the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant together with Bozhidar Antonov, director of the Interior Ministry Vratsa Regional Administration. The two have had a meeting with Kozma Kuzmanov, director of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant and Vratsa Mayor Konstantin Petrov. The only thing that became known is the fact that Dobrev made his visit at the special instruction of the government. The increased interest of Western companies and groups toward our strategic economic object has been discussed.

Czech Republic: Klaus Views Coalition Talks, Economy

LD1106211796 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1620 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Regular interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Jaroslav Skalicky in Prague on 11 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Skalicky] How do you view Czech society after the elections? What did it want to say by the way it voted?

[Klaus] I think that a distance of 10 days is necessary because the first reactions were very simplistic, and that is why I did not talk about them too much. I do not thinkt Czech society expressed disagreement with what has been happening here since November 1989. I think Czech society expressed a certain dissatisfaction in the sense of impatience. Too many people believe that everything can work in the Czech Republic as it does in Switzerland, the Netherlands, or Germany, without understanding that this is simply impossible. [passage omitted]

[Skalicky] The Social Democratic Party [CSSD] formulated its basic demands by which it is presenting conditions for supporting your government. It wants the separation of pension funds from the state budget, it wants higher administrative units, it wants a stricter attitude to money laundering, corruption, and so on. Which of these points are you willing to accept or talk about?

[Klaus] I do not think that is the question. Admittedly, we must conclude a coalition agreement, but not with the CSSD. The coalition agreement will be concluded with the parties that are prepared to participate in the government in these uneasy times. As for the kind of support the ensuing government statement gains in parliament, that is a different matter. There is no doubt that the government statement will be somewhat different from that of four years ago. We are aware of our public's reactions, but none of us has ever agreed that this government statement will be signed with the CSSD beforehand. So, the issue of conditions is out of the question. For me this way of thinking is completely unacceptable and, above all, useless.

[Skalicky] You have already reacted to Milos Zeman [CSSD chairman] comparing you to Adolf Hitler. I would like to ask: Is your personal dislike really so strong for such attacks to take place?

[Klaus] I would like to ask you to separate Mr. Zeman's personal dislike of me from my dislike of Mr. Zeman. If you take my words against Mr. Zeman in the past five years, you will find hardly any; if you take his, you will find hundreds. I would not refer to this as dislike. Admittedly, I do not love Mr. Zeman, I do not agree with him politically, but I accept him as a normal politician, and I am willing and prepared to talk with him. I will not evaluate what he is doing. I think it suffices for citizens of this country to do so.

[Skalicky] Although the CSSD has refused a coalition with the Communists and the Republicans several times, it hopes that these parties will have posts in parliament. What is your view?

[Klaus] I think that talks about the structure of parliament are only beginning. The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] delegated three people from the ODS leadership to take part in these talks: Vlach, Honajzer, and Strasky. They have been asked to start talks on the division of parliamentary posts. I would not like to anticipate this, but they are our delegation.

[Skalicky] The inflation figures for May were published yesterday. What can you say about how inflation will develop by the end of the year?

[Klaus] [Passage omitted] The inflation figure for May—0.6 percent—is no tragedy because, if we leave seasonal influences aside and simply say that 12 times 0.6 equals 7.2 percent, then inflation as such, seen in this light, is nothing tragic. But this is a May figure and as such it should really be lower. So we will have quite a job to maintain an inflation rate of 8 percent, a level I keep talking about all the time.

If two years ago our goal in keeping inflation down was just over 10 percent and in 1995 just over 9 percent, then in 1996 it should be just over 8 percent. This is the main objective, irrespective of the elections.

Czech Republic: Zeman's Hitler Remark Sparks Controversy

AU1106134696

[FBIS Report] Munich FOCUS in German on 10 June on page 208 carries a 500-word interview with Milos Zeman, chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), entitled "The Arrogance of Power." Asked why he rejects a government headed by Vaclav Klaus, he says: "We are against the arrogance of power, as symbolized by Klaus and some other members of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). They have adopted the style of right-wing Bolshevists." "Mr. Klaus in unable to communicate," he adds.

Asked whether he will tolerate the existing government coalition, Zeman states: "If the government includes major CSSD proposals in its program. But Klaus has strictly rejected regional self-administration. We also support measures against economic crime and money-laundering. Just imagine Klaus saying that he is in favor of self-administration, an ombudsman, and a European social charter. That is like Hitler saying that he loved all Jews."

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 11 June on page 2, under the headline "In His Criticism of Klaus, Zeman Used a Comparison of Hitler's Attitude Toward the Jews," carries a 400-word report by CTK and "(km)" on the FOCUS interview and on Vaclav Klaus's response to it. According to the daily, the "mutual intolerance" between the two party leaders is acquiring "an ever more bitter tone." It continues: "After the elections, Milos Zeman stooped to personal attacks. In an interview for the well-known German weekly FOCUS, Zeman even used a comparison in which the former leader of Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler, figures alongside Klaus." MLADA FRONTA DNES quotes Klaus as saying in response to this that "there is no point in commenting on such a statement." The ODS chairman adds: "I have been chided for every little word. If I were to say a fraction of what he said in making this comparison, journalists would write me off definitively. I would be terribly surprised if Mr. Zeman were to get away with this." According to the report, Klaus has not considered submitting a complaint against Zeman.

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on the same day on page 2, under the headline "Zeman: Klaus Like Hitler," carries a 250-word CTK report on the same issue. This report quotes a statement made by Milos Zeman in an interview for NOVA Television on 10 June: "I did not authorize this interview, and I would like to read it first, but, if you say that this comparison is made there, it is definitely not because I am comparing Vaclav Klaus to Adolf Hitler. It appears there because I say that a politician who, for four years, has been passionately opposed to certain of the political parties' demands will come across as very untrustworthy if he begins to advocate these demands."

Slovakia: General on Air Force Deployment Within PFP

AU1106203996 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 8 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Brigadier General Stefan Gombik, Air Force and Air Defense chief of staff, by Peter Valo; place and date not given: "We Do Not Know the Place or the Date of Deployment"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Two years ago, as the only postcommunist state, Slovakia took the liberty of promising, in addition to a field hospital and a rapid deployment battalion, to also deploy the Air Force within the Partnership for Peace [PFP] plan. I asked Brigadier General Stefan Gombik, Air Force and Air Defense chief of staff, what the Slovak military Air Force plans to provide to the UN peacekeeping forces.

[Gombik] It will be eight MiG-29 aircraft, 16 pilots, 60 gunners, technicians, and other ground personnel. Some of them will be ready for replacement in Slovakia.

[Valo] Will that not cut the combat readiness of the Air Force at home?

[Gombik] In addition to other fighter aircraft, 16 MiG-29's will stay here.

[Valo] When did the preparations begin?

[Gombik] The selection began last fall. The pilots undertook very demanding winter survival training. We drew on the experience of a shot-down U.S. F-16 pilot and the experience from the Iraq war. At present, the pilots are enrolled in intensive two-week English-language courses in Kosice. This will be followed by two weeks of intensive flying. That will be the picture for the entire year.

[Valo] What is the difference between this and the regular training?

[Gombik] In addition to training in dogfights, we focus on fights at low altitude, work with the AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System], ground surveys, and searches for small target and their destruction. We have great contacts with the Dutch—they fly F-16's—who were deployed over the territory of former Yugoslavia.

[Valo] Will our crews and aircraft encounter problems with the hardware and regulations used by NATO?

[Gombik] The technical personnel fine tune the fueling system used by the NATO armies. They installed IFF [Identification Friend or Foe] devices that correspond to Western standards in the aircraft. These systems are financially taxing, but, sooner or later, all states interested in joining NATO will have to introduce them in their air forces and get the bonus of safe air traffic over their territories in the process.

[Valo] When should a direct engagement in IFOR [Implementation Force] operations take place?

[Gombik] The crews will go through a strict test exercise in November, which will test the technical state of the aircraft, the skills of the pilots, and their ability to communicate in English, which is the command language. After that, the Slovak Government will be able to report that it kept its promise. The place and date of deployment will depend on political decisions. The intensive training will improve the combat readiness of the Slovak Air Force. At the same time, we are approaching the concept of a small but well-armed air force in an army that could be similarly characterized. It is not without interest that we were the only state of the former Warsaw Pact to be able to provide air forces. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Kovac Discusses Hungarian Relations

LD1106180396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1050 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Passages within quotations marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prior to his visit to Budapest, Slovak President Michal Kovac has met Hungarian correspondents, among them Hungarian Radio's Bratislava correspondent, Ildiko Nagy. This is her report on the news conference:

[Nagy] [Passage omitted] Kovac is very glad about his upcoming official visit, which is to start on 12 June, not only because he hopes to recall his nice memories but because he considers the nurturing of Slovak-Hungarian relations on all levels very important. He spoke about this at a news conference for Hungarian journalists.

[Kovac, in Slovak with superimposed translation into Hungarian] "The factors influencing the life of minorities in this region also depend on the speed of these countries' accession to the EU. If it takes place quickly, similar conditions will have to be created in every state. This means that every country should accept regulations prevailing in the EU and other developed democracies. This is the minorities's best guarantee against arbitrary decisions by individual governments. It will guarantee that minority community members can become citizens with equal rights in the international union [EU], regardless of the state they live in."

[Nagy] One of the issues troubling Slovak-Hungarian relations is undoubtedly the situation of minorities. However, open questions of our common past also weigh on this relationship. Even if it could not settle past problems, a joint declaration of intent, as a civilized gesture, could demonstrate to the world that it is possible to live in peace in this part of the world too. Kovac said the following about this matter:

[Kovac] "At the time, I proposed to Hungarian President Arpad Goncz that he should issue a joint statement on my Budapest visit, which was scheduled to take place following the ratification of the basic treaty. By issuing a joint statement we could close our joint history to date, so that in future we do not have to keep returning to the old questions and we can concentrate our attention on the future.

"Unfortunately, the situation has been complicated by the fact that the ratification process in Slovakia has been dragging on for almost a year. At the moment the natural conditions for involving Hungarian and Slovak experts in the preparation of a joint declaration of intent do not exist. The period between the basic treaty's ratification by the Slovak parliament and my visit to Hungary is too short for a thorough preparation of a significant document like this. And perhaps the Slovak domestic political atmosphere is not the most favorable for this either. Cooperation between the president, the government, and the parliament would also be necessary. Therefore, we have to postpone this declaration. I think, however, that the Hungarian president's visit to Slovakia would also be a good occasion for this."

[Nagy] Slovakia's reputation abroad was also raised. Disputes between the president and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar are widely known. This personal conflict has turned to a national problem and does no good to Slovakia's reputation. This is how Kovac sees this problem:

[Kovac] "The lack of cooperation between the government, the president and the parliamentary coalition does not bring credit to Slovakia and does not improve its reputation. The level of cooperation is just about enough for the president to fulfill his duties as laid down in the Constitution. This includes not only the fulfillment of presidential duties at home but active participation in international life and keeping an eye on bilateral ties.

"I consider the idea laid down in the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty on forming a joint committee to find solutions to specific problems very good. By doing this, these specific problems do not have to be turned into international issues. We should not wait with the setting up of this committee. Either the Hungarian or the Slovak Governments could initiate this process. In my view, representatives of the Slovak community in Hungary and the Hungarian community in Slovakia should certainly take part in this committee. If it was up to me, I would let the minorities decide who they want to delegate to this committee. Since they have their own cultural organizations, political parties and mayors, they should decide who their most suitable representatives would be. This question could also gain a political dimension. However, if we manage to find those who are able to hold talks with the other side without prejudices and come to a compromise, the process will be on the right track. Therefore, those who are unable to take these kinds of steps have no place at the talks. I can only propose individuals, but I will have no decisive say in the establishment of this committee."

[Nagy] Despite his unenviable situation, the Slovak president hopes that Slovakia is also moving toward democracy. It may seem that this progress is taking place in a one-step-forward-and-two-steps-back manner, Kovac, based on his personal conviction, firmly supports all the values of the democratic world.

[Kovac] "If I did not believe that Slovak domestic problems could be solved—be it certain parliamentary or government decisions or the government majority putting the opposition into an impossible position—I would not dare turn to international organizations over a number of issues. For the institutions of a democratic system have also been established in Slovakia. This nation is not worse than any of its neighbors. The question is when and which institution leaves the path of democracy and how serious the consequences of these steps are.

"However, I see that the decisions taken here are aimed at cooperation with the EU and NATO. People are defending the values of democracy, local governments are functioning, and so on. I have to assess all this when I speak about the direction in which we are going and when I judge whether certain mistakes are temporary ones or have long-term effects. My opinion is that our mistakes are only short-term ones. By the time talks on Slovakia's admission to European organizations starts, the situation could significantly change here, too. However, I consider dialogue important, because it will have an effect not only on the state leadership, but also on public opinion. I do not feel satisfaction over the fact that certain laws returned by me to parliament for repeated debate have been found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. However, I consider the existence of this kind of institution important, because this strengthens people's awareness of the law.

"It is true that there are other matters as well. In the case of Michal Kovac Jr., we found a number of problems which point to shortcomings in the way democracy is applied here. By the suspension of the investigation it has been proved that the Interior Ministry and the secret services can have a say in the investigation and hinder the process. These are our weak points. However, if democracy further develops in Slovakia, we can surely hope that these defects will be removed."

[Nagy] The issue of the Benes decrees has been on the agenda of the Hungarian parliament again lately. In reply to a question on whether he, personally, or the Slovak legislature wishes to deal with this issue, Kovac said that after 1989 the Czechoslovak legislature had rejected the principle of collective guilt. However, for the annulment of the Benes decrees—just as for their adoption—the opinion of the one-time ally could also be necessary and no comprehensive analysis had been completed yet which would offer a concrete solution.

Kovac considers his upcoming official visit of great significance because the two presidents can show the world that they wish to implement the basic treaty in practice too and that this document, according to expectations, could bring a change in Slovak-Hungarian relations.

Slovakia: HZDS Regional Groups Meet, Elect Executive Bodies

AU1106130596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 10 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Report by SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA regional correspondents and TASR: "The Delegates Elected New Administrative Bodies for the Movement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—(from our regional correspondents and TASR)—The main tasks of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in the years 1996/97, organizational issues arising from the territorial and administrative division of the Slovak Republic, and the election of HZDS regional bodies and officials were the topics dealt with by the delegates of the constituent assemblies of the HZDS yesterday in the eight newly established regions. Augustin Marian Huska, deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR], told the delegates from the Bratislava region that Slovakia has always been perceived as a provincial country. The commissioners, who wielded power here from the will of the former hegemons, still form an compact unit of the structure that resists the present government coalition and the idea of building an independent Slovakia and an independent center of the republic—Bratislava, Huska emphasized.

Bratislava—NRSR Deputy Chairman Augustin Marian Huska, Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Katarina Tothova, Culture Minister Ivan Hudec, NRSR deputies for the HZDS, and 105 delegates from the five Bratislava constituencies and the future districts of Malacky, Senec, and Pezinok took part in the talks in Bratislava. Milan Mihalik, chairman of the Bratislava HZDS municipal organization, said in his address that the main tasks and objectives for 1996/97, in the region to be newly established in the future, will be an expansion of membership and the expected selection of candidates for the next elections to the NRSR in 1998, to local bodies, and the transformation of the state administration. The delegates elected at the assembly former chairman Milan Mihalik as chairman of the regional organization of the future Bratislava region.

Trnava—An assembly in the future center of the new territorial entity, Trnava, took place with Olga Keltosova, deputy chairman of the Movement, and 107 delegates attending yesterday. Keltosova reported on a government proposal to have an independent budget for each of the future regions. The representatives of six district organizations elected Vladimir Poor, hitherto chairman of the district presidium in Trnava, as chairman of the HZDS Regional Presidium [KP] in Trnava.

Nitra—The delegates and guests of the assembly were welcomed by Mayor Vladimir Libant. He pointed out that Nitra had been in the over 1,000-year history of the Slovaks the place of important meetings that greatly affected the history, development, and fate of Slovakia. The chairmen of the HZDS district presidiums in the districts of Komarno, Levice, Nove Zamky, Nitra, Sala, Topolcany, and Zlate Moravce took part in the HZDS assembly in Nitra, as well as delegates of the district organizations, Tibor Cabaj, chairman of the HZDS Deputies' Club, and other guests. Jan Kovarcik, chairman of the HZDS district presidium in Nitra, emphasized that the most important task of the assembly was to elect new regional bodies. Jan Kovarcik, chairman of the HZDS district presidium in Nitra, was elected chairman.

Banska Bystrica ("ksk")—At the regional assembly in Banska Bystrica, 175 delegates elected NRSR Deputy Dusan Macuska of Lucenec the first HZDS KP chairman. Shortly after the vote, he told SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA: "In the immediate future, it will be difficult to bring the new HZDS regional structures into operation with the maximum possible harmony. That means so that the old districts will harmonize with the new ones, the ideas of the twin city Banska Bystrica-Zvolen with the views of district communities, etc. Only when relations are good can one work in peace. The work in the new region will be very demanding, because, according to the economic analyses, the new Banska Bystrica region will be one of the poorest in Slovakia. There is little industry, so we are going to need a peaceful atmosphere in order that we can all unite as much as possible in creating conditions for economic prosperity in the region. If we argue or if we are not united, we will spend most of our time fighting, far too much time."

Zilina—At the constituent assembly of the HZDS regional organization in the Zilina region yesterday, 148 delegates took part, representing more than 3,000 members. A 40-member KP was elected at the assembly. Jozef Turcak of Namestovo became chairman. The seat of the organization will be Zilina.

Kosice—The willingness and ability flexibly to transform the HZDS structure so as to bring it as close to the citizens as possible were confirmed by the course of the discussion and the results of the elections at the constituent assembly in Kosice yesterday. There were 148 delegates attending, who gave a warm welcome to Sergej Kozlik, Slovak deputy prime minister and finance minister, Alexander Rezes, minister of transport and communications, HZDS Secretary Gustav Krajci, and other guests. Pavol Derfeny from Michalovce was elected chairman. At the same time, a 47-member regional presidium was elected and other bodies.

[Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 11 June on page 3 adds a report on Trencin, while Presov remains unreported:

"**Trencin**—We express our full confidence in and support for Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, to whom we wish a lot of success and an especially fast recovery. We also express our support for the coalition government of the Slovak Republic, which is capable of guaranteeing the continuation of the economic growth of Slovakia and entry of the Slovak Republic into European structures," a statement read that was adopted in Trencin by the participants at the HZDS constituent regional assembly on Sunday.

"The HZDS regional assembly attended by Agriculture Minister Peter Baco, Economy Minister Jan Ducky, and 215 delegates from the future districts of Prievidza, Povazska Bystrica, Puchov, Ilava, Nove Mesto nad Vahom, Myjava, Banovce nad Bebravou, Partizanske, and Trencin elected Milan Rehak chairman. Tomas Cingel became deputy chairman for the economy, Arpad Tamoczy for foreign relations and media policy, Jozef Rea for territorial administration and self-administration, and Pavol Halabrin for social affairs and humanitarian issues. Stefan Varecka was elected secretary. The assembly also elected a 33-member KP, a control commission, and an audit commission."]

Slovakia: Slota Says Coalition Talks End in Total Agreement

AU1106191396 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Eva Stahlova: "Jan Slota: Essentially, We Have Agreed 100 Percent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Coalition Council conferred at Trencianske Teplice yesterday in the presence of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Chairman Vladimir Meciar, Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota, and Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] Chairman Jan Slota. Pavel Delinga, chairman of the Slovak Farmers Party, also participated in the talks. The aim of the session was to discuss the situation that arose in the wake of the statement by the SNS Central Council, issued at an extraordinary session [in Zilina on 1 June], about the need to expand the Special Supervisory Body [for monitoring secret service activities] and National Property Fund [FNM] bodies with representatives of the opposition. According to information broadcast by yesterday's Radio Twist Journal, besides the known internal coalition problems, the issue of an alleged phone call, of which one of the coalition partners of the ruling HZDS has a tape, was discussed at the meeting as well. The phone call supposedly contains a not very positive evaluation of the SNS's activity by a top government official from HZDS ranks. According to Radio Twist's Journal, the government coalition representatives also dealt with a recent statement by Olga Keltosova, Slovak minister of labor, social affairs, and the family, that the HZDS must try to succeed in the next elections without its current coalition partners SNS and ZRS.

"Essentially, we have come to a 100 percent agreement," SNS Chairman Jan Slota said after the meeting to several journalists who managed to uncover the venue of the top secret talks. He refused to provide any more information, just as his coalition partner Jan Luptak. However, as they were leaving the government villa at Trencianske Teplice, where Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is apparently staying, they both seemed to be very angry. The coalition talks are to continue on Wednesday. Jan Slota also observed that, as far as the prime minister's health is concerned, it seems to be "better."

As CTK managed to ascertain, the tape that Jan Slota brought to the talks contains the recording of a conversation of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Sergej Kozlik that proves his personal involvement in the personnel changes in Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak

Insurance Company], which have triggered the most serious political crisis in the coalition to date—it broke out immediately after personnel changes in the management of this largest financial institution in Slovakia. The gist of the problem dwells in the fact that the old management of Slovenska Poistovna was close to the SNS and the ZRS, while the new one is close to the HZDS.

[Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak on 11 June on page 2, in the "Question For" column, carries the following interview with SNS Chairman Jan Slota by Peter Skorna held after the Coalition Council meeting:

"[Skorna] Have you come to an agreement?

"[Slota] We have made certain compromises, about which I do not want to speak prematurely, however. We will continue in the talks on Wednesday, to which we will also invite experts from all government coalition parties."]

Slovakia: Decentralization Seen as Ploy To Consolidate Power

AU1106194396 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Vladimir Jancura: "Decentralization of Power—HZDS Style"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While, after being returned by the president, the Law on Territorial and Administrative Arrangement is waiting to be debated in the legislature again, the ruling movement is not idle and is expeditiously setting up its new territorial bodies. Last weekend, the delegates of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] constituent assemblies met in the eight projected regions (the progovernment daily writes about newly established (!) regions), including delegates of the disputed [by president] Bratislava Region where the capital of the Slovak Republic forms one entity with districts such as Malacky or Pezinok. Incidentally, it was at this assembly that Augustin Marian Huska [HZDS deputy chairman] hinted at the true intentions of the architects of the public administration reform when he spoke hazily about the "compact unit of the structure that resists the present government coalition." In other words, Bratislava was assigned to one region together with the adjoining towns, first and foremost, to reverse the balance of power on the territory of the capital, which has until now been unfavorable for the government coalition. It will be normalized through the Regional Office and through regional self-administration, in which the first fiddle should be played by HZDS representatives and not by "commissioners who wielded power from the will of the former hegemons in the Slovak Republic" (A.M. Huska).

Of particular importance from this viewpoint are the posts of Regional Office chief and chairman of regional self-administration. It was not by coincidence that Olga Keltosova was assuring delegates to the HZDS regional assembly in Trnava that everything would be done to fill those key positions [with HZDS members]. She came to the assembly straight from the Trencianske Teplice meeting of cabinet ministers, at which they supposedly agreed that Regional Office chiefs would avail themselves of "their own budgets." This would confirm the assumption, voiced at this very place approximately two months ago, that, under the reformed state administration, decisions on distributing funds to towns and villages would be made, to a considerable extent, at the level of the region! This circumstance portends, however, a further escalation of the internal coalition political struggle for positions of power, this time within the framework of "decentralization of power." Mrs. Keltosova herself did not beat about the bush in this respect when she called on the delegates to the Trnava HZDS Assembly on Sunday [9 June] not to let themselves be pushed into the corner by their coalition partners.

Worth mentioning in this context is also the resolution from the Saturday meeting of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] National Board. It protests against pressure on state administration staff to join the HZDS if they want to continue working in the state administration. This appears to be one of the ways of realizing the "open door" policy in expanding the members base that Vladimir Meciar announced at the last nationwide HZDS assembly. This is part and parcel of the preparation of personnel for smoothly mastering a task that is being outwardly passed off as decentralization of power, but which in reality only pursues the aim of further consolidating the HZDS's power positions in the state and in society.

By the way, the SDL is complaining about HZDS practices but itself wants to establish its own new regional bodies only in November or December 1996. Will not everything be over by then?

Slovakia: Dzurinda on 'Scandals,' HZDS Politicians

96CH0089B Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 4 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Mikulas Dzurinda, vice chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, by Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "I Have an Immense Quantity of Indications of Illegal Activities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hrabko] Recently you have been devoting yourself systematically to scandals that it is possible to designate as Gasparovic versus Gasparovic and the air travel by Minister Rezes. Why did you specifically choose the wife of the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic?

[Dzurinda] I am not exactly enthusiastic about my work in this area of politics about which you are inquiring. I am not even enthusiastic about the fact that we are interrogating ministers or key politicians, colleagues, or directly or because of them, their family members. However, even this kind of politics must be accomplished. The citizens have the right to know how their money is being handled. Politics is a public matter, and if I obtain indications of impropriety, even in this area, then I am obligated to publicize them.

[Hrabko] In the case of the wife of the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, however, this is not a matter of indications, but rather a matter of what is documented....

[Dzurinda] Yes. When I spoke of indications, there are always indications in the beginning that must be checked and an attempt must be made to learn certain facts. I can tell the readers of DOMINO EFEKT that I have an enormous quantity of indications dealing with illegal activities. Mrs. Gasparovic and Mr. Rezes are simply the most egregious cases at the moment—and, at the same time, they are the best documented cases—indicating how a politician or his family member is actually conducting himself. Yes, even in the case of Gasparovic versus Gasparovic, or rather Minister Rezes, I have such credible documentation that it gives me the right to tell that which I have hitherto publicized.

[Hrabko] How do you perceive the reaction of the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, who felt impacted by their publication and also mentioned the possibility of requesting that his parliamentary immunity be rescinded?

[Dzurinda] I see this as part of the political game that the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] is playing in Slovakia. The approach is clear—to intimidate, to gag the mouth of anyone who dares tell the truth and his independent opinion, to break any kind of resistance, to fence itself in and to block the influx of information. It was a desperate attempt to divert attention elsewhere. He said he would wait for the results of some kind of court action. I do not know what kind of court action he is talking about—perhaps that the involved corporations, Zelstav A-Z, Ltd., and the Railroad Construction Corporation, Ltd., have massive problems and disputes between them, perhaps even individuals, action officers, co-owners are involved, but that is not of interest to me—this is a problem for those involved in the dispute. I do not understand the relationship between the termination of these possible disputes and the questions that I put on the basis of my own investigation, questions that I put and shall put to Mr. Gasparovic. The questions are very clear; I am asking direct questions regarding the relationship with the law—questions pertaining to the relationship with respect to the Commercial Code, to the prohibition of competition, and with respect to the tax law. I believe that Mr. Gasparovic cannot react to my questions, because he would have to confirm them. Recently, the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement] has moved to a system under which it first publicizes certain matters and only then devotes itself to them in parliament.

[Hrabko] Why is that?

[Dzurinda] Because it is evident that the citizens of this state have and will continue to have the last word. Journalists are the best interpreters of information for the citizens. If the prime minister responds to the interpellation of a KDH delegate by saying that he was walking in town and needed to go to the toilet, if he uses this method to vulgarize and dishonor a democratic element such as the interpellation of a delegate; if we question the prime minister, whose cabinet member signed a bad intergovernmental agreement with Russia on the delivery of nuclear fuel and if I always receive incomplete responses, then it is evident that sometimes government officials tend to ridicule the interpellation of a delegate. That is why we are left only with citizens, with public opinion, and, if we have some verified facts, we do not wait for such responses, but make the effort to relay these facts to journalists who subsequently make them available to the citizens.

[Hrabko] A. Rezes, your successor in the office of minister of transportation, according to various items of information, made the execution of his function more pleasant at a very considerable cost. Why did you not require such luxury conditions?

[Dzurinda] Because I am not a modern-day baron. And we in Slovakia once more have a government that is reminiscent of the government of barons. It seems to me that Minister Rezes is the personification of such a new baronetcy in the Slovak administration. In my view, that which he dared do is unappetizing and disgraceful because, in conjunction with the move of his residence, he actually wasted around 20 million korunas [Sk].

[Hrabko] The most recent disturbance was brought about, however, by information regarding his air travels to Kosice. First, the question as to who is paying for these flights.

[Dzurinda] Yes, this is big money. He should not be laughing at taxpayers—he has a salary of less than Sk30,000 and one flight costs around Sk150,000.

These cavalier manners can, however, be observed in numerous areas. When I found out what kind of games are played involving the buildings of the Slovak Postal Service, the Slovak Telecommunications Facilities, the General Directorate of the Slovak Republic Railroads, when I first told this publicly, the spokesperson for the government called it nonsense. Not even a month had passed and the Postal Directorate is moving to Banska Bystrica. He has now announced that even the General Directorate of the Railroads will be moving, although the building recently underwent renovations—and a computer network was installed that is worth Sk20 million. And so we are actually making fun of our taxpayers and we shall now move this colossal facility somewhere else?

[Hrabko] But what if the aircraft used by Minister Rezes is not paid for by him or the ministry, but if he has it for free? Is this not purely hypothetically the worst possible case?

[Dzurinda] If the minister remains silent, then he provides room for hypothetical questions as well. Yes, even such a possibility undoubtedly exists. But first, there is nothing free in this world, and if the taxpayer does not pay for the purchase of a flight ticket on a Ministry of Transportation flight, then it will be paid for somewhere else. Where, we do not know for the time being. I have no intention of unleashing a great fantasy, but even you know very well that such a ministry has enormous quantities of state orders in its possession. We shall not speak further—let us monitor and we shall see. Second, yes, he can receive the flights as a gift. But we have a law on the conflict of interest that has to do with Mr. Rezes. And the law states that after receiving a gift, a high state official is obligated to report the acceptance of a gift to the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic within 15 days, if the gift is greater than the minimum wage. And today, the minimum wage stands at Sk2,450. Such an announcement is recorded by the committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic as being incompatible with the function in question. I can state that Minister Rezes did not report any gift by 12 March 1996.

Slovakia: Results of HZDS Congress Assessed

96CH0089A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 4 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Karol Wolf: "A One-Man Show"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The generally known party hegemony of Vladimir Meciar, HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] chairman, was confirmed on the occasion of the weekend congress of the movement, which was held in Zvolen. The politically scornful remark, "That was some congress, eh?" could even be addressed to the political opponents of Vladimir Meciar. At the peak summit of today's governors of Slovakia, there was actually not even a "glitch." Not only were the chief of the movement and company confirmed in their functions without a problem, but also this time they had this fact "knocked down" not for one, but for two years.

The HZDS congress resulted only in a minimum of new items, even though they are uninteresting. According to all indications, it is thus necessary to prepare for a change in the election system from a relative system to a majority system and for relatively expressive constitutional changes because the HZDS intends to open a debate on the topic of whether Slovakia prefers a parliamentary, presidential, or chancellor system of power.

With regard to these considerations, only one meaningful remark comes to mind. A majority electoral system is no sacrilege. On the contrary, it is a system that brings the voter closer to the politician and eliminates the possibility of party zeros hiding behind the backs of their front-runners. Similarly, all three mentioned systems of power are fully legitimate and have their images the world over. But there is the caution that the presidential or the chancellor system provide the individual with a greater amount of power than that to which we are accustomed in the parliamentary system. They are better suited to the environment of a well-developed democracy where all democratic institutions are functioning without problems (for example, the courts, the free flow of information, a firm and generally recognized and constitutionally provided division of power authorities, and so forth). It is generally known to what extent Slovakia is responsive to these criteria. It is not difficult to imagine how Vladimir Meciar would conduct himself in the position of chancellor or directly as a "strong" president. Much time could be spent theorizing on this topic—what is certain is that this theorizing would not lead to overly fortuitous conclusions.

For the next two years, the HZDS will not be transforming itself into a party. As A.M. Huska noted justifiably before the congress, "for the present, support at home is more important to us than our exclusively foreign policy contacts." It is impossible not to agree with this view—it simply is so. Another matter is the fact that the citizens of this state will have to be reconciled for two more years with the fact that the leading politicians have no decent friends abroad—but what is more, they do not even want to have them. For the present, they are satisfied with the Socialist Party of Serbia, its counterpart from Montenegro, Russia Our Home, and so forth.

For the HZDS, a transformation into a political party would mean resolving a problem that cannot at present be resolved—the question as to what kind of a party would actually be involved. In other words, this collection of people of a special character would have to state what politics actually is and what it means to them. No need. In addition, it seems required to pose the question, Can you imagine how Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar would define himself in a "standard" political science manner?

The conclusion is clear. Slovak politics will continue to be governed by a popular movement of the provincial type, the existence and success of which continues to be supported here by a strong social order of preference, and such a popular and provincial character will thus also permeate the entire political scene and the entire state.

Another chapter in the Zvolen congress could stand to be dubbed the evergreens of the Slovak political scene. The movement continues to struggle against the organizers of a parliamentary coup in March 1994; it continues to uncover millions in bribes that resulted in the loosening of closed ties within the HZDS, and, finally, the movement continues to persist with its irreconcilable hatred of President Michal Kovac. It is true that there is a difference—that it is most likely giving up its efforts to remove him before March 1998—at least that is what is evident from Meciar's words when he said that we shall have to become accustomed to the present status of communications between constitutional organs. It is questionable whether, on the other hand, Meciar believes that his recall in March 1994 was preceded by millions in bribes or whether this is merely a smoke screen to conceal his actual plans. Those who have experiences involving the prime minister will likely agree that the truth will lie somewhere in the middle.

Meciar's remark on the topic of integration into the EU [European Union] was very noteworthy: "We have declared the fundamental orientation of Slovakia; we have said that we wish to be a member of the EU; we have submitted an application; but we did not prepare the internal developments sufficiently well to unleash an internal discussion so that people could become familiar with the values of the EU and would accept them as their own." I do not know how the domestic discussion was unleashed, but I do know that after our internal development started up, there ensued an intensive debate on the direction we wish to take (see demarche, EP resolution, and so forth).

In conclusion, only the following: The HZDS remains the strongest political formation on the Slovak political scene and Vladimir Meciar remains the strongest person in this field. According to all indications, the movement can be expected to come up with a whole series of innovations with which the political opponents will have to struggle. "The strongest stream" in the broad-spectrum ditch continues to rush with the same force, and its volume is not diminishing.

Hungary: NATO's Voigt Assesses Expansion Prospects

AU1106203296 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 11 Jun 96 pp 1, 9

[Interview with NATO General Assembly Chairman Karsten Voigt by Ferenc Kepecs; place and date not given: "NATO Does Not Want To Bring Nuclear Weapons Into This Region"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kepecs] To what extent did the NATO meeting in Berlin last week contribute to the organization's expansion?

[Voigt] Formally, the meeting in Berlin did not decide on NATO expansion, but the decisions made on the organization's internal reform actually prepared the acceptance of new members. NATO can now develop its European pillar. The concept of multinational standard-weapon units makes it possible for countries that are not NATO members to participate in actions similar to the one in Bosnia, and even to participate in planning such actions. This facilitates the candidates' preparation for full membership.

[Kepecs] Did the creation of the European pillar and forcing the U.S. role in Europe into the background serve as means of soothing Russia to a certain extent?

[Voigt] Let me remind you that, although Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov made a moderate statement in Berlin after the NATO meeting, essentially he continued to oppose the NATO enlargement. We do not expect Russia to revise its position on this matter in the future. However, we hope that Moscow will also cooperate with an enlarged NATO. Moscow is already signaling that, although it continues to oppose this enlargement, certain conditions must be fulfilled for such an enlargement to really take place. These are partially reasonable conditions, but also partially unacceptable ones.

[Kepecs] What Russian conditions can be regarded as reasonable?

[Voigt] For instance, the demand that no nuclear weapons should be deployed on the territory of the new member states and that large contingents of foreign troops should not be deployed there. Actually, nobody in NATO is preparing to do that. It is true, however, that NATO does not wish to make any promises to Russia, as NATO never does that, because this is a matter of NATO and the new members.

[Kepecs] What are the Russian conditions that NATO cannot accept?

[Voigt] Let us take, for example, the Russian demand that we cannot advance NATO's infrastructure close to the Russian borders. If they mean by this that we should not deploy large contingents, military bases, arms storages, or big-capacity military airfields in that area, we can again answer that we do not plan anything like that anyway. But if Moscow means by this that the new NATO members should not have the same rights and obligations as the older ones and that the new ones should be content with some kind of second-rate membership, well, this is unacceptable. The new members must be able to participate with full rights in NATO's general headquarters and its integrated military structure.

[Kepecs] It is clear why NATO is good for us, the countries in eastern-central Europe. But why are we good for NATO?

[Voigt] Each NATO country interprets this differently. Therefore, I would only present what Germany and the United States think about this. Well, the problem of eastern-central Europe has never been its military power. The problem is that the countries neighboring this region are much stronger than the region's countries and that the latter are also competing with each other. This problem cannot be solved by means of a national-type defense policy. If these small countries began to arm themselves, it would not be sufficient against the strong neighbors, but the arms race would further deteriorate their bilateral relations, for example the relations between Hungary and Romania. NATO integration provides a solution to all this: As NATO members, these countries can feel secure even without arming themselves. Thus, NATO enlargement represents some sort of a preventive stabilization step. And this step also serves Pan-European security. We, the Germans, are particularly interested in seeing stability in our region. But the Americans are also interested in European stability, because they were involved in two wars in this century, wars that originated from European instability.

[Kepecs] What does NATO membership mean for the new members from a domestic political viewpoint? Will this guarantee their democratic regimes?

[Voigt] Even in the years of the Cold War, NATO exercised pressure on some member states in defense of democracy. The situation has changed today to the extent that we would no longer accept any country that cannot be regarded as a stable democracy. However, the fact in itself that a country is part of a democratic international organization does not guarantee that problems will not emerge in its domestic policy. This can only be guaranteed within the respective country. Domestic policy cannot be replaced by foreign policy. Of course, NATO membership is some kind of additional guarantee that democracy will prevail in the respective country.

For example, NATO played such a role in post-Franco Spain. However, NATO cannot provide domestic policy guarantees.

Hungary: Aircraft Purchase in Sweden Considered

AU1206091496 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 11 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by "nagy": "Imre Mecs on the Airplane Purchase Plans—A Hasty Decision Might Be Harmful"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of the Parliamentary Defense Committee recently visited Stockholm at the invitation, made 18 months ago, of Swedish deputies. As Committee Chairman Imre Mecs told MAGYAR NEMZET, they held talks in the Parliament, and in the foreign and defense ministries. They also participated in the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Swedish Air Force, at which the king inaugurated the Gripen center, which establishes the foundations of the first Gripen regiment. Obviously, bilateral cooperation was discussed at the talks, including ideas to do with the planned Hungarian purchase of aircraft. The Swedish side wanted to know, among other things, what the reasons were for the Hungarian Government's decision to postpone the purchase. In reply, the Hungarian deputies said that the cabinet would like to wait for NATO's summit, planned for next spring, where a decision will in all probability be made on expansion. Mecs also indicated that the Defense Committee is expecting the Defense Ministry to draw up an overall air defense concept in accordance with the military reform and NATO's requirements. According to Mecs, the government will be in a better position to make a decision in the first quarter of next year. It will be able to advertise the tender in a safer position. He also emphasized that members of the delegation had intended to request the postponement of the decision before the Budapest announcement was made.

The Hungarian deputies also met leaders of the SAAB company, which makes the Gripen aircraft. Mecs held discussions with Peter Wallenberg. Mecs said that the Wallenberg group's recently retired chairman indicated that, for the time being, he is putting a hold on investments in Hungary and on cooperation.

Mecs did not confirm the report, bearing in mind the planned aircraft purchase, the Americans are preparing a better offer. He said that the Wallenberg concern had prepared a rather favorable package for Hungary, and the Americans realized that they could only compete with this if they were also able to offer similar conditions. Mecs said it was speculation to say, as some have, that in the competition for the purchase of aircraft, the Americans are promising NATO membership, while the Swedes are promising stronger support for EU admission if Hungary decides in favor of their offer. He said that this cannot even be discerned from the mood of the talks. Mecs believes that too early and inadequately considered decisions can only make matters worse.

Hungary: Office To Investigate Serious Economic Crime

LD1006142296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It seems that the prime minister has got his own way after all regarding the matter of the central investigative office. There will be an office, except it will not be called that. Judit Laszlo reports:

[Laszlo] The prime minister told correspondents on his way out from the meeting of the National Security Council that the ministers had agreed to the proposal submitted to the council. [Prime Minister] Gyula Horn did not give any details but it is clear that the proposal of the prime minister's office was drawn up mainly based on the ideas of the Interior Ministry about setting up a central investigative office.

According to this proposal, the central directory for combating crime [kozponti buenueldozesi igazgatosag] will be set up within the National Police Headquarters with the participation of employees dealing with economic protection and organized crime for the purpose of investigating serious economic crimes. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Finance Ministry's Proposed 1997 Budget Examined

AU1106204096 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Jun 96 pp 1, 9

[Article by Marton Nehez-Posony: "Strict Budget for 1997—The Interest Takes Away the Surplus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A strict budget can again be expected next year—according to our information, this can be seen from the Finance Ministry's proposal on the 1997 budget guidelines which the government will discuss in the near future. According to the draft, it is necessary to dismiss 9,000 people in September 1996 and 13,000 people from January 1997 in the budget sector.

Without privatization incomes and interest payments, the state administration is to produce a 295-billion-forint [Ft] income surplus next year which is 3.7 percent of the GDP. According to other sources, the interest payments will amount to at least Ft650 billion; together with these and calculating with an Ft8,000-billion GDP, the deficit will be at least 4.4 percent in 1997.

State support for the local governments (together with the personal tax reallocation) can increase to 6 percent in 1997. A 4-percent staff reduction (affecting 20,000 people) is planned at the local governments.

According to the draft, the tax revenue returned to the local authorities would increase from 36 to 38 percent but, within this, the section remaining at the place of collection would be reduced from 25 to 22 percent. All in all, the annual balance of local governments will show a Ft10-billion deficit next year.

In the area of social insurance, the Finance Ministry is expecting a Ft1.9-billion deficit in 1997. The draft states that the employers' social insurance contribution has to be reduced by 2.5 percent, and even then the central budget support for social insurance cannot exceed Ft12 billion. According to the draft, a zero-balance has to be achieved at the designated central financial funds but the attached calculations show a Ft12-billion deficit. The funds would not receive direct budget support next year.

The draft treats the reduction of inflation and interest rates as a priority because this is the only way the state debt can be managed. Central budget expenditure has to be reduced to less than 50 percent of the GDP so that financing the deficit can be solved from the savings rather than at the detriment of loans to be given to entrepreneurs. On the income side, they recommend a 4 percent reduction in relation to the GDP, this way, the level of revenue from income tax, contributions, and customs would be reduced.

In addition to the additional resources necessary for the fight against the black economy, the development of public security, membership in the EU, and the significantly increased central investments, the draft gives emphasis to expanding the central resources for higher education. According to the draft, it would be justified to raise the school fees by 50 percent in September 1997.

Wage Increase With Dismissals

Support for the budget institutions can increase by 6 percent altogether (Ft25 billion). According to the proposal, to increase the wage level of public employees and civil servants by 17 percent, it is necessary to dismiss 9,000 people in September 1996 and 13,000 from January 1997. A special reserve of Ft4 to 5 billion is planned for the redundancy payments. The Finance Ministry expects the institutions' own income to increase and their material expenses to slightly decrease. They find it necessary to decrease the amount of services, tasks, and institutions.

In the area of welfare policy support, the draft expects the total expenditure to decrease in real terms (Ft220 billion would be allocated to this in 1997 instead of this year's Ft200 billion). The income limit for eligibility for family supplement would not change, but it is suggested that it be paid only for children who can be classed as true dependents. Through this, the supplement can be increased by an average monthly Ft200. All in all, the Finance Ministry can see a possibility for an average monthly Ft500 to Ft700 supplement increase if Parliament approves the necessary Ft4-billion budget for this.

Within the support of economic organizations, the amount of agricultural support would increase by Ft8 billion compared to this year's target. However, within this, export support would decrease from Ft32.3 billion to Ft18.3 billion, and the agricultural market support would increase from Ft5 billion to Ft23.9 billion. The nominal value of support for privately financed house-building would not increase; it would be at around Ft33 to Ft36 billion. Because of the former guarantees, the Finance Ministry urges moderation in the area of state guarantees and finds it justifiable that no more than 2 percent of the overall expenditure should be allocated to this purpose.

20-to-42-Percent Personal Tax Keys

The draft says that to reduce the level of taxes, customs duties, and social insurance contributions, exemptions have to be reduced, the bases for the personal tax and social insurance contribution have to be brought closer together, and as much illegal income as possible should be channeled into the legal sphere. In the case of personal taxation, the dual tax table has to be abolished—without reestablishing the 0 key—but in the case of wage income, they would implement a limited tax refund in proportion of the wage (also during the year, when advance tax is paid). According to our information, the Finance Ministry considers a 1.5-percent average reduction of the tax burden realistic. According to the plans, the tax table keys would be between 20 and 42 percent.

The system of personal taxation would again be based on individual taxation, but elements of family taxation could also be implemented. The proposal says that a tax refund of Ft1,000 could be requested per dependent per month, without income limit.

In the Finance Ministry's view, tax on the dividends paid for work has to be coordinated with the keys of personal taxation and the average tax burden. According to one possible solution, a 20 percent linear dividend tax would be put on incomes removed from enterprises which are lower than 52 percent of the own assets. Dividend income above this would have a 27 percent tax and social insurance contribution. According to the other version, dividends exceeding 52 percent of their own assets would come under progressive personal tax from which the company tax for this section of the assets could be deducted. In the case of individual entrepreneurs, it would be possible to remove 50 percent of the income that comes under tax and social insurance contribution from the enterprise free of charge.

Company Car Tax?

Therefore, tax on dividends and exchange rate gains, and tax deducted at source would increase from the current 10 to 20 percent. For the time being, referring to a former government decision, they are not suggesting increasing the current 0 percent key of the interest tax. (This decision was made by the prime minister, in coordination with the finance minister, rather than by the government—editor's note.) However, in the long run, they would find this measure justified because an interest tax lower than 5 percent would not significantly reduce the savings while every percent brings Ft1.5 to 2 billion for the budget.

The Finance Ministry would make it possible for enterprises to include the depreciation of company cars among the costs. However, in exchange, a "company car tax" would be levied. The ministry finds the tax exemption of agricultural small-scale producers up to an income of 1 million forints an unjustifiable preference, for this reason, while maintaining the preference, it suggests two alternatives. Small-scale producers would get a taxation card, and the current allowance would either be calculated on the basis of income derived from the balance of incomes and expenses proved by bills and recorded on this card, or they would pay a flat-rate tax on a proportion of the income to be defined by law.

Hungary: Official Views Bank Privatization Prospects

AU1106112096 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 10 Jun 96 p 8

[Interview with Miklos Pulai, general secretary of the Hungarian Banking Federation, by Laszlo Gergely; place and date not given: "Bank Privatization and Its Chances"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The political and professional public speaks less about bank privatization these days, probably because the evaluations of parliamentary deputies who examine the consolidation are louder. The cash guarantee of 5.5 billion forints [Ft] for the fusion of Mezobank also received more attention than the finance minister's announcement that the Finance Ministry will not consider anything else but professional interests in the course of privatizing the banks; the other tasks fall within the jurisdiction of the State Privatization and Asset Management Corporation [APV Rt]. As is well known, the owner state is bound by law to sell the majority of its bank shares within a given time; therefore, it is not useless to clearly see the "goods."

[Gergely] With regard to the heritage of past years and to consolidation, are the "rest" capable of recovering and becoming marketable in a way that the almost simultaneous offer does not make business hopes unrealistic?

[Pulai] There are no longer many banks that should participate in the privatization. The Hungarian Credit Bank Ltd, the Commercial and Credit Bank Ltd, the Mezobank, and some smaller ones are awaiting privatization. The banks that participated in consolidation are now in the difficult process of adjustment, and the fact that most of these financial institutions have become profitable shows that this program is carried out successfully. They became profitable because they cleared their portfolios, settled their credit losses, restructured their system, reduced their personnel, and reduced their expenses.

[Gergely] The continuation could be decisive in the case of the big banks too.

[Pulai] The big question is whether the banks should stay at their current level or should increase their activity, as this is the ambition of every honest enterprise. The best thing would be to carry out a privatization involving capital growth. A situation might develop by the end of this year in which the ongoing preparatory talks are followed by talks involving serious partners with serious intentions. We have good reasons to believe that the year 1996 will not be worse than the previous year, and thus it is definitely not impossible to normally prepare and even carry out privatization this year. [passage omitted]

[Gergely] Within a given time, the state will largely withdraw from the banking system. What positions could emerge in the wake of this ownership change?

[Pulai] The banks really working on a business basis will not be state property; at most 15 percent will be state owned. Some special institutions will make an exception, like the Eximbank, the Land Credit Institute, and the financial institution that also helps the state's structural policy: The Hungarian Development Bank will emerge from the Hungarian Investment and Development Bank next year. The National Savings Bank is a rather special case, because it represents one-third of the banking sector and even 70 percent in certain business sectors. It seems certain that it will carry out a capital growth from time to time in order to preserve its share. The banks that have shown considerable dynamism lately—the Postabank, the CIB, the Unicbank, and others—are expected also to show strong activity in the future. Thus, the banking system will have a uniform ownership structure: a considerable foreign and also a considerable Hungarian share but, with the exception of some special banks, the state will only have small share in some of those banks.

Hungary: National Bank's Financial Losses Deplored

AU1006095196 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 7 Jun 96 p 7

[Editorial by Janos Earsi: "Who Will Foot the Bill?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that the agreement with the IMF will have to be revised, and if so, this is the best case. It seems that we cannot keep the promise of a 4 percent budget deficit for this year and 5 percent for next year. According to government officials, the problem lies in the interest expenses and related Hungarian National Bank [MNB] losses. However, the fact that without interest expenses, budget incomes are higher than budget expenses, shows the "real performance" of the budget. In this respect, officials promise a surplus of 4.5 percent of the GDP this year as well as the next.

One can understand from this evaluation that the financial leaders want to hide the fact they gave up the Bokros-style rapid deficit reduction and the idea of trying to reach the miraculous Maastricht threshold of a 3 percent deficit as early as next year. Further rapid reduction in the deficit seems to be impossible: Take the state of social security, or of the severance payments that the state apparatus has to carry out, a state apparatus that is facing further streamlining. Or take the local government bodies that will most probably start spending money the moment they take possession of their gas and electric power shares.

One thing is impossible to understand: If the budget interest expenses are the problem, where are the interest savings? Where are the 23 billion forints [Ft] hastily distributed for developing exports and the provinces, for health-care restructuring, land registries, agriculture, culture, and so on? People here say that this Ft23 billion is the fruit of privatization income. However, first, the large-scale privatization at the end of 1995 led to both interest savings and a State Privatization and Asset Management [APV] guarantee—or state guarantee—of Ft300 billion. Second, the surplus is an interest burden, and we will have to explain this to the IMF; this is the other side of the same coin, namely the interest saving deriving from privatization income. Both elements are a heritage of the past: There are both profits and even bigger losses involved in this.

The MNB deficit will reach Ft50 billion in the first half of this year, and the finance minister expects a deficit of Ft70 million in 1996 as a whole. Part of this deficit emerged as a result of privatization income and other capital inflow: The MNB exchanged this money into forints and, in order to "siphon down" the accumulated funds, issued state bonds and thus gave up the interest on these bonds. And this loss of interest was not included in the ominous Ft23 billion! The MNB also makes "sacrifices" when it repays the foreign debt, because it buys the necessary funds for forints and then "siphons down" the forints, that is, it again gives up its valuable state bonds.

Halting inflation and financial stability also cost money! When the MNB makes "sacrifices" to achieve financial stability, it is actually the public that pays: The budget—that is, the taxpayers—has to pay for the MNB losses, although footing the bill can be postponed by increasing the state debt. The forint is increasingly losing its value, so paying the state debt back is more costly than at the time we received the loan. This is also a loss, but its burden has been rolled further through the technique of state debt without interest. This now appears at the MNB, but the budget will share the easing of this by paying tremendous amounts of interest. Actually, the public is losing from devaluation. Just like the accumulated and currently privatized property, the accumulated and partially repaid debt is also a heritage of the past. Where is the interest savings in all this?

Who will foot the bill after all? Here is the Ft23 billion "who knows what" (because it is not interest savings), and the various lobbies and apparatuses can prepare bills for it.

Economic plan figures are redrawn and, along with the slower growth and less successful halt in inflation than promised, the interest burden also occupies its real place. We do not understand why they only acted now. Why did we fail to sign a realistic agreement with the IMF?

B-H: Serb Prime Minister Rules Out Bosnian Reintegration

LD1206141296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1026 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 12 Jun (SRNA)—People must understand that the reintegration of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is out of the question, even if it means that we become economic victims of Western policies, Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the [Bosnia] Serb Republic, told [the Bosnian Serb newspaper] OSLOBODJENJE.

Klickovic described the Dayton agreement as "a medley of policies, declarations, and wishes," and went on to reiterate that the Serb Republic would observe the agreement and would preserve "all the characteristics of a state within the loose union of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Refugee centers in the Serb Republic must be disbanded before the winter and the refugees settled in their own homes, he said. [passage omitted]

Speaking about the demobilization of soldiers, Klickovic said the government would instruct firms not damaged in the war to take back their employees and give them back their old jobs.

The prime minister singled out Serb Sarajevo as an area where certain industrial facilities would have to be sited to help economic revitalization.

We plan to build residential estates on the fringes of Serb Sarajevo to resettle the population that experienced the ordeal of exodus, Gojko Klickovic told OSLOBODJENJE.

B-H: 'Eyewitnesses' Claim U.S. Platoon 'Encountered Mladic'

AU1106202596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to eyewitnesses' reports, a U.S. platoon arrived on Bosnian Serb controlled territory yesterday and encountered a group of Bosnian Serb soldiers who were training in the vicinity of Ratko Mladic's main headquarters. The Serb soldiers detained the Americans until General Mladic ordered them to leave.

As it is known, the NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina have the task of detaining all suspected war criminals who are sought by the Hague Tribunal. The U.S. Implementation Force [IFOR] press spokesman denied reports that the IFOR members in question were Americans and that they encountered Mladic.

B-H: Karadzic Reported Still in Pale; Security 'Intensified'

AU1206132296 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Karadzic in 'FAMOS'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Serb Republic is still in Pale, in his cabinet in the FAMOS factory. The security around the factory has been intensified, and the building is being protected by a large number of members of the interior ministry's special units and by well-trained dogs.

It is obvious that Radovan Karadzic has decided to remain in Pale, and not go into hiding, and—as VESTI has found out—he has rejected a suggestion by his close associates to go to Banja Luka, where the chances of his arrest are much smaller.

B-H: Pale at 'Boiling Point' Over Possible Karadzic Arrest

AU1206133396 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by M. Kusmuk: "Americans Preparing Assault on Pale"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The atmosphere in Pale has reached boiling point over the last few days as the citizens of the Serb Republic capital can see with the naked eye that the "peace forces" are soon going to try and arrest Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic.

It is plain to see that the number of Implementation Force [IFOR] soldiers has increased, their transporters are deployed at almost every intersection, and, for four days now, three transporters have been stationed in the center of this town near the most-frequented cafe, the BBC (near the government building). A great number of combat vehicles has been passing daily through Pale and its vicinity. NATO helicopters have been flying five to six sorties every day over the capital of the Serb Republic.

Five transporters with well-equipped crews are located on the Han-Derventa intersection, 4 km from Pale, on the only road that links Pale with Yugoslavia and the west of the Serb Republic. The soldiers are well-armed, with flak jackets and helmets, and, last night, they checked every car that was coming from Pale and let through without stopping those on their way to Pale.

The psychological pressure on the citizens of Pale is intensifying, and they are getting increasingly nervous. They no longer view IFOR soldiers with a benevolent eye. The people passing by them turn their heads away and mutter a few swear words at them.

Sources close to IFOR are announcing the possibility of President Karadzic's arrest, which should be carried out by special U.S. assault units. To judge by the atmosphere in Pale, one can conclude that, if IFOR attempts to arrest President Karadzic, the people's resistance will be fierce.

B-H: Psychological Profile of Karadzic

96BA0310A Sarajevo DANI in Serbo-Croatian May 96 pp 74-76

[Excerpt of article by Miljenko Jergovic: "Write the Way You Shoot"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the early summer of 1990 Radovan Karadzic was a member of the initiating committee to establish the Greens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The newspapers record his having said at the time that as a human being he resisted limitation of a man to his nationality and that in multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina he could not be a member of an ethnic party.

The Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] was established a month later, and Radovan Karadzic was elected its president. I never expected people to be consistent, especially if they are having problems with the work they would like to do, and Karadzic was having problems with poetry. Aside from that, after the definitive fall of communism, we found ourselves in a kind of vacuum, in an open field where every man, this time without the help of the party committee, had to find to find his place. In that sense it was only a step from the Greens to the nationalists, a step easy to take, since post-communist society did not resist inversions and contraversions. Everyone, every individual, had an opportunity to alter his spiritual position and the coordinates of his life, just as one changes his dwelling after a natural disaster has destroyed his house or apartment. And communism in our country was not brought down by the logic of internal changes in society and people, but it was brought down as a consequence of a quiet and tender natural disaster. Put simply, after Tito died, the Berlin wall was destroyed, the Soviet empire fell, all the institutions of the system collapsed in the shouting and hollering, and communism had to disappear. The second thing is that at the same time from the east, from Belgrade, Milosevic's national-communist machinery was set in motion and saw the fall of communism as an opportunity for destroying federal Yugoslavia and for establishing an ethnically pure national state of the Serbian people which would occupy a major part of the dying Yugoslav federation.

Confused and Lost In his first speeches Karadzic gave the impression of being confused and lost, as though he were embarrassed for some reason or as though someone had tricked him into becoming the head of the Serbian party. As though he had come to the party headquarters of the Greens, but overnight someone had played a trick and changed the name on the door. From time to time he would even speak out of that same sentiment and in the same way as in the Assembly of the Writers' Association of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But as time passed and as he made speeches more and more frequently, he freed himself more and more of the ties which had bound him, his voice was becoming rougher, and the division of people into Serbs, Croats, and Muslims was becoming clearer. In the fall of 1990 immediately before the first multiparty election, he was already talking about the threat to the Serbian people, the Battle of Kosovo, World War II, ustasha atrocities, and the intention of the Serbs not to let go of a single foot of soil where they lived. He set up a logic whereby it was more relevant to the future of a city to have decisions made by the three percent who were Serbs than the 97 percent who were Muslims and Croats. He learned to raise his voice, and the whole world was his.

In November of that year he met friends of his who did not understand what had happened to Karadzic. They believed at first that there was some mistake that would soon be corrected and that the same old Radovan would emerge once again. After that they began to tell stories about Karadzic's secret collaboration with police and military espionage services at a time when he represented himself as good and normal, at a time when he was a real friend of theirs. In the end they concluded that he had gone mad. It was still an entire year before the war.

I do not believe that Karadzic went mad or that he underwent a fundamental change. Only the circumstances changed, and this is best and most precisely confirmed by his rapid development from environmentalist to Nazi. That is, it does not seem to me that it makes sense to divide people into good and bad, nor into those who have in themselves the potential to become Hitlers, Stalins, and Karadzices, and other people who can only be their victims. Potential criminals, potential initiators of the 'final solution' are walking the streets of all the world's cities every day. The biggest anti-Semites are inviting their Jewish friends to Sunday lunch, since Hitlers take pleasure in small things, children's drawings, and little songs about nature and spring. Stalins go skiing in the Alps. Watch them breathe on their fingers blue with the cold as they wait for the lift to take them to the top of the mountain. When the father of a young Dante scholar, an instructor at Sarajevo University, died, his older colleague, a professor and Shakespeare expert, was the first to contact him. He offered him every assistance. He brought people to the Muslim payer for the dead in his car. He stood crushed by the open grave where the hodja was reciting the Islamic prayer for the dead. Just half a year later that professor, Shakespeare expert, fired from artillery guns on his young colleague, Dante expert, and talked about the 'ethnic recomposition' which was meant as an academic euphemism for genocide. And about how that could happen.

The answer is pitifully simple. There is a great deal less strategy and planning in a great crime than in an altogether ordinary and petty murder for gain. One need only recognize that moment when under external or internal pressures society is ceasing to honor legal norms. Radovan Karadzic developed into a criminal step by step, doing what was allowed. So long as there existed coercion which set down the legal principles, he was a legalist. He did not want to be an asocial character behaving outside social norms. He was in fact very similar to the man in your neighborhood whom you meet every morning on the stairs and whose nationality you perhaps do not even know. You will learn it only at the apocalyptic moment when all the restraints give way and when law and the structures which guarantee it and implement it cease to be standards of social behavior. Personal and social morality are utterly unimportant to this story. They can be talked about only so long as there is legality and a law-governed state aside from everything else. Without that, personal and social morality become a sterile and miserable monopoly of victims who are usually very confused by the fact that someone has put a knife to their throat. The obstacle to that knife, it is worth repeating once again, is not morality, but legislation and the legal system.

Radovan During Bairam

I met Radovan Karadzic only once after he became president of the SDS. His chauvinism was already on the rise, but he still was not brandishing a weapon. Again it was spring or perhaps late winter 1991. A reception for Bairam had been organized in the offices of a Muslim-Bosniak organization. He appeared with Momcilo Krajisnik and three bodyguards. The hosts treated him courteously. Thus Radovan was conversing with the political leaders of his future victims. I watched him from a safe distance. I had no intention of greeting him. First of all, I loathed him since his threats frightened me, and aside from that I had already written several articles in the newspapers in which I insulted and ridiculed him up and down. Perhaps it is a pity that I did not hear what they were talking about, although the reason and sense of the conversation were clear to me. That is, always and everywhere politicians have the illusion that protocol is as important as the Holy Mass to a priest. Protocol called for Radovan Karadzic to be invited to the Bairam reception. Likewise, politicians believe that political strategy is above all morality and decency, and that is why they accept enmity as someone's strategy (otherwise would European parliamentarians in Strasbourg sit in the same benches with Zhirinovsky? The capacity for a nonchalant and relaxed conversation with one's political enemy, who is a chauvinist, is referred to in politics as tolerance, but only until war breaks out. Then the same thing is referred to retroactively as naivete, stupidity, collaboration.... If by some chance Hitler had not attacked Great Britain and France, i.e., if his appetite for conquest had turned eastward for tactical reasons, Chamberlain and Daladier would have been called politicians of genius and what is written today about Churchill would have been written about them, and Churchill would probably have been called an insane warmonger. Had he not evaded the peace agreements too frequently, Radovan Karadzic would have been an esteemed and equal partner in all the talks throughout European political and intellectual salons, regardless of the genocide which he passionately carried out. He probably would not be invited to Bairam receptions unless they were organized by some Western peacenik who with the noble objective of reconciliation would invite Karadzic to drink and sup on the national specialties of his corpses.

The picture of criminals, unfortunately, is not what those who experienced the crime or those who have testified to it from various scientific and artistic angles would have us believe. Radovan Karadzic, that 'doctor of souls,' who had been known to calm down the Bosnian literary society when it was carried away with anarchoid exaltation, is today in the same place and in the same spiritual and historical space as Adolf Hitler. That is why I am readier to believe the portayal of Hitler as a man who loved children and dogs (Radovan once had a cat in his Sarajevo apartment), than to believe that he was as mad and hysterical as he is represented today. Mad and hysterical people can only commit individual crimes. Those great and most horrible crimes of genocide and holocaust were set in motion and carried out by amiable and likeable people whom the absence of social norms and the deaf ear turned by the entire planet enabled to realize all the darkness of their souls. The difference between Karadzic and Hitler is only that Karadzic had a smaller murder machine (human of course). Both of them murdered without any doubts and with no hesitation at all. They murdered until the last breath, to the end of their strength. It is no longer important how much people are willing to acknowledge this and how many there will be to the end of time who will find reasons to justify the crimes, to relativize them, or to attribute them to mad men, psychopaths, and maniacs. It is difficult to accept that a murderer is like unto oneself, and it is not important that he was a poor poet or a poor painter, nor that he was a better grandmother to his son than your parents could have been, but in the end one must nevertheless acknowledge it. Crime does not come from Hell, nor does a criminal know anything about Hell. The young Dante expert, who is working today in Paris as an interior painter, was named Muhamed.

B-H: Pejanovic, OSCE Representatives Discuss Human Rights

AU1106180796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and chairman of the Serbian Civic Council, received representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], with whom he discussed the upcoming elections, the situation regarding the human rights, and stability in the region.

It is a common attitude that it is necessary to hold the elections, but, as Pejanovic pointed out, the elections will not legitimize extremists who will be working for the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather the elections will bring about a new democratic, cooperative political structure. Speaking about the situation regarding human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pejanovic said that the human rights of refugees and their right to return are particularly endangered and that ethnic segregation has been carried out in the Serb entity and on the territory under the control of the Croatian Defense Council. He added that special organizations and foundations for the protection of human rights should be set up.

B-H: Prlic Comments on Failure To Sign Arms Control Accord

LD1106224496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Let us hear what Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic said in Oslo about the failure to sign the agreement on arms control:

[Begin Prlic recording] We are in the same position as when we arrived in Oslo. Instead of a signing ceremony we have reopened what is basically a political question of how and in what way to present the sides which are to sign this agreement. This is clearly a fairly major political issue. No matter in what variant we present it, there is one side which is not prepared to sign the agreement. During the afternoon, contacts took place between President Alija Izetbegovic and U.S. Secretary of State Christopher and we are now awaiting the results of these talks. [passage omitted]

We are prepared to sign. All the other details of the agreement have been fully agreed and this agreement is of great importance for all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. With this agreement, the embargo on arms imports is lifted and it also makes possible the beginning, or continuation, of the Train and Equip program in the federal army. [end recording]

B-H: Sarajevo Refusal To Sign Arms Agreement Reported

LD1206135396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1323 GMT 12 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Oslo, June 12 (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Muslim government in Sarajevo refused to sign an arms control agreement for the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Gen. Vigleik Eide, who chaired the meeting in Oslo, said on Wednesday morning.

The Norwegian general briefed reporters on the outcome of marathon negotiations and said the Sarajevo government persistently refused to sign the agreement in which the Republika Srpska was treated as an equal signatory side.

The Sarajevo government maintains that such a status would allegedly mean the beginning of the recognition of the statehood of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Eide said, however, that the political dispute was a 'political sidetrack' because the disputed part fo the agreement text is the same as that used in the Dayton peace accord, which was also signed by the Muslim side.

Eide called it a success the support offered by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, the Sarajevo government, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska to the document agreed through six-month negotiations in Vienna.

The Dayton peace agreement stipulates that the arms control agreement should be signed six months after the signing of the peace accords, that is on Tuesday, june 11, at 22:00 hours GMT.

The signing ceremony in Oslo was planned to take place on Tuesday morning in the presence of the member-states of the five-nation Contact Group (Great Britain, Russia, United States, France and Germany).

The latest deadline for the signing of the arms control agreement is June 20, Eide said, adding that talks would continue on several levels.

Some progress is quite likely to be made in Florence on Thursday at a ministerial meeting of the signatories of the Dayton agreement and international mediators.

The Yugoslav delegation at the Oslo meeting, which started on Tuesday morning, was headed by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic.

Circles close to the Yugoslav delegation said that it was highly important not to restart the negotiations from the very beginning given that 99 percent of the agreement had been agreed upon and that that it would be not only detrimental to the arms control issue but the entire peace process as well.

B-H: Muratovic Refuses To Sign Demarcation Accord

AU1206163096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has refused to sign an agreement reached at extended negotiations of the commission for demarcation between the entities, the IFOR [Implementation Force] spokesman, Major Simon Haselock, stated at today's news conference in Sarajevo.

We are confused by this sudden refusal, because he was quite satisfied with the accords earlier. So far, Muratovic has not given us any explanation, Haselock said. He added that the Serb and Croat officials were ready to sign the agreement. We shall consider the further course of our action, and General Walker will soon present his attitudes to Gen. Smith on this question, Haselock said.

B-H: IFOR Spokesman Explains IEBL Demarcation Process

AU1106195296 Paris AFP in English 1918 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 11 (AFP)—Armed with six-inch (20 cm) nails and a hammer, former enemies in Bosnia-Herzegovina will start symbolically marking out their territory on Monday, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) said Tuesday.

They will be marking a line between the two entities into which the former Yugoslav republic has been divided—the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Serbs' Republika Srpska [Serb Republic].

"The procedure is simplicity itself," IFOR spokesman Max Marriner told journalists.

"A survey party and one representative of each side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) will travel over the next three months along the length of the agreed section. At various points...they will agree on he mark for the IEBL," he said.

At 447 places on the over 1,000 kilometre (620 mile) long line, the small team will plant a nail to finalise the agreement between the Federation and the Republika Srpska on a series of disputed points.

The operation is due to begin on June 17 and will last three months. The line will then be officially entered in maps of the country.

"One of the parties will hold a six-inch nail while the other hits it with a hammer. It is very symbolic," Marriner said.

"This union will symbolise the acceptance of the location of the IEBL by both the parties."

The nail will then be taken out of the ground so there will be no physical indication of the line—which the international community insists is not a frontier.

The line marks territory controlled by the Federation—in total 51 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina—and that controlled by the Republika Srpska—49 percent. It will be 1,097 kilometres (681 miles) long and there are still a number of unresolved disputes over an area of 80 kilometres (48 miles).

The most contentious are in Dobrinja, a suburb of Sarajevo, which was under Serb control during the war but which is now partially under Federation control. The line there crosses buildings and even apartments.

B-H: IFOR Denies Alleged Deal on Muslim Takeover of Brcko

AU1106190996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1549 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 June (BETA)—Today in Sarajevo representatives of the Implementation Force [IFOR] assessed as "completely unfounded" the news launched by the Pale media that the international community and IFOR had agreed with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army that the Muslims should take over the territory in the Brcko region, the city of Brcko and a territory north of the road Kljuc-Jajce.

According to the Sarajevo-based news agency ONASA, IFOR speaker in Sarajevo Max Mariner said at a news conference that it was very likely that the state media in the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina were "playing on citizens' fear," assessing this as a "cynical manipulation."

He expressed hope that this information will be revised.

B-H: Germany's Ruehe: IFOR Troops To Remain Until Jan

*AU1206080496 Paris AFP in English
0751 GMT 12 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, June 12 (AFP)—German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe announced Wednesday [12 June] that troops of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia would remain there until January.

"For technical reasons, there will be (NATO-led Implementation Force) soldiers on the ground until January 1997," he told journalists.

"IFOR (Implementation Force) must remain operational until the end of its mandate, namely December 19," Ruehe said.

He said the "deployment level will remain practically unchanged until mid-September."

B-H: UK General Disputes U.S. Estimates of Islamic Fighters

*LD1106163296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1510 GMT 11 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 11 June (SRNA)—General Michael Walker, commander of IFOR [Implementation Force] ground forces in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, told reporters in Ilidza that "foreign Islamic fighters are still present in former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The U.S. State Department claims that only "four" Islamic soldiers remain in former Bosnia-Herzegovina while IFOR intelligence sources claim that the number is considerably higher.

"I do not know where the State Department got this figure. They certainly did not get it from me," the British general said.

According to Walker, there are no organized foreign units, but "what we have is clear evidence of their presence."

According to IFOR intelligence sources, between 100 and 200 Islamic jihad warriors, mujahidin, remain in Bosnia. [passage omitted]

B-H: EU Asks IFOR To Increase Security for Mostar Elections

*AU1106165396 Paris AFP in English
1612 GMT 11 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 11 (AFP)—The European Union has asked the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) to boost security in the southern town of Mostar before elections there, a senior EU official said Tuesday.

The elections on June 30 will be the first post-war polls in Bosnia and are being organised by the European Union which has run the town since 1994.

"We are currently trying to establish some coordination with IFOR to put in place the necessary security conditions for the elections to be held," senior European official Klaus Metscher told AFP.

He said this was necessary in the light of recent "incidents."

"People are frightened and they want to be perfectly safe when they go to the polling stations to vote," he added.

The EU administrator of Mostar, Ricardo Perez Casado, pledged recently that the municipal elections in Mostar "will take place even if there are regular incidents" in the town.

One person was wounded in an exchange of fire in the Moslem-controlled east of the town last week. Mostar has been divided between Croats and Moslems since 11 months of fighting ended in 1994.

Yet despite an attack by Moslems on a car with Croat number plates last week, most recent incidents have been between people of the same community.

European police based in Mostar say the motive is often political. They add that the atmosphere remains tense less than three weeks before the elections are due to be held.

The elections were originally due to take place on May 31 but were postponed after an agreement was reached to allow refugees to vote. Six Moslem-dominated parties had threatened a boycott over the issue.

B-H: EU Rejects Mostar Opposition Parties' 'Joint List'

*AU1106192296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1620 GMT 11 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 Jun—The EU Electoral Commission in Mostar rejected the candidacy put forward by the newly formed coalition of opposition parties comprised of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats (UBSD), the Croatian Peasants' Party (HSS), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Republican Party, and the Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO).

The coalition was named "The Joint List of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and it tried yesterday to put forward its candidates for the 30 June elections, because it thought that it was the last day for applications, its representatives said at today's press conference in Mostar. However, representatives of the five opposition parties claim that the EU Electoral Commission's offices in Mostar were closed yesterday and that none of the organization's representatives, including Mostar Administrator Peres Casado, could be reached.

The only information a representative of the "Joint List" managed to get from an EU clerk is that yesterday had been the last day for submitting candidate lists.

The deadline for submitting lists is 20 days prior to the elections, and the representatives of five opposition parties say that they will not accept mathematics according to which 30 minus 20 makes nine, and that the last day could not be 9 June, but rather 10 June. [sentence as received]

"The Joint List of Bosnia-Herzegovina" has lodged a protest with all international organizations involved in implementing the Dayton agreement, as well as with the U.S. Embassy and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The representatives of the coalition assessed that they have been eliminated from the electoral race because somebody fears "people who represent neither the policy of Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action [SDA] nor Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]."

They explained that they had decided to submit the list on the last day because "every day on the opposition list presents a danger to the lives of its candidates." They said, moreover, that Mostar citizens for whom it was rumored they would be on the list had already been threatened.

The coalition's representatives rejected the possibility that they had been excluded from the list because the ruling parties had pressured Casado and expressed hope that the EU commission would change its decision.

EU sources told BETA that there is a great chance of the "misunderstanding being cleared up" which means that the newly formed coalition might after all participate in the 30 June elections.

The Mostar coalition list should be headed by Josip Jole Musa. It also includes former Bosnia-Herzegovina Defense Minister Jerko Doko and former UJDI [expansion unknown] member Zelimir Rebac and others.

B-H: Liberals Deny Reports of SDA Talks on Mostar Coalition

AU1106184896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At an emergency news conference called today, the Liberal Party of Bosnia-Herzegovia has denied the news published yesterday that it had taken part in talks on forming coalition lists with the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO] for the municipal elections in Mostar.

The secretary general of the party, Hasib Salkic, said that the misunderstanding had come about due to imprecise talks on the different levels at which the Mostar elections are to be carried out. The misunderstanding was cleared up yesterday, and our candidates have withdrawn, of which all the electoral commissions in the city have been informed, Salkic added. The Liberal Party is sticking to its attitude that it supports the Mostar list of citizens for a unified Mostar, hoping that this will be a significant step toward the unification of Mostar and the return of all Mostar refugees to their city.

B-H: Commentary Criticizes Clinton for 'Rushing' Elections

AU1206104396 Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 96 p 9

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "American Haste"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is becoming more and more difficult to decipher the policy the United States wants to install in Bosnia. Washington analysts are no more unanimous in that job. The differences in their assessment have deepened following the Geneva meeting of Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic. Some are of the opinion that the pat on the shoulder that Christopher gave to Milosevic meant that the United States has once again peeked through its fingers at the president of Serbia. Threats of renewed sanctions are mentioned only shyly, which means Milosevic added some new promises to the heap of the old, unfulfilled ones.

The United States not only postpones drawing up an inventory of those promises, but it plies its debtor with new debts, convinced that it can always charge him both principal and interest. When Hague Tribunal President Antonio Cassese said in Sarajevo at the end of last week that he would demand sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs because they had not extradited those indicted for war crimes, the United States said no. The explanation was: "It is too early for that. If we do it now, we may not get the reaction we expect." Probably only Milosevic and the Americans know what kind of reaction that is.

The breaking news on the eve of the Geneva summit was that Milosevic was carrying Karadzic's written statement in his pocket, signed by hand, in which Karadzic informs the general public about his leaving office. The news was broadcast by many world news agencies, but it proved to be one more bluff of the Milosevic propaganda staff. While observers expected Christopher to push away that sheet of paper like a used napkin and demand the unconditional extradition of Karadzic and General Mladic, they were in for a new surprise: Those primarily responsible and indicted for the war crimes in Bosnia were a second-rate subject. It seems that the case had been solved a couple of days earlier, when Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Primakov called the American attempts to extradite Karadzic to the International War Crimes Tribunal counterproductive. Milosevic has obliged himself, as far as he is concerned, that the elections in Bosnia will be held as scheduled. This time, it was sufficient for the Americans.

No serious person can deny that the September elections are momentarily the most important American interest in Bosnia. The difference of opinion arises when the question is raised of whether those elections will result in reintegration or division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It seems very likely that the elections will mark the new victory of the present political and military elites, who, by the nature of things, are incapable of building bridges to help people live together. For such an accomplishment, one needs new people on the political stage. But those who claim that any authority is better than no authority in preserving Bosnia are not without arguments. The elections will bring some kind of authority, which will, under the vigilant eye of the international community, function in keeping with the provisions of the Dayton agreement.

Many people dealing with politics in the West condemn American persistence on the September elections, considering that conditions are not at all right to hold them. They say that human rights in Bosnia are still not respected, that freedom of movement is limited, that those charged with war crimes have not been arrested, and that the return of refugees is reduced to only individual adventures. Since those are the most important provisions of the Dayton agreement, it is clear that the approaching elections, in and of themselves, cannot be any real evidence of its implementation. The aforementioned warnings come from people who have sufficient knowledge about Bosnia and are disposed to be friendly toward it. However, they, too, are not divided in their assessment of what the West really wants.

It has become obvious that the American pressure on Belgrade and Zagreb is abating, and those are the places where the threat to the external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina is coming from. Milosevic and Tudjman have done much more to underline its internal borders than they did to respect those external borders recognized by the world. Perhaps that is not what the West really wanted, but we are witnesses that the world did not oppose it, either.

Aware that the damage is irreversible, Clinton is rushing the elections in Bosnia, although it is all the same to him what those elections will bring. Perhaps someone should suggest to Clinton that he have his own elections first, then deal with the Bosnian elections. But he needs one more urgent result in Bosnia. When the American troops started suffering large-scale losses in the Vietnam slaughterhouse, which was the introduction into a lost war, one retired general suggested to President Lyndon Johnson: "It would be the best thing for us to declare ourselves winners, pack up our things as soon as possible, and get back home." Perhaps someone has already sent a message about Bosnia to Clinton: "Let us declare that we have established peace in Bosnia and organized elections, then pack up our things as soon as possible and get our guys back home."

B-H: SDA Leader on Elections, Opposition, Voting Rules

AU1206100096 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 96 p 10

[Interview with Edhem Bicakcic, vice chairman of the Party of Democratic Action, by Azra Alickovic; place and date not given: "The Factions Within the SDA Have Been Invented by Mr. Karic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Alickovic] What does your statement mean that the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] will not be yielding to the opposition in the election campaign?

[Bicakcic] The election is a serious matter and a competition that the SDA wants to win. Because of our basic principle of supporting Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have so far enabled the opposition to act. This is the reason that the opposition occupies several important posts that should belong to the SDA by virtue of the election results, beginning with the Presidency and the Assembly down to other levels. There were similar talks and agreements regarding the Sarajevo canton constitution. Something like this will be excluded in the forthcoming period, since we shall try to attract voters.

There will be no compromises any longer. I would like to point out that we shall very much oppose the actions of the opposition that are harmful for the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we shall show this to voters. The most recent example relates to the diplomatic and consular offices, which, according to the opposition, are controlled by the SDA. This is not true, since we are not pleased with their structure. We would be happy if they were controlled by one party.

Without Concessions

[Alickovic] Does it mean that you will not beat the opposition?

[Bicakcic] Ha, ha, ha.... I did not say that, but it is perhaps how they interpreted and tried to misuse that statement.

[Alickovic] Will the SDA replace those opposition members who already perform some functions?

[Bicakcic] No, absolutely not! We have only said that the opposition should not require any concessions until the election, since there is no space for them any longer.

[Alickovic] Why would someone vote for the SDA today?

[Bicakcic] All those who support Bosnia-Herzegovina will vote for the SDA, since this party created the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its struggle for independence and sovereignty. I do not want to question the role of others, but it is minimal compared with the SDA. It was the SDA that saved Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling in silence. We have created a powerful and respectable army, which is now the pillar of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been recognized by many states. We have replied to the genocide and the challenge of ethnic cleansing in the honorable way, thus finding our place in civilized Europe. We ourselves have punished the Bosniaks who did not adhere to these rules, and this is the big investment we can offer.

[Alickovic] Are these the merits of the SDA or of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bicakcic] We are the ruling party, so we have also made the biggest contribution. The opposition often criticizes us, saying that we have to be made responsible for the suffering the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina went through. It would be honest to mention good aspects too, and we think that there are many more of them. We are, after all, the only party that has offered organized opposition to the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We Are the Mainstream

[Alickovic] Your assertion that all those who support Bosnia-Herzegovina will vote for the SDA could be understood to mean that the opponents of this party are against Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bicakcic] It does not mean that, but we were the ones who achieved results in the creation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not other parties. We are the mainstream, into which the branches can only flow.

[Alickovic] It is a fact that former SDA members have established new parties, Haris Silajdzic, for example. What was his contribution as a ruling party member to the defense of the country?

[Bicakcic] He was a distinguished SDA member and he contributed much to the establishment of the party. Unfortunately, he disassociated himself from the SDA, but this is not unusual in the world. The only important thing is that Bosnia-Herzegovina is part of Europe and the world.

[Alickovic] There are different opinions about Silajdzic's split from the SDA. Some people think that the split is real, but there are also opinions that the SDA wants to obtain new votes in this way. What is true?

[Bicakcic] The SDA did not plan the split. You have to ask Mr. Silajdzic what he will do. We do not think that one party can represent all Muslims, but as a party we are ready to offer the best program.

[Alickovic] Does the establishment of new parties harm Bosniaks?

[Bicakcic] Not necessarily, since the Bosniaks were able to respond to fascism by democracy. They will show their power in a democratic way by voting for the SDA in the election.

Invented Factions

[Alickovic] What is your attitude toward the BOS [expansion not known] program which supports the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bicakcic] All those who do not accept that Bosniaks should return to their homes are working against the interests of the SDA. This is the wrong policy for Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not know their program in detail, but on the whole I consider it minor.

[Alickovic] Are there factions in the SDA today?

[Bicakcic] The notion of faction was invented by Minister Enes Karic. There are no factions. We are a democratic party and there is no democratic centralism, since we do not act according to the principle of a central committee. There is a competition of various opinions, but this does not mean that there are factions.

[Alickovic] Can it be claimed that the SDA is a movement?

[Bicakcic] We have already established ourselves as a modern political party. In this election we shall participate as a party of the political center. We expect to be supported, apart from the Bosniaks, by the Serbs and Croats who consider Bosnia-Herzegovina their homeland. Our deputy to the Assembly from Olovo is Kaca Temimovic, who is a Serb.

[Alickovic] What is the minimum below which the SDA will not go in the September election in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bicakcic] It is difficult to speak about a minimum, because it depends on the situation at that moment. Now, the Hague court must accomplish its part of the task in the Serb entity, in order to start the democratic process there. The election rules in Mostar should be the model for the election. We cannot accept an election if it is not held in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Apart from that, the people who were forced to change their residence should be enabled to vote in the places where they used to live. This means that the Serbs from the vicinity of Sarajevo have to vote in Sarajevo boroughs, since they were forced to move out from there under the pressure exerted by their leadership. The change of residence can be accepted only if it was motivated by human rights such as marriage or suchlike.... Electoral lists have to be prepared, since most criticism in the 1990 election, which was directed at all parties, including the SDA, referred to disorderly election lists. Diplomatic and consular offices should also be in charge of carrying out elections, apart from the places determined by the OSCE. Local commissions must be proportionally represented according to the situation in 1991.

[Alickovic] Will Edhem Bicakcic be on one of the SDA electoral lists?

[Bicakcic] I hope he will, but the bodies of the party will decide on it.

[Box, p 10]

Voting by Refugees

[Alickovic] Is the SDA perfectly happy with the change of election rules in Mostar?

[Bicakcic] The basic things have been achieved. The refugees from Mostar can vote. We are not perfectly happy, since the four locations that have been approved of are too few. There should be 40 at least, since the election must not be something difficult for the people. We think that the refugees from Mostar, I mean primarily the Serbs, should be enabled to vote in places in which they live now.

[Box, p 10]

The SDA Is Not a National Party

[Alickovic] Do you think that now, after almost four years of war, national parties are the concept that will lead the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the future?

[Bicakcic] Neither by its name nor by its program is the SDA a national party. We have constantly been called a national party. It would not be bad if it were a national party, since parties active in Europe are predominantly national. The principle of organization on the national basis is not bad. There may be defects in the program implementation, as can be seen with the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. The SDA has responded to this in a civilized way. You can witness the absolute freedom of the media, unremembered even in the United States. Whereas the truth about the Gulf War was reported only by CNN, the truth about Bosnia was reported by everybody.

B-H: Conditions for Bosnian Free, Fair Elections 'Unlikely'

MS1206101896 London INDEPENDENT in English 12 Jun 96 p 10

[Report by Tony Barber: "U.S. and Europe Ignore Bosnia Poll Warning"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A climate of fear and ruthless clashing nationalism is jeopardising the chances of staging free and fair elections in Bosnia according to an internal analysis by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However OSCE officials are expected to bow to U.S. and European pressure and reluctantly declare that the elections should go ahead by 14 September, as stipulated by last year's Dayton peace agreement.

The OSCE was charged under the Dayton accord with preparing elections intended to provide Bosnia with multinational, democratic institutions. However, the OSCE analysis indicates that, far from stitching Bosnia back together the elections, if held as early as September, may consolidate the country's division into Muslim, Serb and Croat sectors.

Representatives of about 40 countries will meet in Florence tomorrow to review progress in implementing the Dayton terms. The U.S. and major European powers are expected to propose a September election with the OSCE fixing a precise date later this month.

A summary of the OSCE study concludes that three vital conditions for free elections are not yet in place: a politically neutral environment, freedom of movement, and freedom of association. Independent media are thin on the ground, especially in the Serb and Croat areas, and it is impossible to phone between the Muslim-Croat federation and the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska.

The OSCE analysis states that in the Serb, Croat and mainly Muslim areas, civic institutions, such as police, courts and local government structures are dominated by one nationalist party—respectively, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and Muslim-led Party of Democratic Action (SDA). It is especially critical of the HDZ, contending that "in Croat-controlled federation territory...the ruling HDZ has effectively ensured that the climate of fear prevents the evolution of a political alternative."

According to the study, the borders between the Muslim-Croat federation and Republika Srpska have become more open since the war ended, but most Bosnians do not enjoy freedom of movement. The Serb, Croat and Muslim sectors have different vehicle number plates, which encourages police roadchecks, and the Bosnian Serbs have sabotaged United Nations efforts to set up bus services between the Muslim-Croat and Serb zones.

The OSCE analysis estimates that only a small proportion of Bosnia's 2.6 million refugees and displaced people have returned home to areas where they would be in an ethnic minority. Non-governmental observers say this makes it unlikely fair elections can be held in areas from which large numbers of people have been expelled.

It also suggests that Bosnia's three-way partition along national lines is steadily becoming a fact on the ground. This trend has been underlined since the end of the war by the movement of tens of thousands of Serbs out of Sarajevo, which is under Muslim-led government control, and their replacement by Muslim refugees who originally lived in areas such as eastern Bosnia which are now under complete Serb domination.

OSCE officials are known to be angry with the U.S. and European governments for insisting the elections should go ahead, in spite of the likelihood that they will be seriously flawed. Some officials were shocked when Robert Frowick, the head of the OSCE's Bosnian mission, appeared to cave in to U.S. and European pressure by ordering his staff not to highlight negative developments in Bosnia in their reports.

Other senior international officials, such as Antonio Cassese, the Italian head of the UN war crimes tribunal, have also cast doubt on the wisdom of holding elections in September. He said that if the Bosnian Serb leaders, Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, remained at large, free elections "will not be possible in an environment polluted by war criminals."

But the U.S. State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns, said this week that the Dayton accords "do not say that the conditions [for the Bosnian elections] have to be pristine or Jeffersonian."

Richard Holbrooke, the former U.S. diplomat who brokered the Dayton peace, said that if elections were not held while Nato troops were stationed in Bosnia, they might never be held at all.

B-H: Opposition Coalition Parties' Chances Viewed

AU1206121996 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jun 96 p 3

[Analysis by Alenko Zornija: "Elections in the Bosniak Part of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Five Parties in Search of Voters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Along with the constant feeling of skepticism regarding the possibility of holding the elections in the part of the Federation under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, there is a jockeying for position in the race to win the electorate's votes. The statements given by party officials long ago assumed the form of a preelection address.

And while the ruling Party of Democratic Action [SDA] has been trying to use the military and state and media machine to achieve victory, the opposition has been trying to find the strategy that would grant success. "Hot" preelection topics these days are checking the lists of voters, important because even now they could significantly determine the results of the elections, and collecting signatures needed for the registration of candidacy of the parties and independent candidates.

One of the more interesting Bosnia-Herzegovina preelection "vignettes" is also the recent announcement of the formation of an oppositional coalition made of five parties, which have so far appeared under the title of the coordination of oppositional parties.

The Social Democratic Party [SDP], Union of Social-Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina [UBSD], Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO], Croatian Peasants Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina [HSS], and Republican Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina should appear more coherent and united in the future. Many people say that in this coalition-coordination are all those who represent a real opposition, because the others, as it is claimed, have approached too close to the ruling party. That particularly refers to Kadic's Liberals and Ibro Spahic's Citizens' Democratic Union. They even claim that for Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is by many people considered the heir to the SDA after Izetbegovic's withdrawal.

On the Sarajevo political stage there are also Filipovic's Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO], and the newly founded Amila Omersoftic's Women's Party. However, it is estimated that these two parties have no influence whatsoever, for the time being, to disturb the big blocs.

Social Component Part—SDP's Trump Card

So, what is the profile and strength of the parties that are to make an oppositional coalition together? Already the information that only two of them, SDP and UBSD, have managed to collect the required number of signatures, while the others will have to use the prolonged period of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] (from 7 June moved to 14 June) to do so—proves that the former Communists and the former Reformists (Alliance of Reformist Forces of the former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic) are the strongest parties in this bloc.

And the first of them, Durakovic's SDP, sees the social component part as its first trump card in the approaching elections. Regardless of the obvious attempts to give the SDP the features of a modern social democracy with Bosnian or Bosniak air, it is clear that this party will find their voters mostly among those who cannot leave behind the period of some kind of communist social security and relative equality in factual poverty. Since, in today's war-ravaged and impoverished Bosnia-Herzegovina, for a large number of people the past truly seems to have been a period of welfare, it is not ruled out that many of them will associate that with the SDP, with or without good reason, and vote for this party. This party is also helped by the general trend of recovery of the reformed communist parties in the territories where that system ruled.

The SDP's leading trump cards, in terms of staff, is party president Nijaz Durakovic (who, allegedly, will not run in the elections for the "Dayton presidency"), and whose vice, like the alleged love for "a droplet more," in Bosnia-Herzegovina could make him both likeable and closer to the common people. There is also Zlatko Lagumdzija, young professor of information science, who is trying to build the image of a western-type manager, and a man who can take Bosnia-Herzegovina into a richer future.

UBSD Calculations

The second large party of the Bosniak left wing (in Bosnia, the division into left and right must be taken with some reservation because of the still undefined political space), the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, lays most hope in Tuzla, where under the old name—the Alliance of Reformist Forces—it won the last elections. The popularity of the city mayor there, Selim Beslagic, has been confirmed by all relevant opinion surveys. The second strong man is Sejfudin Tokic, who often causes contradictory reactions with his rancorous attacks on the authorities in Sarajevo.

The remaining three parties in the coalition, it is estimated, can take count on a significantly smaller support of the voters. The Croatian Peasants Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the claims that it is supported by clerical circles, has reduced the chances of winning a more substantial number of votes from the Croatian national corps by its relatively soft and servile relations toward the authorities and participation in the power, by which it has in fact legitimated one-nation, and one-party authority, and made it possible for it to present itself as multiethnic.

HSS Without Strategy

The first president of this party, Ivo Komsic, former communist official and the candidate of the then SKB-H [Communist Alliance of Bosnia-Herzegovina], has frozen his status in the HSS because he discharges the duty of a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The head of the party is Stanko Sliskovic, who has spent some time as a top official in the Ministry of Defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even the motto under which the signatures have been collected for the elections—"We Want To Go to the Polls, Support Us"—proves that this party does not have a totally clear election strategy, because, apart from the appeal to vote for them, they offer no specific program.

There are constant declarative statements in favor of the united Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state of democracy and equality, but, it seems, nobody offers any solutions to realize that, or to win over a bigger number of voters. On the other hand, the recent statement given by President [of the HSS] Sliskovic, that he was not for the Washington concept of the Federation of nations, but for what the Bosniak leadership advocates, that is, for the federation of cantons, could, it seems, reduce the number of those voters among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina who do not intend to vote for the HDZ, and on whose votes the HSS is primarily counting.

The Republican Party, with all due respect to the other members, is—Stjepan Kljuic. Despite certain sympathies that the former president of the HDZ Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoys with the inhabitants of Sarajevo, primarily because of the splendid rhetoric, and the stands toward the "Croatian question," which are closer to the official Sarajevo than to the political leadership of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina—realistic estimations say that he can count on a weak support of the voters, even a lot below 5 percent.

This also works for the Muslim Bosniak Organization, the party which appeared when Zulfikarpasic's faction seceded from the SDA, and from which, later on, Filipovic's LBO seceded. For the MBO behaves in a manner that is too politically sterile to emerge from the group of much bigger parties that support similar stands.

B-H: Tuzla Commission Releases Findings on Ethnic Cleansing

969B0027C Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 15 Apr 96 p 9

[Article by M. Bikic: "Tuzla Commission for War Crimes: Irrefutable Evidence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *File on exodus of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa completed; list with names of 115 persons who committed war crimes provided to the public prosecutor.*

Tuzla—Throughout the entire war, the Tuzla State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes worked without interruption, so that information on genocide and war crimes would be recorded and filed in the documentation. This was one of the things noted by Rifat Karic, the chairman of that commission, at a cabinet meeting of the head of Tuzla Municipality held on Friday.

Over the past year, the Tuzla State Commission for War Crimes has accepted and filed 215 statements. Sixty-five statements have been recorded on video cassette. The Tuzla Commission has gathered 132 statements on various events and people and provided them to the State Commission for War Crimes of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A certain number of statements and documents have been provided by the Tuzla CSB [expansion not given]. The Commission has completed three volumes on the shocking massacre in Tuzla on 25 May 1995, when 71 people were killed and 142 were injured, which the Republican Commission and the Tuzla Municipality authorities will use as documentation. Part of the reason why the Commission was able to carry out this big job is the fact that Tuzla remains a collection center for displaced persons and exchanged prisoners.

It should be noted that the Tuzla Commission is formally known as a municipal body, but in reality it functions on the level of Tuzla-Podrina Canton. Why has this commission not been accepted, equipped, and financed as such? If this institution had good technical equipment and more or less adequately remunerated people working day and night to gather data, then the documentation on crimes certainly would be even more complete.

The members of Selim Beslagic's cabinet acknowledged the members of this commission and promised that they would ultimately solve some of their technical problems (for example, the commission has no fax machine, car, or other aids).

The war crimes commission in Tuzla has received a great deal of recognition for its previous work, but it must continue its work in peacetime at an even faster pace. After all, now that the roads are open and civilians are able to move about, it is possible to supplement the files on crimes, persons, and events.

Thus far, the war crimes commission in Tuzla has printed three publications on massacres, executions, pursuits, robberies, and rapes. Last year, an exhibition of photographs on the subject of war crimes was organized in Lukavac. It participated in an international round table on the suffering of children in this war. The commission has also completed a file on the exodus of the civilian population from Srebrenica and Zepa.

The documentation at the disposal of the war crimes commission in Tuzla was open to anyone who wanted to see for themselves what all happened in this region during the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of the documents have already been sent to The Hague. The public prosecutor of Tuzla Municipality has also been provided material with the names of 115 persons about whom there is warranted suspicion that they participated in war crimes.

B-H: Assessment of Bosnian Serb Media

96BA0294A Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 18 Apr 96 pp 22-23

[Article by Ermin Cengic: "In the Twilight Zone of Newsgathering"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At mention of the phrase "media space and news media in the Srpska republic [RS]," the fairly well-informed "consumer of information" on the territory of the federation will probably think first of Srpska Radio-TV [SRTV] and then of the agency SRNA [Srpska Republic News Agency]. The manner in which these two quasi-news organizations have conducted media warfare for many years and engaged in intensive warmongering propaganda on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina need not be described to anyone who has heard even once any "information" from SRNA or heard a program of SRTV. Even after establishment of peace in Bosnia, these two media have not departed from a propaganda matrix that is entirely at the service of Karadzic's regime and achievement of the programmatic goals of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party].

Who Writes What in Banja Luka?

The writing of the press in the Serbian entity, however, is less well-known. How many newspapers are there? What is their editorial policy? Is any of the papers being published operating independently of the influence of the Pale current in the Serbian leadership? These are questions which arise of themselves in the media isolation experienced by these regions. The author of these lines had an opportunity during a recent visit in Banja Luka to learn the answers to some of these questions in a meeting with journalists of the newspapers NOVI PRELOM (which was represented by Spasoje Perovic, managing editor, for many years a journalist of Radio Sarajevo) and NEZAVISNE NOVINE (whose representative was Zeljko Kopanja, editor in chief).

Along with the writing of a few independent journalists who collaborate with these two houses, the activity of these Banja Luka media is actually the only alternative to the writing of the main daily newspaper in the Srpska republic: GLAS SRPSKI, of which it is enough to say at the start that by a decree of the war criminal Karadzic it was "decorated with the Order of Njegos First Class." In discussing the media scene of Banja Luka, without claiming to concern ourselves with the writing of the so-called SRPSKO OSLOBODJENJE or any local media whose work we were not able to go into very much, we will attempt with a survey of NOVI PRELOM, NEZAVISNE NOVINE, and GLAS SRPSKI to say something more both about life and about the political climate in the largest city of the Serbian entity.

NOVI PRELOM

Like every other medium which has not been instrumentalized for the purposes of the state, NOVI PRELOM faces difficulties of a political nature (the opportunity to think more freely was opened up only after the peace agreement) and economic problems caused by the scant space on the market for development of a newspaper. The editorial conception of PRELOM has been defined and is based above all on the political ideas of the newspaper's founder and editor in chief Miodrag Zivanovic, who is also the president of the Social-Liberal Party of the RS. Although emphatically a "party" paper, with a circulation of 3,500 it is obviously oriented toward the urban milieu of Banja Luka (if anything of the kind still exists), severely and with good documentation criticizing the incumbent regime, the SDS, and the state media because of the policy of nonimplementation of the Dayton Agreement and the autocratic behavior of the powers that be at the local and national level. That criticism, aimed directly at Karadzic and the people around him, is directly evident in the columns written by Zivanovic himself, but also manifested indirectly in the articles promoting democratic values pointing up the unresolved social problems, and certain manifestations of "pressure" on non-Serbs and those who think with their own heads.

In any case, NOVI PRELOM tries in its content to cover all social phenomena both in the RS and also in the federation and outside the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One is immediately struck by the broad cooperation with the Alternative Information Network (AIM) from which PRELOM takes most of its articles, so that authors from Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zagreb, Belgrade...appear. The fact that half the paper is printed in Cyrillic and half in the Latin alphabet, that some of the articles clearly emphasize the need for living together and cooperating with the federation (Zivanovic himself emphasizes that Bosnia-Herzegovina is his country), and that the paper has been liberated in its content from chauvinism tells quite a bit about the intentions and inclinations of the journalists to come closer to the ideals of professionalism and a democratic view of future life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Professional objections arise mostly because NOVI PRELOM unnecessarily insists on an approach (both in certain articles and also graphically) which is nurtured by the so-called youth press, which gives a dose of unseriousness to the entire project. Also, exaggerated emphasis on certain party activities of the editor in chief, the poor quality of the paper, and the newspaper's rather poor graphic appearance, along with the shortcomings mentioned, threaten to stop NOVI PRELOM at the level of Mr. Zivanovic's party bulletin. It is to be hoped that this will not happen, because even as it is it represents some kind of resistance to the fascism and isolationism which are overabundant in the state media of the RS.

NEZAVISNE NOVINE

By contrast with the 24 pages of NOVI PRELOM, NEZAVISNE NOVINE has a 32-page format and a circulation of 7,000 and a somewhat different appearance and especially a different editorial policy. The paper's founder, Milorad Dodik, of the Party of Independent Social Democrats [SNSD], probably has a decisive influence on the paper's political conception which contains quite a bit of contrast. That is, the ethnic commitment in the paper is pronounced, talk about Serbism, national heroes and traitors, and very little, almost no, mention of Bosnia-Herzegovina are rather clearly pronounced on the one hand.

On the other hand, within the RS NEZAVISNE is openly against Karadzic's policy (although it is not clear on what grounds), it gives firm support to Kasagic, exposing the attempts to neutralize him politically, it insists on Banja Luka's independence from negative political trends in Pale, and indirectly it talks about economic ties to the federation. All of that is both a reflection of the political views of Milorad Dodik and also, it seems, a mirror of actual relations within the Serbian entity and a picture of the political atmosphere in Banja Luka.

In addition, in its content NEZAVISNE covers and maintains the "state of the spirit" in the Serbian people of the Banja Luka region, although it is also concerned with topics from other regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The paper is rather concerned with conflicts, with "scandals," pretty much saturated with columns and analyses (one of their columnists is Nenad Kecmanovic, an obscure member of the State Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of the war).

However, NEZAVISNE does not hesitate to interview the mufti of Banja Luka, to congratulate Muslims on Bairam, to reprint articles from LJILJAN and GLOBUS in Zagreb, to raise the topic of the trials in The Hague, but at the same time to publish articles clearly colored with pathetic concern for the "suffering" of the Serbian people and utter indifference to the position of the Bosnjaks and Croats in the RS.

By comparison with NOVI PRELOM, aside from political connotations, the paper is more interesting and intriguing, although the level of professionalism and quality of the articles vary drastically from page to page.

What is more, NEZAVISNE also suffers from party politics, it concerns itself with some purely day-to-day topics and departments (but it comes out every two weeks), the paper is regularly bad, and the presentation of the articles on the verge of disaster. The graphic appearance is also very poor, and some of the articles can only be read with a magnifying glass. All in all, NEZAVISNE NOVINE, although much more "Serbian"-oriented than NOVI PRELOM and with quite a few debatable political outbursts, is an alternative emerging in the narrow media space not taken up by the media in Pale.

GLAS SRPSKI

A brilliant example of a state and party newspaper in the worst sense of the word is certainly the daily GLAS SRPSKI in Banja Luka.

It is sufficient to say of it that it takes an immense portion of its news from TANJUG and SRNA and that the editorial staff, under the "conductor's baton" of Gordan Matrak, attempts in every way to plant ideas very close, more precisely identical, to those being "pushed" by the other national-socialist state media.

In both conception and content, then, this is a bulletin in which "all Karadzic's people," from Krajisnik and Buha to certain anonymous leaders of local chapters of the SDS, state their views freely and voluminously. The very appearance of the newspaper (leaving political ideas aside) is terrible, in topics and graphically it is completely the same as the newspapers done in these parts in the period of the blackest communism, somewhere around the beginning of the fifties.

That appearance best reflects the gloomy picture of media space both of the Krajina and also of the entire Srpska republic and the darkness which prevails there, broken up only sporadically by "excesses" like PRELOM and NEZAVISNE

[Box, p 23]

The Bosnjak at NOVI PRELOM

While visiting Banja Luka, we had occasion to visit the editorial offices of NOVI PRELOM, where we met several people directly or indirectly related to that project or to the Social-Liberal Party itself. Far from the hustle and bustle of the urban part of the city, the private house where the editorial office is located seems like a place where people of like political mind are gathered almost semi-illegally, far from the "all-seeing" eyes of the regime's security services.

Among the journalists, we encountered E.K. (his real name is known to the editors—author's note), a member of the editorial staff, a Bosnjak who spent the entire time of the war in Vrbas. We listened with interest to his story, so typical and actually in line with all the information related to torture of the Bosnjaks and Croats which has reached Sarajevo. So, he spent the entire war in work details, digging trenches, and picking fruit, along the way he was occasionally abused by the "extremists," and then, finally, in September '95 he and his wife (who incidentally is a Serb) were brutally thrown into the street from their private home.

This was allegedly done by refugees from Croatia who "occupied" Banja Luka, terrorizing the non-Serbs in large numbers, all of this with the blessing and indifference of the local authorities. E.K. talks quietly and despondently about his position, resigned to the fact that he is different from the others, attempting by comparison to the position of the Serbs in Sarajevo to find some kind of consolation (we did not try to convince him that the comparison is in bad taste and out of proportion), he talks with loathing and scorn of the rural element which has taken control of the "gem of Krajina" and carries with some strange lightness the burden of the "dissident" possessed by every journalist of NOVI PRELOM.

It is probably twice as heavy for him, but he seems not to be aware of it. Dayton also brought a kind of relief to him because the police-military pressure has relaxed, but obviously E.K. is still a "second-class" person.

Croatia: President of War Crimes Tribunal Interviewed

AU1206095996 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Antonio Cassese, president of the International War Crimes Tribunal, by Vuk Djuricic; place and date not given: "Karadzic and Mladic Will Be in The Hague by the End of the Year!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The decisions being made by the International War Crimes Tribunal are very important to the fulfillment of that body's duty to bring war criminals from the former Yugoslavia to justice. This holds particularly true for Tribunal President Antonio Cassese and Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone. During his recent visit to Zagreb, Cassese spoke with government representatives but also met with Zvonimir Separovic for a lengthier, unofficial conversation Thanks to Professor Separovic, Cassese agreed to answer a few questions exclusively for NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA.

[Djuricic] Why are you visiting Zagreb, and what was the subject of your conversation with Vice President Ljerka Mintas-Hodak?

[Cassese] The purpose of my visit is to improve cooperation between Croatia and the Tribunal, which is particularly important in light of my report to the Ministers Council, which will meet in Florence on 15 June. We are aware that Croatia is working to improve this cooperation, but one crucial issue has yet to be resolved; specifically, the issue of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have asked the Croatian Government to pressure some people in the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Croats live to see that those whom we have charged are apprehended [uhititi] and handed over to the Tribunal.

Documents From Croatia

[Djuricic] How are relations between Croatia and the international Tribunal now?

[Cassese] Much better. Croatia has recently passed a special constitutional law regulating these relations, and it has succeeded in convincing and handing over General Tihomir Blaskic to The Hague. These are all important moves, but there are still some issues that need to be addressed before the entire problem in this area can be resolved. First, we need to reexamine and fully process all cases in which crimes have been committed after Operation Storm. Second, the Tribunal needs to receive as many documents on the war criminals as possible. As I have already said, the Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina against whom charges have been issued must be apprehended and handed over to The Hague. Those are our demands, that is, the issues that need to be resolved! [Djuricic] You have said that the Tribunal must receive as many documents on the war criminals as possible. Does this mean Croatia is not giving The Hague the documentation it is requesting?

[Cassese] Until now, Croatia has been giving us most of the documents regarding crimes that others have committed against Croats, but we would also like to have the documentation on crimes that were possibly committed by Croats. This is an area in which we are asking for full support from Croatia, and I believe we will receive it.

[Djuricic] What will be Gen. Tihomir Blaskic's fate?

[Cassese] Gen. Blaskic is receiving due process. I believe the tribunal proceedings will begin in September, and in these few months an investigation will be conducted to decide whether he is innocent and needs to be released, or whether he is guilty. It will be a fully, fully, correct procedure!

[Djuricic] To what extent do politics affect the Tribunal's work?

[Cassese] Politics have no influence on the Tribunal's proceedings. Do you know why? All 11 judges are from different countries. They are experts whose work cannot be influenced by any kind of politics, and none of us have had any contact with the former Yugoslavia. We have been chosen to do a difficult and responsible task, not to deal with politics!

[Djuricic] Both you and Richard Goldstone support the view that the war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic must be captured. On the other hand, Richard Holbrooke and Carl Bildt tend to support—one might say—compromise. Is this a "conflict" between the Tribunal and politics?

[Cassese] No. A few days ago, Carl Bildt told the BBC that at no time or place did he suggest any agreements with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The State Department spokesman also recently stressed that no agreements had been made with them. They will be apprehended and handed over to the Tribunal. The only issue about which Carl Bildt and I disagree is that he, in my opinion, should ask for stricter sanctions to be imposed upon the "Serb Republic," and if necessary even upon Serbia!!

[Djuricic] Do you believe you will try the war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic?

[Cassese] Yes. We are pressuring the international community to take certain measures against them. We will begin the process on 27 June and display all the gathered evidence against them. On 12 July we will decide whether to issue an international warrant for their apprehension through INTERPOL. I believe Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic will soon be captured, turned over to the Tribunal, and tried by the end of this year!

[Djuricic] After Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, should it be the turn of their boss, Slobodan Milosevic?

[Cassese] I know an accusation against Slobodan Milosevic has been filed with the Tribunal, and one of the organizers is Zvonimir Separovic. What I can tell you is that we have no restrictions, and the chief prosecutor can bring to court all those against whom evidence has been gathered. This is within the purview of Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone, and I do not know what he is doing. I do know, however, that he is prepared to go after anyone, if he has the proof, of course!

[Djuricic] There is now peace in the former Yugoslavia, but it is a peace without justice.

[Cassese] I agree. Without justice there is no real and lasting peace. If there is no justice, it will be a temporary break in hostilities, and in a year or two this enmity will break out again!

An Office in Belgrade

[Djuricic] Belgrade has not cooperated with the Tribunal for a long time. What are relations like today, and has Belgrade "softened up"?

[Cassese] There was no cooperation for two years, but recently they have begun to cooperate. They have permitted the chief prosecutor to open an office in Belgrade. This is a great step forward, and recently they had handed over two witnesses from Belgrade, one of whom, in my opinion, should be accused of war crimes. Preparations are under way to implement legal procedures that would allow war criminals to be apprehended and handed over to The Hague.

[Djuricic] This could be a "large transport"?

[Cassese] We will demand that all guilty parties be handed over to us; that is, all those suspected of committing war crimes.

[Djuricic] Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone will soon be leaving. Will his departure affect the Tribunal's work?

[Cassese] No. Every person has his own way of working, and maybe the new chief prosecutor, a Canadian judge, will have a different approach and style. I believe, however, that she will continue all the investigations that have already been started, and perhaps she will open some new ones. I do not think there will be a dramatic change in the Tribunal's work. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Parliament To Revoke Courts-Martial

AU1106173196 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 96 p 4

[Report by Josip Smidt: "Courts-Martial Take Off Uniforms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Courts-martial are being revoked in Croatia! The information—launched in the government session and fully supported in the first reading in the parliamentary procedure—initially caused a bit of confusion, even disbelief, although it is completely reasonable, realistic, and predictable in our time. The war is over and the independence of the Republic of Croatia is not directly endangered anymore, which makes courts-martial unnecessary. Such is the opinion of the Justice Minister, and the Defense Minister and the majority of members of parliament agree. The Justice Minister, Miroslav Separovic, told us:

"I am very pleased by the discussion in the parliament. Most representatives of most parties share the opinion that present courts-martial are not necessary in our system anymore, although they did a good job. I am satisfied that the suggestion I and and the government made was supported in the parliamentary discussion."

However, the decision about the revocation of courts-martial does not seem to be that simple. The present courts-martial were established—by the so-called War Decree of the President of the Republic—in six military districts [zborna podrucja]: Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, Osijek, Karlovac, and Bjelovar; and those can be revoked only after the president has withdrawn his 1991 Decree. The Court Law, adopted in February 1994, also orders courts-martial to be established, but only in Zagreb and Split, which gives the two courts a very wide area of responsibility.

Support of the Parliament

However, those courts-martial were never founded and have never started to work because the Court Law provides a transitional regulation that enables the two courts-martial to begin their work only after the president's decree is revoked.

Accordingly, we first have to establish that Croatia does not need courts-martial, and then remove regulations about courts-martial in Articles 13 and 14 of the Court Law. When the parliament removes those regulations and thus demonstrates that Croatia does not need courts-martial, it can be suggested to the president of the republic to revoke his decree on courts-martial. The suggestion could actually have been made before, but the bodies that suggested the revision of the law—the Government and the Justice Minister—probably wanted to gain the support of the Croatian parliament first. Besides, revocation of the president's decree would activate the regulations of the Court Law, which would create additional procedures that could be avoided, as obvious from the parliament's decision that courts-martial are unnecessary.

Courts-martial founded by the president's decree have had an extremely wide legal capacity. It comprised as much as six fields from indictable offenses committed by military persons, to trying citizens for offenses committed under certain circumstances. Those courts-martial have done a lot of work in the past five years, and they still have 4,896 cases to work on. The application of two Absolution Laws will surely reduce the number of those cases. Courts-martial regulated by the Court Law have a narrower legal capacity, only applying to military persons and citizens whose punishable acts involve military equipment or weapons.

The suggestion to cancel courts-martial was accepted with certain suspicion and even conflicting opinions among experts, especially certain chairmen of courts-martial, who thought that courts-martial should be kept or founded on a regular basis, in Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, and Osijek, because of their complicated and numerous tasks.

"That suggestion is also logical, but reasons for the revocation of courts-martial are stronger and have prevailed," Minister Separovic told us.

The suggestion of revisions and amendments to the Court Law actually provides that alternative solution, but it was not accepted in the parliamentary debate.

Other Models

The Czech Republic and Slovenia have already revoked their courts-martial; Austria has not had any and neither has Germany, but they have military senates within regular courts to handle processes to military persons. France and Russia still have courts-martial, while the United States have courts-martial as specialized institutions within the Defense Ministry.

What shall we have instead of courts-martial? Courts-martial are presently situated in the buildings of county courts, they depend on administrative and technical services of those courts, and judges in courts-martial are not military persons, but judges of municipal and county courts mobilized for service in courts-martial. The suggestion is to found specialized boards or departments in municipal and county courts to handle cases of military persons. The previous parliamentary debates have disclosed opinions that such specialized departments in regular courts are not necessary, as military persons are also citizens, and there are no grounds for special treatment. Those issues, according to Minister Separovic, will be determined by a special regulation.

"Having received political support for the revocation of courts-martial," Minister Separovic said, "we will begin the revocation, but it will be done gradually and it might take several months. We will consider the issue of transfer of capacity and archives very carefully, as well as the future of judges presently engaged in courts-martial."

Croatia: Klein Calls Serbs' Autonomy Demands 'Unrealistic'

AU1106173996 Paris AFP in English
1719 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 11 (AFP)—Jacques Klein, the UN official in charge of Eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-held part of Croatia, said Tuesday that the Serbs' demand for autonomy there was unrealistic.

"That's not realistic because Croatia will never tolerate that," Klein, the UN temporary administrator of the region, said at a conference here.

He said he thought Croatia had "no intention" of using force to try to retake the area, which comprises 4.4 percent of its territory and borders onto Serbia.

"They are not logistically deployed to do that, they are not militarily deployed to do that and there is no rational reason to do that because we will reintegrate this peacefully in the year," he said.

Klein told a conference at the Yugoslav Institute for International Politics that the idea of autonomy was one "whose time is past," and the Serbs should negotiate what was realistic.

The local Serbs want the right to elect a government and parliament for Eastern Slavonia, to have their own flag, anthem and symbol, and for its inhabitants to have some kind of regional citizenship.

These demands go against an agreement signed in November between the Croatian government and the local Serbs. Under the agreement, the area is due to return to Croatian control within two years at most.

Klein criticised the amnesty law passed by the Croatian parliament in May, saying that it did not make clear who was amnestied.

"What I need is a bill that clearly says these people are war criminals and we all know what war criminals are," he said. "But 99 percent of the population were innocent victims."

Croatia: Klein To Demand Amnesty for 'All' Croatian Serbs

AU1106142896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Report by Jugoslava Zagorac]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the roundtable discussion organized by the Belgrade Institute for International Politics and Economy, Jacques Klein, international administrator for the Srem-Baranja Region, presented political, military, humanitarian, and economic aspects of solving the situation in the region, as well as the principles that the international community is following in the region. Jugoslava Zagorac reports:

[Zagorac] The first step that the international community undertook in the Srem-Baranja Region has been realized to a great degree, Jaques Klein said. [Words indistinct] the population's physical safety. We have reached an agreement with the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] to actively work on refugee return. The most important thing is to reestablish trust between peoples and to overcome conflicts. Klein added that the international community, in cooperation with the FRY and Croatian Governments, is creating a new structure of authority in the Srem-Baranja Region.

Next week, stressed Klein, I will appear before the UN Security Council, where I shall submit a report on the activity of the transitional administration, and I shall demand that the international community see to it that Croatia grants amnesty to all Croatian Serbs and that the repatriation of refugees is carried out throughout Croatia, including Western Slavonia and the Knin Krajina.

Croatia: UNTAES's Dave Calls Serb Autonomy 'Preposterous'

AU0906163296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1250 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 9 June (BETA)—Graham Dave, chief of the civilian affairs of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES], today assessed as "preposterous" the demands for Serbian autonomy in East Slavonia.

"The local speakers would like to exploit the population, which is in dire straits, for their political goals," Dave said in a statement for UNTAES radio.

He added that East Slavonia was a part of the internationally recognized Republic of Croatia.

Croatia: Serb Radio on European Parliament Criticism of Zagreb

AU1006170996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 7 Jun 96

[Commentary by Petko Koprivica]

[FBIS Translated Text] As was expected, an overwhelming majority of European representatives voted in favor of passing a resolution strongly condemning the undemocratic acts of the Zagreb government, especially regarding the freedom of media, but also the series of arrests of and threats against journalists working for the opposition newspapers. In a letter addressed to Banski Dvori [Croatian parliament building], the Council of Europe stresses that the way Croatia is handling the situation in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and other human rights problems in the region is extremely important to the European Parliament. Consequently, Europe demands that Zagreb stop banishing people from their homes. As UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] official Sadako Ogata said recently, the Zagreb government is setting all kinds of obstacles to the return of Serb refugees who were forced to leave Krajina and Western Slavonia.

Furthermore, civilized Europe also condemns Croatia's refusal to implement the law on amnesty [zakon o amnestiji i aboliciji], as was agreed. One of the reasons why Croatia will have to wait and whine in front of the doors of Europe is the fact that official Zagreb is persistently avoiding cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal.

Moreover, European Parliament representatives directly criticize the policy of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], Tudjman's ruling party, which keeps preventing the establishment of legally elected city authorities and officials who are not its members. That party has long been openly declaring itself as the party of the Ustashas, no less. That is why the resolution passed by the European Parliament demands that the Croatian Government relinquish the project for turning the Jasenovac memorial for victims of fascism into a war memorial, as the resolution calls it, to reconcile the victims and Pavelic's [Ante Pavelic, head of Independent State of Croatia] followers.

The parliament also demands that the European Commission and the European Union Ministerial Council stop all talks on admitting Croatia into the program for helping eastern European countries, talks on individual business deals with Croatia, and talks on trade and cooperation. In short, Croatia cannot become a part of Europe. The reason for that is quite simple. Europe does not want such a Croatia. The European association obviously does not want a country established on fascistoid foundations, on an ideology that brought so much misery to Europe and all of mankind. Among other reasons, Europe is against admitting Croatia into its community also because it does not want a partner that has committed genocide against another nation—the Serbs in this case—as a basic pathological guideline for existence and survival.

Croatia: Serb TV Reports on Beli Manastir Assembly Session

AU1106172796

[FBIS Report] Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian at 1915 GMT on 7 June carries an approximately one-hour special program on the session of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly held earlier that day.

The report begins with an overview of the session's agenda and says that the report submitted by the head of the Beli Manastir police department was rejected and that a new report to be read at the next session should "analyze all criminal activities on the territory of Baranja that destabilize the region and name the persons behind them."

The program also includes excerpts from a report by Executive Council Chairman Vasa Zigic on the "progress, ways, and results of the talks with UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] representatives." Describing the current political situation, Zigic says that "politics will have to be the art of the possible, as Mr. Klein said that the Serb side will not get what it deserves."

"The most interesting part of the session" dealt with the report on the registration of pensioners in Darda and the related pilot program, about which Mr. Zigic says: "Having consulted with the vice president of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem Executive Council and other officials, I called Mr. (Kaluza) asking him to put an end to the program in order to prevent possible incidents."

The program continues with the reactions of several representatives to the report. Calling for better coordination between bodies and institutions of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, an unidentified speaker says that: "There is no doubt that the Croats, in the areas in which we are not active, will look for ways to get into our system. If we are reconciled with what they are doing here, we are admitting the Croatian authorities to the district without a transition period." Expressing "outrage" at the fact that Croatia demands birth certificates and certificates of citizenship from those who claim a right to Croatian pensions, the speaker says that "it is impermissible that, with so much delay, we find out that the Croats are registering pensioners in Darda without the presence of a single Serb representative."

The report also condemns "the propaganda launched by the Croatian media," especially a report on Osijek Television, with a statement by Milan Vujic, who says: "What Simic said on television—they keep saying that this is not Simic's personal policy, but Simic was appointed mayor of Vukovar—or something like I believe is the position of their official authorities and the Croatian regime: 'We want a territory without the Serbs.'" Vujic goes on to criticize the lack of resourcefulness of the Serb negotiators saying that "Our side and negotiators should also have something that was signed somewhere. Instead, we are only told that a certain document was signed somewhere. We are not told where it was signed or what was signed, and so we become the losers. The problem does not lie in Croatia or UNTAES. We are the problem, because we do not know the details of any resolution."

Slobodan Milovac, former chairman of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly, then addressed the session, criticizing Beli Manastir Radio and Television and demanding that "Croatian Television programs should be recorded and used as unequivocal evidence in negotiations with the Republic of Croatia." Milovac also calls for "the formation of teams of experts that will go to world centers and spread the truth about the Serbs and their plight."

Croatia: Loncar Reports on Demilitarization in Slavonia

AU1106182796 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] "The demilitarization of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem is under way as planned and without incidents," stated Major General Dusan Loncar, commander of the Serb Army Slavonia-Baranja Corps. "Our soldiers are aware that demilitarization is a part of the Erdut Agreement," said Loncar and emphasized that the implementation of the agreement should bring a lasting peace and ensure the survival of the Serb people in the district. The commander of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps added that demobilization of its forces in Vukovar is also a part of the demilitarization plan and that it is incorrect that some Croatian media have made so much about the case of Vukovar with the goal of agitating the population.

Croatia: Bosnia Seen Heading for Division, Conflict

AU1206112696 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 96 pp 31-32

[Commentary by Goran Rosic: "Neither War nor Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting of Presidents Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Milosevic with the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Geneva on 2 June is the latest in the series of meetings to speed up the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement, which, despite the international community's efforts, is facing disaster. It is clear that the Dayton agreement brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina more than six months ago, and that the military part has been completely respected, but there is no other movement. There is still no freedom of movement. The negotiations between the two entities have brought no results. There is a ruthless media campaign in which one uses lies and labels, and recently there have also been incidents like the one near Doboj, when several hundred Bosniaks Muslims wanted to visit their homes, but were stopped by the bellicose Serbs "armed" with cudgels. Everybody—starting from the international community, to the United States to Carl Bildt, to official Sarajevo—is ready to find an excuse for the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the fact that Radovan Karadzic remains in power, that is, in absolute power in the Serb Republic. However, that is not the whole truth. For some time now some processes have become clearer, and they lead us to the conclusion that each party has been trying more and more openly to express its dissatisfaction with the peace agreement and some of its provisions, openly placing obstacles in the way of implementation.

Karadzic as an Alibi

Thus, for instance, the Serbs use every opportunity to interrupt the implementation of what has already been agreed—they do not respect the agreement on media freedom and the unrestricted movement of journalists throughout the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not all prisoners of war have been exchanged yet. They do not allow any refugees to return. They openly say that any kind of coexistence with the Croats and the Bosniak Muslims is impossible. They refuse cooperation with the International Tribunal in the Hague for war crimes committed on the territory of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. They do not want to cooperate with the international financial associations, and so on. They use a perfidious game for such behavior. Milosevic stands surety for the international community for the implementation of the Dayton agreement, but he does not want to neutralize Karadzic, who is, together with Mladic, the main obstacle to that process, and he serves Milosevic as some kind of an alibi. Thus, for months, the same Serbian game has been going on in front of the international community—Milosevic is ready to cooperate, but he cannot do anything because of Karadzic. It is significant that the international community tolerates this and is prepared to believe such hypocritical and cynical explanations. Nobody asks oneself how it is that Karadzic regularly "visits" Belgrade and "harmonizes" further moves with Milosevic for hours.

On the other hand, the Bosniak-Muslim leadership is slowly grasping that the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina still exists only on paper. It is adjusting its policy more and more openly to the idea of the pure Bosniak state in the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. However, before the eyes of the international community it uses all its forces to struggle for a whole and united Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alija Izetbegovic and his associates have introduced a novelty by which they put pressure on the Serb entity (they are using these tactics in Stolac, too) and increase tension. In an organized way they send members of their nation into the Serb entity (Doboj, Prijedor, Brcko) and thus provoke the Serbs. At the same time they are testing the resoluteness of IFOR [Implementation Force] to protect civilians. These attempts have proved unsuccessful so far. The frequency of them suggests that even worse incidents could happen, which is probably the objective of such a "policy." In the same way, they put pressure on the international community to enable the large-scale return to the homeland of those Bosniak Muslims who are in exile all over the world. Their return could create a critical mass of homeless and dissatisfied which could result in new crises, both in the Bosniak Muslims' relations with the Serb Republic and with their partner within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Prejudiced Solution

In addition, the Bosniak-Muslim leadership is waging a ruthless battle for the money that many sponsors and investors want to invest in the reconstruction of whole Bosnia-Herzegovina (they want the largest part of it for themselves). Contrary to the declared integralist aspirations, a completely different policy is being carried out on the ground. The best evidence is the example of the "liberated" Sarajevo municipalities. Namely, all the Serbs who remained there, or returned, are being driven away in every way possible. In Sarajevo, Zenica, and Bugojno, various forms of pressure are being applied to the remaining Croats to move out. Refugees from various regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been settled in an organized manner into all abandoned Croat and Serb houses and apartments, and thus some solutions have been prejudiced, which is contrary to the Dayton agreement. No less important is the fact that the Islamization of Bosnia-Herzegovina is taking place more and more openly. Cardinal Puljic has recently pointed that out quite openly, too, although he is very cautious in his statements. Within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, obstacles have been put in the way of its implementation in every way possible.

The best proof of this thesis is the last session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when the Bosniak-Muslim representatives outmaneuvered the adoption of the Law on Defense, although everything was agreed at the Forum of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Washington and at the meeting in Geneva. In that way they have clearly let us know how much they really cared about the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and removed many masks in front of the international community. The same goes for their tricks and blackmail regarding the holding of the local elections in Mostar.

Croats Aside

In this whole process of outmaneuvering the Dayton agreement, one gains the impression that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats are standing aside. What they achieved by struggling in the military and political sphere—survival in the territory in which they were the majority before the war, and the status of a constituent nation—they have been trying to preserve in every way possible. In the process of the implementation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they have assumed a constructive approach from the very first day, and they have made many concessions to the Bosniak-Muslim side. Some say too many, because it is apparent that the opposite side comes back with unacceptable new demands for every concession it gets. However, it seems that such an "approach" has come to an end. Regarding it as a whole, it seems that a good part of Croat policy is outside the process of obstruction of the Dayton agreement, and that it has left that to the Bosniak-Muslim and Serb sides.

The international community has stopped the war, but it is doing nothing to "draw" all the sides "closer" to each other. The expected active support for the return of people to their homes is missing, and there is no foreign capital that would reanimate Bosnia-Herzegovina's devastated economy, which is the precondition for the citizens of that country to be able to provide for their long-term existence. The only thing done is a drastic reduction of humanitarian aid, the consequence of which is that for most people today life is even harder than it was during the war. This social moment could very probably yield new tensions and conflicts. The thing that the international community stubbornly insists on is the general election in September. They think the election will solve everything. However, there is no consistency in respecting what was agreed in Dayton, too. There are many concessions made for the interested sides, and in that way the regularity of the election is brought into question. On the other hand, it is significant that over the last couple of weeks, within the international community, mutual accusations about the fall of Srebrenica, about not having tried to stop the war at all, have grown more frequent. On one side, there is the United States, which still holds the lead in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, but one can feel their gradual withdrawal from this territory. France and Britain are conducting a tepid and undefined integralist policy as at the beginning of the war, and they want to push the United States out. Germany is more and more standing aside, while Russia is preoccupied with its elections.

Between War and Peace

Having all this in mind, one can conclude that such an approach by the international community toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the behavior of the Bosniak-Muslim and the Serb side, suggest that Bosnia-Herzegovina is situated between war and peace at the moment. No vital question has been solved, and day by day the renewal of conflict is growing more and more certain. The most recent stratification within the international community and nonexistence of an united policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina suggest that IFOR is no longer such a guarantee of peace as it was three or four months ago, and that its role is becoming more and more questionable. Further, the autumn elections—one can already say that with certainty—will cement the final division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the elections, the conflicting ideas of a united, whole, unitarian, and civic Bosnia-Herzegovina, or a small Islamic state (Bosniak Muslims), an ethnically cleansed Serb state that in the long run should join the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the state of three equal nations (Croats). So, the cause of the war remains the moot point. Now it is clear that this problem cannot be solved at the meetings like the Geneva one. One needs much more. But the question is—who can do it and how?

FYROM: Italian Foreign Minister on EU Agreement

AU1006183196 Skopje MIC in English 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is due to sign the Agreement on trade and cooperation with the EU soon, which represents a first step towards its association," the EU chairman, the Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, who arrived on a brief visit to Skopje on Saturday, together with the chairman of the European Commission Jacques Santer, stated after his meeting with President Gligorov, Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski and the Vice President of the Government Jane Miljovski.

According to the press release of the Foreign Minister, the talks centered around the regional approach to the EU and the so-called "evolutionary clause," contained in the concept for future cooperation between the Balkan countries and the EU.

"The regional approach is designed to facilitate the reconciliation in the regions of the former Yugoslav Republics, with the purpose of achieving stability in the region. It is not directed toward Macedonia specifically, but more toward the other republics, as Macedonia is already maintaining solid regional cooperation. The regional approach should not be comprehended as a condition in the Trade Agreement and it is not mentioned as such, but much more as a policy, which, in my opinion, is fully shared by the Macedonian government. In this respect, Macedonia leads the other YU republics, especially in the projects for transport and communications," Dini said.

Assessing Macedonia's position toward the EU as extremely good, Dini confirmed that it is far ahead than the other former YU Republics.

"The upcoming Agreement on trade and cooperation, together with inclusion with the PHARE [Economic and Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] programme, will bring Macedonia considerable benefits. The Agreement is very important and will have a decisive role in our country's association with the Union," the chairman of the European Commission Jacques Santer stated at the press conference.

Macedonian Foreign Minister Frckovski said that the debate focused mainly around the introduction of the regional and evolutionary clause, as well as the visa regime, the balance of payments, as well as two items of special interest to Macedonia.

FYROM: Government Defines Draft Agreement With EU

AU1106180896 Skopje MIC in English 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At yesterday's session, the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government determined the draft-text of the Agreement on cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the EU, which is due to be signed in Brussels, at the session on June 18 and 19.

Yesterday, the ministers accepted the report of the Macedonian delegation on the negotiations with the EU, held in Brussels on May 28.

The government assessed that the to-date course of negotiations is quite positive and a maximum level of concessions on the part of the European Commission has been achieved. This realizes the efforts of the government in terms of the given promises for a speedy, more efficient appearance of the Macedonian economy on markets in Europe.

FYROM: France Opens Consulate in Bitola

AU1006171996 Skopje MIC in English 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The chairman of the French National Assembly Philip Segan, who stayed on a two-day visit to the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], opened the Consulate of the Republic of France in Bitola on Sunday. "France has never stopped maintaining cultural links with the Macedonian population, especially through the cultural center which was opened in Skopje more than 25 years ago," Segán stated.

He recalled the historic links between Macedonia and France, which date back from the consular period when a special French school operated in Bitola.

Otherwise, the high-ranking guest from France was received by President Gligorov and the chairman of the Macedonian Assembly Tito Petkovski.

In the talks, both sides expressed satisfaction with the Macedonian-French relations, as well as the continuation of the support France is giving Macedonia in the process of its association with the EU.

FYROM: Election Petition Goes to Constitutional Court

AU1106181196 Skopje MIC in English 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Coordinative Committee of the civil initiative "150,000 signatures" will send an appeal to the Constitutional Court today, in relation to the conclusion reached by the Macedonian [The Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly, the Vice-President of VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonina National Unity] Dosta Dimovska stated.

At its session on June 4, the Macedonian Assembly concluded that the civil initiative for issuing a notice of referendum for new elections is non-constitutional. The initiative for assessing the constitutionality and legality of the Assembly's conclusion will be submitted to the Constitutional Court today or tomorrow, the leader of the Democratic Party Petar Gosev stated.

"We have sent a letter to the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, in which we informed about the violation of the Constitution and the disrespect of the will of 220,000 voters," Dosta Dimovska said, adding that the Democrats have yet to do the same.

The chairman of the Legal Commission of VMRO-DPMNE Georgi Naumov explains that under article 108 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is authorized to make decisions about this issue, as it is a state body protecting the constitutionality and legality.

"The Constitutional Court is also authorized to repeal or invalidate other regulations or general acts, article 112 of the Constitution determines. The Assembly's conclusion is a general act, and as such, it is under the competence of the Constitutional Court. If it is proclaimed that the Constitutional Court does not have the authority, there is a Supreme Court which decides on the rights of the citizens," Naumov says.

FYROM: Albanians Protest Alleged Poisoning of Students

AU0706171496 Skopje MIC in English 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] We demand that the authors of this criminal act be found, that the analysis of the poisoning of the students in the hotel "Galeb" in Struga is carried out by special centers in Western Europe and that conditions for the security of the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] be created.

These were the messages sent out from yesterday's protest meeting held in Tetovo, which was attended by several thousand citizens, and organized by the PDPA [Party for Democratic Propserity of Albanians], NDP [People's Democratic Party], the Party for Democratic Action—True Path, the Republican Party for National Unity, and the student and teacher council of the secondary medical school "Nikola Stein."

A number of allegations on account of the Macedonian authorities were expressed at the gathering, regarding the indolence in the clarification of the case and anti-Albanian actions. The PDP was also attacked as being a traitor, especially the Deputy Health Minister from this party, Ilir Ljuma. Remarks were also addressed to the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] missions, as well as the other international organizations, for their failure to take part in shedding light on this case and "support of the anti-Albanian politics of the Macedonian state."

The PDPA spokesman Alaetin Demiri announced the holding of "a number of such manifestations of civil disobedience, as the dissatisfaction of the Albanians is mounting."

The Vice-President of PDPA Menduh Tachi, stressing that he was not accusing anyone in specific, on the basis of the doctors' findings and the "bitter experience from Kosovo," concluded that the poisoning "was obviously caused intentionally and what's most important, it was directed against the Albanian students." Literally all speakers, including the "rector" of the Tetovo University Fadil Sulejmani expressed dissatisfaction with the decision of the Macedonian authorities to carry out the analysis of the blood of the poisoned children in Novi Sad.

A number of banners were brought to the gathering, with the following contents: "We are not acting," "Watch out, the black hand is on the loose," "Shed light on this case!," "Ilir Ljuma, down," "UNPREDEP and OSCE, do your duty."

FYROM: Use of Children for Political Aims Revealed

AU1006183496 Skopje MIC in English 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Saturday so-called peace protest at the city square in Tetovo, under the organization of PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] and with the support of the other political parties of the Albanians in Macedonia (with the exception of PDP—Party for Democratic Prosperity), held on the occasion of the "recent case of poisoning of a group of students from the secondary medical school 'Nikola Stein' from Tetovo," seemed to focus the least on the "motive." Namely, the very contents of the protest, the statements and speeches of the numerous speakers in front of the masses, foremost high schools students, actually revealed the true motives—misuse of the case and what's even more terrifying, manipulating with the children and students for political purposes and political marketing. And, those purposes and that policy of the protest were used, perhaps in the most drastic form yet, to inspire feelings among the youths for spreading inter-ethnic hatred and intolerance, for presenting the case as "organized and intentional poisoning of the Albanian youth," as the spokesman of the PDPA Alajdin Demiri said.

All the speeches were in that style and in the spirit of the party goals to create distrust also toward the current Macedonian authorities, which, as it was said "also has Albanian servants helping it," as well as the adversary parties from the Albanian block. The case has even been compared to the one in Kosovo a couple of years ago. According to Nevzat Halili, "as the Serbs want to poison the Albanians, the Macedonians are doing the same here." With an obvious aim of creating an atmosphere of euphoria and drawing on the sympathies of the children, Milaim Fejziu sent out a greeting with two raised fingers, adding that the "Slav Macedonian communists want to eliminate this nation from these regions, but that will never happen." Or, the statement of the spokesman of PDPA "there is a nation that wants to be educated, and there is a government that's against that," which incited the calls "Down with the government," "Down Ilir Ljuma" or the statement of the student Farie Emini "We will live even if we are dead."

It's an undisputable fact that the poisoning of the children did not come from the food or the children's stay in the hotel "Galeb." The preliminary results from the analyses confirm that. If it is so, then in whose interest is it to politicize this case, to use the students for political goals. As if they could hardly wait for something to happen in order to jump out on the streets, always according to the same pattern and scenario. This time, it's new that the politicians and the 'university figures' are coming out one next to the other more often and in public, although there were attempts to deceive the public into believing that the Tetovo University has exclusively educational goals. And, this protest has shown that in Tetovo, the above-mentioned political parties are taking advantage of every chance for political purposes, foremost the most sensitive area—eduction.

Poland: Exercises Check Readiness To Cooperate With NATO

WS1206122396 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 11 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Andrzej Godlewski: "The Blue and Red Are Training With Civilians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The 'Summer-96' exercises that began yesterday are the main training task for the Polish Armed Forces this year," General Wladyslaw Saczonek, chief of the General Staff Command Directorate, has told ZYCIE WARSZAWY. Over five days, Polish officers are to check, among other things, the possibility of cooperation between commanders of different levels and civilians in wartime.

Aside from the commands and staffs of the Silesian (the "red"—an assumed enemy) and Cracowian (the "blue"—our troops) Military Districts, the exercises are bring attended by representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, Communications, Transportation, Construction, and Environmental Protection.

For the first time in Poland, the officers are using maps with a scale of 1:250,000, such as that used by NATO. Before this, the Polish Armed Forces used maps with a scale of 1:200,000. Computer maps for supporting the command will be a novelty, too. The 6th Airborne Brigade, which was designated to participate in NATO peacekeeping operations, is using English as the language during the exercises. The remaining commands and staffs will use their English only sporadically. The use of English documents as well as NATO military signs and acronyms is intended to facilitate an evaluation of the Polish Armed Forces' readiness to cooperate with the Atlantic alliance.

Poland: Kwasniewski on NATO, U.S. Visit, Church

WS1106145196 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7 Jun 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Anna Kwiatkowska, Aleksander Checko, and Karol W. Malcuzynski in Warsaw on 6 June: "Poles on Both Sides of the Vistula River"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The Central European summit is beginning in Lancut. Can any breakthrough decisions be expected?

[Kwasniewski] I do not think anything entirely new or revolutionary will be raised in Lancut. The process we launched in 1989 is running along smoothly, and with each passing year the Central European countries approach the goals they have set for themselves in great strides. As for Poland, we are far more ahead on the road to the EU, we are more advanced in our negotiations on membership in NATO, and we have more positive experience in regional cooperation. In my view, no major threat is visible, and our basic hypotheses will be confirmed. This is not the first meeting between the Central European states, albeit the guest list is different. Discussions are informal. From the very beginning they were intended to provide the heads of Central European states with an opportunity to exchange views on the problems and the future of Europe, regional cooperation, existing threats, and challenges faced.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Will the decisions recently made at the NATO summit in Berlin accelerate our membership in the Alliance in any way?

[Kwasniewski] I believe that a tremendously important decision was made in Berlin, namely that NATO is to undergo significant changes. This, to my belief, might relieve the alliance of the stigma, attached to it by our Eastern neighbors, in particular, that NATO continues to be a creation of the Cold War, a bloc that divides Europe instead of uniting it. The declaration that NATO will develop, that it wishes to provide a new foundation for European security, is extremely important and should cut short arguments raised by those who oppose the enlargement of the alliance.

In my view, this decision actually paves the way for NATO enlargement. If the alliance strengthened its hitherto configuration and further developed the principles of cooperation within its current structures, it would mean it was far less willing to expand. A NATO that redefines its role, its place, and its internal rules will be far more ready to accept new members. I am deeply convinced that the enlargement process will take real form in 1997.

We have strengthened democratic systems in Central Europe. Central European countries are recovering from long economic crises. This is a very strong argument because not many states are willing to accept a country in deep economic crisis into its military structures. We have successfully taken part in solving the Yugoslav crisis. Although we had feared that the Partnership for Peace project might be considered an alternative to NATO, it has advanced the adaptation of military structures in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia to NATO standards.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You are going to visit the United States in July. Lech Walesa has recently been there. Do you not fear that the former president's visit may affect your own?

[Kwasniewski] I would not connect the two. I am of the opinion that the former president is also an important figure. I trust that in the course of such visits my predecessor will try to put his emotions aside and speak of Polish interests, of Poland's vital needs. The reports I have read on Lech Walesa's U.S. visit indicate there is no duality of opinions or evaluations between the former and current presidents. I also believe that former presidents—Walesa, Jaruzelski, Kaczorowski—can do a great service to Poland. The timing of my visit to the United States is very good. I will certainly be the first president from this region to meet President Clinton after the Russian elections. I think U.S. opinion on the results of the Russian elections are very important to us, and having an influence on their formation is very important.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] "I do not expect any dramatic changes in Russia's foreign policy if Zyuganov wins," Minister Lamentowicz told our reporter last week. Do you share that view?

[Kwasniewski] I do not expect any dramatic change, either. I have met with Zyuganov three times. He is neither a brawler nor an irresponsible politician. His enmity to NATO enlargement is unacceptable to us. Having been deemed a new Stalin by Yeltsin, Zyuganov retorted by agreeing with the comparison because he wants a powerful Russia. I do not believe, however, that any of the presidential candidates want a feeble Russia. Zyuganov would not be an easy partner, but Russia does not want conflict.

The majority of Russian citizens want democracy, but most of all they want to put an end to the economic crisis. They cannot do it alone. Regardless of the result of the elections, Poland's policy toward Russia should remain firm, consistent, and patient—firm because we want to enter the European structures while retaining the best possible relations with Russia, consistent because we have to talk not only on top political levels but also during the course of economic contacts, and patient because we have a partner who is suffering from his own internal problems, and anyone who thinks the decision on NATO enlargement will depend on the results of the Russian elections is wrong.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What traits should the person who will be appointed Polish ambassador to Russia have?

[Kwasniewski] The ideal choice would be [current Ambassador] Stanislaw Ciosek's younger brother. In Russia, it is not enough to know two politicians to understand Russian politics. You have to know the country, travel around it. You have to have diplomatic skills, speak Russian and English, and "be fit." We are on our way to finding a candidate.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You have still not paid one important foreign visit—to the Holy See. Do you want to go to the Vatican?

[Kwasniewski] Naturally. I think this is a badly needed visit. I invited the pope to the Eucharistic Congress in Wroclaw, thus, I will meet with him at the end of May or in early June. Each visit, however, requires a precept. After all, a president coming from the largest parliamentary group is expected to present a credible plan.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What would that plan be?

[Kwasniewski] I do not know. If the Concordat is rejected for specific reasons, I might explain during such a meeting why this happened. If the Concordat is passed, the legal status will be different. If it is neither passed nor rejected, the only question that can be asked is when a decision will be made. If that question cannot be answered, the visit would be very embarrassing and inconclusive.

Counter to rumor, I did not insist on the visit given the circumstances. I think settling the issue in Poland is more important than paying a visit to the Vatican. I believe that the visit remains purposeless as long as we fail to solve a number of basic problems, the two most significant being the Concordat and constitutional provisions on church-state relations.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Do you want the Concordat to be passed?

[Kwasniewski] I want a decision made by the public and the members of parliament on the basis of the widest scope of information possible. Charges that the decision was dominated by political considerations should be avoided. We have been unable to pass the Concordat for the past three years because we committed the "original sin" of failing to hold a public debate on the subject. Because it was not signed in the open, parliament members and, most of all, voters started having doubts. Those doubts have to be dispelled.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] As chairman of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], you said: "First the constitution, then the Concordat." What made you change your mind?

[Kwasniewski] The problem of whether the constitution should be passed before the Concordat has become a controversial one. Although I claim we are working on the constitution efficiently, it will not be adopted soon.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The SLD claims that, regardless of when the Concordat is signed, it will have to renegotiated. What do you think of that?

[Kwasniewski] The Oleksy and Cimoszewicz governments tried holding talks on the topic. The Vatican does not want to renegotiate the Concordat. I hope that the correspondence [Foreign] Minister Rosati has entered with his Vatican counterpart will dispel doubts as to financial aspects and the bilateralism of the agreement. Dialogue is necessary because the Polish state authorities have the responsibility of explaining issues that perhaps the current government did not decide about but for which it is held responsible because of the continuity of power. Once the talks end, their results will be presented to parliament members and the public. I said the Concordat needs new qualities. It could have been attained by exchanging letters. We have what we have. This does not mean that dialogue is over. We have been debating the issue for three years. Now, ladies and gentlemen, the time has come for a decision.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Will you try to persuade the SLD parliamentary club to vote for the Concordat?

[Kwasniewski] I think the decision of whether to vote for the Concordat is up to the deputies, who take responsibility for their own conscience and the voters. If the voters exert pressure on a deputy to vote against the Concordat, I have neither the moral nor the political right to demand that he do the opposite. I want that to be a conscious decision. The Concordat is not just a law that can be passed, amended later, reviewed by the Senate, appealed against via the Tribunal, or rejected. He will have to say "yes" or "no" and pay all of the consequences: internal, because the issue of the Concordat is dividing Poles, consequences in church-state relations, and international consequences because both passing and rejecting the agreement will be widely commented on throughout the world.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The issue of the Concordat must be explicit. Are you clear about it?

[Kwasniewski] The most important thing for me is what I spoke about with Primate Glemp, Nuncio Kowalczyk, and [Sejm] Speaker Zych—namely, that a dialogue be launched on the constitution. I have heard that a meeting is to be held between representatives of the Episcopate and the Constitutional Commission. Solutions to problems raised by the church—relations between the state and the church, the protection of life, and the education of children—and the preamble [to the constitution] still remain to be discussed. The moment we see the first signs that a compromise is being reached on these four major issues, that we are a country of religious freedom in which all churches are equal while remaining a secular state, then I think many of the doubts the Concordat raises could be considered settled. We do not have such solutions yet.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The church, having an influence on the [future] constitutional referendum, has already supported the Solidarity draft. What can be done about this?

[Kwasniewski] Polish law provides for procedures of passing the constitution. The Constitutional Commission was presented with the joint Solidarity and Senate draft, which is even more deeply rooted in the Christian tradition. Let us not talk any more about who has a better draft because we could go on like that for the next 1,000 years. Let us talk about the specific draft that is being developed by the Constitutional Commission established especially for this purpose. Ten topics contained in four articles are currently debated. They have to be discussed, and a conclusion has to be drawn on whether a compromise is possible. I believe that one example of such a compromise is the provision on the protection of life. The Polish constitution will be passed if a compromise is worked out. If we have two drafts, one supporting the model of a secular state and the other of a Catholic state, and one gets 51 percent support and the other 49 percent, how can we expect such a constitution to be workable? Should one-half of the Poles live on one side of the Vistula, with their own constitution, and the second half on the other side with theirs?

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But the results of the presidential elections were very similar.

[Kwasniewski] You have to respect the person the majority elected. You cannot compare elections with a constitution. The constitution, by its very nature, should provide for various issues, among them the armed forces, social rights, the judicial system—and not only refer to Christian values. It has to be a normative act approved by society.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is passing the constitution possible before the parliamentary elections, which are sheduled for May?

[Kwasniewski] The Constitutional Commission is currently completing work on the texting of the draft. Time off is needed so that a group of experts could read it, assess it, and standardize it in terms of language and definitions. The second reading can be expected in early September. Long days of work are ahead. Perhaps by early October it can be completed.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] One year ago you spoke of spring!

[Kwasniewski] I dropped some highly unrealistic deadlines to provide an incentive. Various things happened. Political campaigns were launched, the deputies were busy, chairmen of the commission changed. More than

200 articles are ready. Now we have to wrap it up. I hope that parliament members of the current Sejm and Senate will understand that it is "us, no one else; now, not any other time." The fact that the procedures of developing the constitution have not been amended is creating a danger that the effort might be wasted; the new constitution is not likely to be passed in the [parliamentary] term of 1997-2001. We would then have to start everything from scratch.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Maybe this is the problem/ . Perhaps the constitution provides the best field for waging political battles.

[Kwasniewski] I do not agree. We stand a chance of passing the constitution eight years after transformations were launched. This is ample time to pass a constitution that serves as the framework for a legitimate democratic state. If we take too long, I fear Poland will be viewed as a country in which makeshift states are the most durable.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Do you remember the difficult meeting Lech Walesa had with the Freedom Union parliamentary club? Do you not fear your meeting with the SLD next week?

[Kwasniewski] I am calm and trust it will proceed normally, like a meeting with old and tested friends.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The Concordat, the meeting with Primate Glemp, and your statement that the ineffective state administration is vulnerable to corruption because its competences are not clear (after all, this administration is made up of the SLD-Polish Peasant Party [SLD-PSL] coalition) raises doubts among leftist politicians.

[Kwasniewski] I think there would have been reason for criticism if I had not met with the primate. All of my past ties to the left aside, I am fulfilling all of my obligations to the state as president. One of those obligations is keeping in touch with representatives of the largest church in Poland.

The Concordat is a burning issue, but it is not the most important one.

As for the state administration, it is not a question of which coalition runs it. That statement should not be seen as an attack on the government. Poland did not have a historical chance to create a solid and stable administration. We have carried out many significant changes. At the Sejm, for example, we passed the self-government laws, which still need improvement. The first major reform of the administrative center was carried out in 1987. The structure created at the time is still functioning, and I believe we are now approaching the stage at which branch subdivisions have to be removed from the management system and functional ministries have to established. As for the government structure, ever since Wold War II, we have had the Council of Ministers in the form of a federation of ministries. The ministers have their ministerial laws and can legitimately refuse to follow orders from the prime minister. This is not so in Germany, where the Cabinet is collectively responsible and ministers cannot hide behind the shield of a law claiming that their ministerial competences do not allow them to make a particular decision. The draft constitution suggests changing this state of affairs. It was suggested even earlier by the government in the administration reform project.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Do you support the initiative of Deputy Rokita and Deputy Pek on strengthening the position of the prime minister?

[Kwasniewski] I support strengthening the position of the prime minister and his cabinet because only then the executive branch, empowered by parliament, can be truly efficient and responsible. When I say that the administration is weak, I am speaking about the system. The problem is well understood by the majority of serious political groups.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You want a strong prime minister, but you also want to strengthen the position of the president. This becomes particularly visible when one compares the views you represented as chairman of the Constitutional Commission and your current initiatives in this field. Have you now personally come to realize the predicament of a figurehead president who only awards medals?

[Kwasniewski] If I were to be that kind of president, the election battle would not make any sense. There are two models of governing: presidential and cabinet-parliamentary. A model combining elements of both has evolved in Poland. We do not have enough experience as a democracy to opt for a strong presidential model. We cannot have a cabinet-parliamentary model because a party system has not yet evolved. In countries with such a system, political parties are a stabilizing force.

We had a lot of difficulties in defining the role of the president. The fact that the president represents the state in international relations is simple, but what does it mean that the president guarantees the continuity of power? Does he have his own seal and flag? Does that mean that, when there is no government or parliament, he takes over their duties? It was very difficult to answer those questions. The small constitution similarly states that the president is the general overseer of internal and external security because he safeguards the constitution and is responsible for the independence and territorial integrity of Poland. What instruments does the president have in this area? Not many. We suggested the creation of an instrument allowing the coordination of activities pertaining to defense readiness and security—namely, the State Defense Committee [KOP] and an advisory body, the State Security Council [RBN].

I no longer regret that the Constitutional Commission has rejected the project of establishing KOP, although in practice it could be very convenient in circumstances where it does not make much sense to involve the entire Council of Ministers as a coordinator. How am I to perform my constitutional duties if I do not have the coordinating instrument in the form of KOP? I will have to resort to the Cabinet Council, specifically to the assembly of the Council of Ministers convened by the president.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The PSL has taken a very firm stance on earlier elections. Speaker Zych claims that the raison d'etat and the interests of the PSL require that elections be held at the prescribed date.

[Kwasniewski] I will not comment on anything related to the interests of the PSL. However, I do believe that referring to the raison d'etat in the context of elections is inappropriate. The Polish raison d'etat demands that elections be held, that they be free, democratic, and honest, and that they appoint a stable parliament and government. Moreover, the raison d'etat requires that we create a situation in which, after the elections, the government could begin working on the budget law in a normal manner. If the budget law is drafted in the course of an election campaign, it will become an element of political fighting. It is best to separate the budget from elections, otherwise it will not be adequate.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Appraising your first 100 days in office as president, [Presidential Chancellery head] Minister Waniek said that the Chancellery was busy extinguishing conflicts generated on the political scene by the Oleksy case. This was not something everyone observed.

[Kwasniewski] I was faced with the Oleksy case, one of the most difficult and precarious, immediately upon taking office. Failing to solve the problem would have posed the danger of uncontrollable tension. We ended up relatively unscathed. This is due primarily to the fact that we were capable of appointing a cabinet with wide social support very quickly. Second, legal proceedings were instituted, as a result of which investigations were dropped and no one ever complained that the prosecutor had worked under political pressure.

I said that the case had to be settled by parliament and by the law. The prosecutor's office and the internal commission of the Office of State Protection [UOP] have finalized their investigations, the Sejm commission will soon complete its proceedings, and a white paper will be published so that the confounded public can see the documents with their very own eyes. These political, parliamentary, and legal proceedings allowed state institutions to be cleared. This does not mean that the discussion is over.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How can the case be sensibly closed without provoking charges of hiding the truth? Would a decision have to be reached by all political forces?

[Kwasniewski] I do not think any political action can put an end to the case. A thorough debate has to be held once the Sejm commission completes its work, and definite conclusions must be drawn from the report by the internal commission of UOP because we cannot settle for statements claiming that the law was violated or that false testimony was given. Deep institutional changes have to be carried out in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and UOP, and civilian control over these institutions has to be introduced in order to ensure that similar events do not take place in the future.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is agent "O" someone in the Polish state administration?

[Kwasniewski] I do not know anything about this. I have not seen any documents. Experts deal with cases like this. If we do not know whether there is an agent within state structures, it is up to special services to establish that. Now that the secret services have new leaders, who were not involved in the case, they can find the man with precision and without any hindrance.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Are "Olin" and "O" one and the same person?

[Kwasniewski] No, this was clearly stated in the report. All my knowledge comes from that report.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Does that mean that "Olin" does not exist?

[Kwasniewski] I was not in charge of the case.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is "O" the code name of Colonel Anklewicz?

[Kwasniewski] I do not know.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Will the white paper contain the documents on the Oleksy case disclosed by the Presidential Chancellery that had been left behind by Lech Walesa, as well as your report on a meeting with [former Interior Minister] Milczanowski and [former Foreign] Minister Bartoszewski?

[Kwasniewski] This report will not be included because it was never written. We found only three documents at the Chancellery that I found to be significant because they presented my talks with Ministers Bartoszewski and Milczanowski in a completely different light. Those talks were held on 11 and 12 December. An ultimatum was made that Prime Minister Oleksy vanish from the political scene both as prime minister and deputy. We spoke of possible dates. The first feasible one was 20 December. Minister Milczanowski then said that sometime after 19 December would be better. And we parted. Correspondence found at the Chancellery indicates that, on 13 December, one day after our conversation, the president notified the prosecutor that the case was to be launched. It was launched before 19 December. No one told me what was going on. That is why I do not know what the ultimatum was. Before 19 December, we held a lot of talks on how to protect Poland from a brawl.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Was there such a chance?

[Kwasniewski] There was. Minister Milczanowski could have stayed in office, the materials could have remained in his files, and we could have checked them. The information that charges were leveled against the prime minister, not backed by fact, did not give me any room to formulate an opinion.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Do you think President Walesa and Minister Milczanowski should be placed before the State Tribunal?

[Kwasniewski] There is no reason in the case of President Walesa. I believe he was far better informed than I and took the action his duties required him to.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How do you think the case will end?

[Kwasniewski] There is a chance this case will be settled. This is possible if prosecutors, judges, and anyone else appointed to make a decision display independence and professionalism, and if the media show responsibility. The case is being described in the papers as if it were a detective series with an unpredictable ending. The commissions are working, information is leaking, interpretations proliferate, comments are made, and comments create facts.

As president, I feel responsible for the disarray in the protection of state interests and secrets. I am starting with the politicians because none of the reporters would have seen those documents if they had not been revealed by someone who had access to them and the obligation to protect them. I thus wish to appeal for the reinstatement of a normal state, in which the media are independent and watch politicians' moves, but where the principle of responsibility is observed.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is this only an appeal, or is it something more?

[Kwasniewski] For the time being, I am only appealing and taking action in connection with the leaks. The Prosecutor's Office is working. If any paper or politician is punished for the leaks, I will not expect indignant outcries that this is tantamount to "muffling" and a coup on the freedom of speech.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] At a meeting with reporters, you announced that we would have half a year of boredom ahead. When will words be finally followed by deeds, and what will those deeds be?

[Kwasniewski] It seems boredom is not Poland's destiny. From the point of view of state interests, we could use boredom. I think that once the "Olin" case is over we will have time to talk about things that are really important. I would really like to see the constitution stir up as much emotion as the "Olin" case did once we complete the final draft and invite a public debate.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Do you follow the fate of your own initiatives, for example, the Constitutional Tribunal case?

[Kwasniewski] A draft amendment has been submitted to the Sejm and—to my knowledge—the first reading is to take place before the end of June. I wonder whether I myself should present it to the Sejm.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Do you intend to put up a fight to turn Warsaw into a European capital, and not a central provincial town?

[Kwasniewski] I have been living in Warsaw since 1979. My father was a native of Warsaw. I was a deputy from this city; therefore, I feel sentimental and indebted to it. The changes taking place in Warsaw are truly immense. It will be difficult for Warsaw to become a city like Prague or Budapest for historical reasons. Before the celebrations of the 400th anniversary of Warsaw had been launched, I told Mayor Swiecicki and a number of people who care about our capital—for example, Professor Gieysztor—that, apart from putting on a fireworks display, we should come forth with a wise and necessary project for Warsaw. The city has a problem with the transportation system. Unless the subway is developed, the city will "choke." Besides, the city needs at least one more bridge, two if the Syrena Bridge is taken down. I am not worried about investments in Warsaw. I have spoken with several representatives of major international companies, and they want to come to Warsaw to do permanent business here.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Gdansk Solidarity Begins Shipyard Strike

LD1206082596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0600 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A two-day sit-in strike started at the Gdansk Shipyard an hour ago. The decision on the strike was made by the work force at a protest rally yesterday. Trade unionists are protesting against the decision on the shipyard's bankruptcy and are demanding action from the government to save the plant, which is deeply in debt.

[Correspondent Agnieszka Michajlow] Employees of companies who wanted to start work as normal were not allowed in. A dozen or so shipyard workers are guarding the entrance to the yard. So far, it is not known how many people will take part in today's strike.

Banners, posters, and flags have been placed on the historic Gate Number Two [symbol of the 1980 strikes]. Religious hymns are being played by loudspeakers.

Jerzy Borowczak, leader of the shipyard Solidarity organization, has not arrived yet, and the immediate plans of the strike committee are not known. The strike has been planned for 48 hours. It is to continue until 0600 hours on Friday. So far, most of the shipyard workers have remained at the plant.

The Gdansk region Solidarity branch has invited Gdansk residents and shipyard sympathizers to take part in a support rally at the shipyard gate this afternoon at 1600. Trade union committees from other enterprises that support the shipyard strike are to take part in the rally.

Poland: Sejm To Debate Gdansk Shipyard Bankruptcy Decision

LD1206090596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Sejm [lower house of parliament] has accepted a motion, filed by the [opposition] Freedom Union [UW], demanding a report by the prime minister on the situation at Gdansk Shipyard, as well as the reasons for the government's decision to declare the plant bankrupt. Over to our parliamentary reporter:

[Unidentified correspondent] Good morning. The agenda of the Sejm's 81st session has been slightly changed. As we have reported, following a UW motion, the Sejm is to debate the issue of the Gdansk Shipyard's bankruptcy. According to UW representatives, the government's decision concerning the plant was motivated not only by economic, but also by political reasons. They say that many other enterprises are in a similar situation to what the shipyard is in—for example, coal mines—and similarly radical decisions have not been made with regard to them.

However, the Sejm has rejected a motion for a resolution on the issue. [passage omitted]

Poland: President Comments on Gdansk Shipyard's Bankruptcy

LD1106153596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Aleksander Kwasniewski thinks that Gdansk Shipyard's declaration of bankruptcy is legal and a result of the enterprise's bad financial condition. Antoni Styrczula, the president's spokesman, stressed that the president believes poor management was to blame for the current situation.

[Begin Styrczula recording] The bankruptcy decision was issued in accordance with the law. The reason for the decision was Gdansk Shipyard's very poor financial and economic condition. The economic collapse was a result of ineffective measures taken over many years by the yard management.

The president also expressed the hope that the State Treasury, which owns the majority of the shares, 60 percent, will do everything it can to ensure that the bankruptcy process is conducted in a controlled manner and to provide jobs for the people who fail to find employment at plants that will be established after the declaration of bankruptcy.

The president hopes that representatives of the State Treasury will demonstrate sensitivity, give the necessary assistance, and show understanding of the problems the Gdansk Shipyard work force may experience. The work force has been a victim of poor management of the yard during the past four years. [end recording]

Poland: Interior Minister Fires Bialystok Security Chief

LD1106185796 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister of Internal Affairs Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has dismissed Captain Krzysztof Bondaryk from his post of head of the Bialystok division of the State Protection Office [UOP]. The interior minister implied that the dismissal is connected with the publication by Konrad Napierala, a Union of Labor [UP] deputy, of a UOP official's order concerning the monitoring of security threats resulting from social unrest and strikes at major work enterprises.

Romania: Melescanu Views NATO Integration Chances

AU1106133596 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 7 Jun 96 p 12

[Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Bogdan Chirieac; place and date not given: "One Should Not Dramatize the Declarations in the Budapest Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Chirieac] Mr. Minister, what is the practical significance of presenting the strategy for Romania's joining NATO?

[Melescanu] In my opinion, the elaboration of that strategy has a double significance: First, for Romania, the establishment of the measures that ought to be taken on a short- and medium-term basis indicates the determination of our country to do its best to be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement. Furthermore, this strategy is also intended to achieve a more efficient coordination of our national efforts made to meet the admission requirements and thus reach our goal. Second, for the alliance, the elaboration of this strategy comes to demonstrate once more the seriousness with which our country embarked on the road of integration.

[Chirieac] In your assessment, does the reform within NATO favor the eastward expansion of the alliance?

[Melescanu] Of course. Every current NATO reform is also implemented with an eye toward enlargement. The recent measures by which they created a European identity within the alliance cannot be interpreted in any other way but solely as a further step made to achieve enlargement. Actually, the creation and strengthening of a European pillar within NATO implies, among other things, the broadening of the circle of the European countries that are members of NATO. As a matter of fact, at the Berlin conference [of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council—NACC], U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher suggested that the aforementioned European pillar should also be joined by the partner countries in central Europe.

[Chirieac] Are there any new elements that could redefine Romania's position in the race for Euro-Atlantic integration?

[Melescanu] You are right, certain new elements have emerged recently in Romania's relations with NATO. As is known, our country has already commenced its individual dialogue with the alliance, and a second round of talks is to be held soon. Furthermore, at the recent Supreme Defense Council meeting they established several measures intended to work as a framework for our actions to achieve this fundamental objective of Romanian foreign policy, namely our integration within the European and Euro-Atlantic political-military, economic, and security structures. To illustrate this, I would mention just a few of the concrete steps that are to be taken in the near future, such as: the setting up of an interdepartmental body to manage the our political-military NATO integration efforts; the setting up of a distinct Romanian diplomatic mission accredited to NATO; and the intensifying of our bilateral dialogue with NATO, as well as with all its member countries, by means of every possible channel, be it governmental, parliamentary, or at the level of political parties. And finally, I would mention one more, perhaps a fundamental element in defining Romania's position in its relations with the North Atlantic alliance. This is the one that can be derived from the support given by our country to the peace process in the former Yugoslav region, to the relaunching of cooperation among the Balkan countries, as well as the ones in its vicinity, and, generally, to the consolidation of the climate of balance, security, and stability in our region.

I believe that all the aforementioned efforts will not pass without qualitative results in our country's relations with NATO.

[Chirieac] Recently the Republican Bob Dole presented a draft to the U.S. Senate regarding the acceleration of the NATO expansion. Do you consider that he solely envisaged, as some press agencies claim, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary?

[Melescanu] It is true that Mr. Bob Dole, the leader of the Republican majority in the U.S. Congress, has presented a draft on the acceleration of NATO enlargement. However, what I would like to recall is the fact that elections are to be held soon in the United States, and therefore such initiatives ought to be seen in their electoral context as well. It is true, this initiative nominates some of the countries, but even if it is passed, it will not have the nature of a law. Furthermore one should not forget that the U.S. Administration also has a clear stance of its own, which, as a matter of fact, they are promoting in the NATO enlargement process. This stand is based on the evaluation of the way in which the candidate countries meet the criteria established in the NATO enlargement study and the designation of the future members of the alliance.

[Chirieac] What is your assessment of the recent statements made by Yevgeniy Primakov, muting, to a certain extent, Russia's opposition regarding NATO enlargement?

[Melescanu] It is difficult to make an immediate assessment of Minister Primakov's statements, due especially to the slightly conflicting nuances in the way various press agencies reported on those statements. It is quite obvious that any constructive position, any opening on behalf of the Russian Federation regarding NATO enlargement cannot but suit the wish of the central European countries, including Romania's, to integrate within NATO. As I have stated before, the expansion of NATO to include the central European countries, together with certain concrete steps made to establish partnership relations between NATO and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and all other countries that have not expressed their wish to join the alliance, represent, in our opinion, the backbone of future European security.

[Chirieac] Would you comment on the recent statements in the Hungarian Parliament with respect to Trianon and collective rights for ethnic minorities?

[Melescanu] I appreciate the promptness by which the daily ADEVARUL published the speeches made on 4 June 1996 in the Hungarian Parliament, occasioned by the 76th anniversary of the Trianon Treaty. As anyone could notice, the declarations in question were made by representatives of certain political parties that are known for their nostalgic stance for bygone times.

Personally, I believe that such declarations should not be dramatized, because they come from political forces that do not play a major role on the Hungarian political scene. As a matter of fact, I think it would be sufficient for me to recall that Hungarian political personalities, including Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, the Hungarian foreign minister, took a stance against those declarations.

On the other hand, however, I would like to emphasize the fact that such declarations do not favor, in any way, the normal evolution of the relations between our countries, and therefore it is necessary that we should make efforts to eliminate them.

[Chirieac] In the next few days, in Warsaw, there will be a meeting of the presidents of Austria, Germany, and Italy with the presidents of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine, focusing on the perspective of their integration within Euro-Atlantic bodies. Why do you believe Romania was not invited as well?

[Melescanu] It is true that in the coming days in Poland there will be a conference of the presidents of the nine countries you mentioned. I would like to point out that such meetings represent a form of cooperation initiated in 1993 by Austria, intended to help the furthering of closer relations between the central European and the west European countries. The number of countries attending such meetings increases by giving the presidents of the host countries the right to invite the president of one of the neighboring countries. This year Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski invited the president of Ukraine, Mr. Leonid Kuchma.

Personally, I believe that in the future they will also invite our country to attend such conferences.

Romania: Zimbabwean President Signs Trade Accord

AU1106190396 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The official two-day visit paid to our country by Robert Mugabe, president of the Republic of Zimbabwe, concluded this afternoon. After a last round of talks at Cotroceni Palace, a trade agreement was signed between the governments of the two countries.

At a joint news conference with Romania's president, the sides emphasized their mutual interest in developing the bilateral relations in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. They pointed out the importance of direct contacts between the chambers of trade and industry, banks, and economic units from the two countries. In this respect, they referred to the negotiations on concluding certain contracts for the delivery of Romanian tractors and trucks and for the construction of an assembly line for this product in Zimbabwe. Likewise, Romania intends to export water installations and to grant assistance to Zimbabwe in the railway sphere. The Romanian side also showed its interest in Zimbabwe's rich mineral resources—our correspondent Sorina Man reports.

Robert Mugabe, president of the Republic of Zimbabwe, also met with Romanian businessmen in Bucharest this afternoon.

Romania: Gherman Hopeful About Signing of Treaty With Hungary

AU1006125896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Senate President Oliviu Gherman held a news conference today dedicated to the conference of the presidents of the European parliamentary assemblies, which he attended between 7 and 9 June in Budapest. This conference is held every second year and is attended by the presidents and secretarys general of the parliaments of the Council of Europe member states.

Mr. Gherman pointed out that the Budapest conference offered him the opportunity to meet with the heads of the Ukrainian, Swedish, Moldovan, and Hungarian parliament heads.

Replying to a question about the current stage of the basic treaty with Hungary and the prospects of its being signed, Mr. Gherman expressed the hope that the Hungarian treaty could be signed following the [3 November] legislative elections in Romania, but before the end of the current year. Romania, however, added Gherman, maintains its position regarding Recommendation 1201 [of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly], our correspondent Dan Preda reports.

Romania: CDR Leader Not Ruling Out Coalition With USD

AU1006163796 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 8 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by Irinel Radulescu on statements by CDR President Emil Constantinescu after the announcement of the 2 June local election results: "Emil Constantinescu After 'CDR Day'—'If Parliamentary Elections Were To Be Held Now, the CDR Could Form a Government Alone or Together With the Democratic Party'—If the Electoral Threshold Had Been Kept at 5 Percent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Under Professor Emil Constantinescu's smiling gaze, the representatives of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] who qualified for the runoffs for the Bucharest Mayoralty and Bucharest Sector Mayoralties held their first news conference yesterday, 7 June, after the first round of local elections. The day of 2 June was qualified as "CDR day" by Victor Ciorbea who continued to anticipate: "And after the runoffs we will talk about a CDR holiday."

Recalling all the "manipulations to which the press was submitted" and also the latest released statistic data, the CDR leader evaluated the situation that was created after 2 June: "The person's qualities were important for the position of mayor. Regarding the votes for councillors, these were cast for parties. This means that if parliamentary elections were to be held now, the CDR could form a government alone or with the PD [Democratic Party]." Emil Constantinescu expressed the belief that, had the electoral threshold stayed at 5 percent, this would have made a contribution to the structure of the parliamentary majority. However, Professor Constantinescu believes that the PDSR [Party of Social Democracy of Romania] was afraid and preferred to open up the gates to smaller parties for the possibility of future alliances. From data released so far, one can see that the CDR has obtained at this year's local elections fewer votes than in 1992. The CDR leader reckons that this is due also to the massive absenteeism at the voting stations and in no way to the parties that withdraw from the CDR and which, according to the results, "have disappeared at country level." Certainly, they could be reaccepted in the alliance, on condition that they respect the protocol and do not come up with exaggerated claims.

A CDR-USD Accord at the Level of Local and County Councillors

Victor Ciorbea, the CDR's candidate in the runoffs for the position of Bucharest mayor, announced that they are nearing the conclusion of an accord between CDR and USD [Social Democratic Union] councillors, so that the opposition can boast an absolute majority in local and county councils to be able to implement its program. Ciorbea said that, under the current circumstances, the PDSR councillors have no chance whatsoever, regardless of the alliance they wish to conclude, to implement their own program. In this context of alliances, Emil Constantinescu emphasized once again that he rules out all understanding with the PDSR, either or probably in the future, too, given the fact that he is thinking of a CDR-USD government.

Romania: PUNR's Funar on Plans as Reelected Cluj Mayor

AU0906174096 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 4 Jun 96 p 17

[Interview with Cluj Mayor Gheorghe Funar by Mircea Tatar; place and date not given: "We Have To Be Considerate With Our Colleagues in the PDSR, Given the Fact That They Are in Mourning After These Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tatar] Mr. Gheorghe Funar, you have won again the position of mayor of Cluj Municipality. What do you wish to convey to Cluj residents and to the inhabitants of our country?

[Funar] I thank the residents of Cluj-Napoca municipality for the outstanding civic sense that they displayed and for the responsibility and maturity that they showed during the local elections, when they went in large number to the voting stations. I am glad and I thank them that they trusted the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] representative for the position of mayor of Cluj-Napoca Municipality to ensure unity and continuity to this position.

[Tatar] The Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR] wished very much to win the Cluj Mayoralty. Do you believe that your victory will influence in a negative way the future cooperation with the PDSR?

[Funar] No, on the contrary. I believe that this cooperation will be enhanced after the local elections and we will try to be considerate with our colleagues in the PDSR and virtually take into account the fact that they started mourning after these elections, at least in Transylvania. From data that I have received, the results are disastrous for the candidates of the PDSR. These are incredibly low results for the PDSR after an aggressive and forceful electoral campaign in which PDSR leaders were involved and even President Iliescu was invited to make the acquaintance of many candidates in Transylvania. Nevertheless, a great majority of the electorate turned toward the PUNR and not only in Transylvania but also in many other counties of the country. I thank the Romanians who trusted us.

[Tatar] An idea has been circulating lately, namely that Cluj Mayoralty is greatly important for the PUNR and its political future depends on it. Does it indeed mean that much to the PUNR that you won the elections in Cluj-Napoca in the first ballot?

[Funar] I believe that regarding the realistic aspect of the 2 June elections in Cluj-Napoca, these results are extraordinary for the PUNR and for the president of the party and the results of these elections give us the opportunity to make known throughout the country that in Cluj-Napoca, in the past four years, there was a real public administration and the Romanians felt indeed masters in the spiritual capital of Transylvania. They acted as such and succeeded in making Cluj-Napoca one of the most beautiful towns of Romania. I hope that by implementing the electoral offer that we made, in the next years, with the help of the residents of this municipality, we will turn Cluj-Napoca into the first city of Romania.

[Tatar] Will this victory stimulate you to run for the country's presidency?

[Funar] At the moment this is not a topic for discussions. We, the PUNR members, will strive to support our colleagues who are competing in the runoffs. Then, we will meet in our National Council to examine the results of local elections and discuss the strategy for the parliamentary and presidential elections, and after all that, such a possibility will also be discussed.

[Tatar] How do you view cooperation with the other parties in the future local council of Cluj-Napoca Municipality?

[Funar] We hope to gain almost 50 percent of the councillor seats; we will cooperate the way we did in the previous term with the councillors of other political parties and we will try from the beginning of the new council's activity to make the councillors understand that they have been elected by the residents of Cluj-Napoca Municipality to solve their problems and there is no point in dividing themselves into councillors of those in power and those of the opposition.

Slovenia: Drnovsek Signs EU Associate Membership Accord

AU1106101796 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In the absence of Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler, Slovene Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek signed an agreement on our associate membership in the EU in Luxembourg a few minutes ago. On this occasion, he also submitted an application for our full membership in the EU. Here is Edo Zitnik, our special correspondent, reporting from Luxembourg:

[Zitnik] Prime Minister Drnovsek first thanked all the ministers present who had signed the agreement on behalf of the members of the 15 and the European Commission for their help in preparing for the signing of the agreement. He said that over the past two years, all chairmen of the 15—Germany, France, Spain, and Italy—made a special effort to help solve the case of Slovenia. Prime Minister Drnovsek also thanked Great Britain for its goodwill move because without it, despite the solution to the dispute with Italy, the signing would not have been possible today.

According to Drnovsek, through associate membership, Slovenia will strengthen its already high level of cooperation with the EU. It will have an opportunity to actively participate in the European integration process both through European institutions and as an associate member. On this occasion, Drnovsek delivered the application for full membership to EU Chairman Lamberto Dini. According to Drnovsek, this is a logical consequence of the Slovene rapprochement with the EU that began in 1991 following independence.

For Slovenia, today's signing concludes a significant period. Drnovsek expressed the hope that this will mark the beginning of an even more significant period for Slovenia. According to Drnovsek, because Slovenia is one of the most successful countries in transition, it will be in the first group of candidates to start negotiations for and to receive full membership.

Slovenia has applied for full membership at a time when the EU is reforming itself. According to Drnovsek, one of the important issues of the reform is how to accept new members while maintaining the unity of the Union and preserving the differences among the members. Answers to such questions are particularly important for Slovenia as a small country that has just become independent.

Addressing the ministers present, Drnovsek expressed his hope that the intergovernmental conference on Union reform would be successful and would prepare conditions for expanding European social and economic standards, stability, and progress to future members.

Slovenia: PM Hopes Slovenia Among First New Full EU Members

AU1106133696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 10 Jun 96

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Luxembourg—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the signing of a 240-page document on associate membership, Slovenia today became the tenth East European associate EU member. Prime Minister Drnovsek, who signed the agreement in Slovenia's name, said on this occasion that this was one of the most important moments in the history of relations between Slovenia and the European Union.

Simultaneously with the signing, Drnovsek handed our request for full European Union membership to the EU Chairman, Italian Foreign Minister Dini. He expressed the hope here that Slovenia, as one of the most successful countries in the transition, would be in the first group of countries to start negotiations on full membership.

Italian Foreign Minister Dini voiced satisfaction that the dispute between the countries, because of which Slovenia had waited two years for the signing of today's agreement, was resolved. He voiced the hope that the Italian parliament, just as the European Parliament and the parliaments of other EU members, would ratify the Slovene agreement as soon as possible. EU East Europe Commissioner Van den Broek voiced a similar wish. According to him, Slovenia will now be able to also formally take part in the so-called prejoining strategy, with which the associate members are preparing for a full EU membership. The European Commission will now officially draw up an assessment of Slovenia's readiness for full membership, on the basis of which, as some estimates believe, the Union will start shortlisting the most serious candidates for entry in about six months' time.

As a result of today's signing, the Slovene representatives will attend the information meeting hosted by Italian Foreign Minister Dini in Luxembourg tomorrow, who will brief the EU associate members on the progress of the preparations for the EU reform.

Slovenia: Kucan Says EU Agreement Fulfills Expectations

AU1106140596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 10 Jun 96

[Statement by Slovene President Milan Kucan on the signing of Slovenia's EU associate membership; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The signing of the EU associate membership is an act by which Slovenia repays a substantial portion of the debt toward its citizens, the debt connected to the expectations surrounding our plebiscite and proclamation of the independence, namely that Slovenia would joint the Euro-Atlantic structures.

The EU associate membership agreement involves Slovenia in the structural dialogue on the future of the European Union, the future of Europe, and of course also the future of Slovenia. It also opens possibilities for Slovenia's cooperation on an equal footing in the European cooperation processes.

Our seriousness and maturity are to be tested now, especially because we have also voiced our desire for full-fledged membership. To accomplish this, we will need to resume the interrupted political parties' negotiations on a consensus on Slovenia's pro-European orientation, that is, integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Slovenia: Political Parties View Signing of EU Agreement

AU1106154296 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning we invited all leaders of the parliamentary opposition parties to assess yesterday's signing of the EU associate membership agreement for our station. Nadja Pengov has rounded up their statements:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] Tone Persak, the Democratic Party:

[Persak] There are at least two positive reasons for signing this agreement. One of them is the protection of our economy, that is, our economic interest in exporting to the EU and the other is Slovenia's separation from the group of countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia at a symbolic level. What is problematic in connection with this agreement is that Italy nevertheless managed to squeeze a sort of bilateral promise from us.

[Pengov] Marjan Podobnik, the Slovene People's Party:

[Podobnik] The manner in which the associate membership agreement was signed unfortunately also means the defeat of the European idea because the European countries agreed to Italy's humiliating Slovenia into accepting the conditions that no other country had agreed to. I can only hope that the adoption of the Spanish proposal—by the way, the People's Party voted against it—will not result in any fateful, long-term consequences for Slovenia regarding the territorial issues.

[Pengov] Janez Kocjancic, the United List of Social Democrats:

[Kocjancic] We believe that this is the crucial step that will allow further progress toward achieving Slovenia's full-fledged membership in the EU and our inclusion in the political and economic circle to which Slovenia belongs historically and by merit of its (?orientation).

[Pengov] Janez Jansa, the Social Democratic Party:

[Jansa] The fact is that Slovenia finally signed the association agreement and that, although it met most criteria a lot better than other East and Central European countries that had signed this agreement beforehand, it was practically the last one to do so. What is still ambiguous in our opinion are all the accompanying appendices to this agreement. Generally speaking, signing this agreement is positive, especially because Slovenia is facing the loss of the exclusive right on trade quotas that it enjoyed.

[Pengov] Zmago Jelincic, the Slovene National Party:

[Jelincic] Signing the agreement with the EU could be anticipated, and ultimately it is right that it was signed; however, the price that we paid for it was absolutely too high. We allowed our neighbors from Italy and indirectly also from Austria to push us to the point where the Slovene Government out of incompetence agreed to absolutely all the conditions, which harm Slovenia greatly.

[Pengov] Saso Lap, the Slovene National Right:

[Lap] We perceive the signing as the ultimate separation from the Balkans. In the continuation we will naturally have to adjust our legislation. Let me tell you that at our proposal [words indistinct] in the first reading, an additional conclusion was passed to the law on ownership rights which envisages a 15km security belt along the border with Italy and Austria—the State Chamber passed this appendix with an overwhelming majority—which prevents the purchase of land by foreigners. [end recording]

Slovenia: U.S. Contribution to EU Association Accord Noted

AU1106152096 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Report by Uros Lipuscek from New York—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although today's NEW YORK TIMES reported the signing of the associate membership agreement between Slovenia and the European Union in only one sentence, Washington has been monitoring the process that led to yesterday's event very carefully. The Clinton administration, which has been following Slovenia's efforts to join the European Union with sympathy all the time, advised British Foreign Secretary Rifkind, who paid an official visit to Washington last week, that the British Government should refrain from blocking the signing of our EU associate membership despite the so-called mad-cow war that is under way between London and Brussels. U.S. officials advised something similar to present Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi during his visit to Washington prior to the last parliamentary elections in Italy. It is evident that the new center-left coalition in Italy is more receptive to U.S. advice than the previous two Italian governments.

Official Washington, which has advised the Italian and Slovene sides to control their passions, has thus contributed substantially to the signing of the EU associate membership agreement yesterday. The U.S. mediation was very subtle and diplomatically polite and formed a part of the wider Pentagon plan to create a sort of central European NATO pact wing by linking Italy, Slovenia, and Hungary that will prevent the spread of instability into Europe.

Slovenia: Bonds Issued To Repay Slovene Share of SFRY Debt

AU1106171596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today is also an important day for Slovenia. Our country accomplished another important stage in the achievement of its independence today. It has issued bonds by which it will repay its share of the former Yugoslav debt to foreign commercial banks. As is known, the negotiators after several years of talks reached a consensus a little less than a year ago. According to it, Slovenia will repay 18 percent of the debt of the former Yugoslavia. Suzana Kos reports:

[Begin recording] [Passage omitted] As reported, Slovenia issued these bonds today, namely, in German Marks and in U.S. dollars, separately for the portion of the debt due and separately for the portion of the debt not due yet. The creditors previously specified the currency of the bonds that will appear on the Luxembourg stock exchange.

Chief of the Slovene negotiators Mojmir Mrak on this occasion stated that the international financial markets are now opening for our country. The chief of the other side said that the creditors were satisfied with the exchange of the old debt for the new, that is, for the Slovene bonds. As he said, this is an extremely important step for the resolution of the entire debt issue.

Let us also say that Slovenia issued 646 million in dollar bonds and 255 million in German mark bonds. In our currency, the entire Slovene debt without interest, according to the medium exchange rate of the Bank of Slovenia, amounts to a little more than 122 billion Slovene tolars. [end recording]

Slovenia: Union Leader Says Unemployment Doubled Since 1991

LD1006230296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1628 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 10 Jun (SRNA)—Dusan Semolic, leader of the Slovene Association of Trade Unions, said in Podgorica today that there were 130,000 unemployed workers in Slovenia at the moment and that this was 50 percent more than when Slovenia seceded from [former] Yugoslavia.

Semolic, who is heading a delegation of the Slovene Trade Unions visiting Montenegrin trade union representatives, also said that Slovene unions had managed to secure a minimum wage of DM420 and a summer holiday bonus worth DM1,000.

According to Semolic, the average wage in Slovenia is DM850 while a three-member family needs DM1,100 for a selection of staple goods which is almost three times more than the minimum wage.

He said that Slovene workers in the metal-processing, textile, and leather industries faced great difficulties and that one of the reasons for this was the loss of markets in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Federal

FRY: Government Adopts Stand for IMF Membership

LD1006164796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1510 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 10 Jun (TANJUG)—At the session held today, the federal government adopted the Yugoslav delegation's basic principles for experts' talks with representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be held in Geneva on 14 and 15 June, the Federal Ministry of Information announced today.

This is the continuation of talks concerning the membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the IMF.

At this meeting, the Yugoslav delegation, which is to be led by Oskar Kovac, will act in line with the unanimously adopted principles of the federal government, in which the consistent policy of the FRY is clearly recognized.

The status of the FRY in the IMF and its legal and economic aspects will be the main topics at the experts talks in Geneva.

The federal government has again expressed its readiness to achieve the best possible solutions for the normalization of relations with this financial institution.

The Yugoslav side will attempt to resolve issues relating to its status within the fund in a pragmatic and realistic manner.

The government concluded that the principles for the Geneva talks are based on earlier adopted documents of the federal government and are within the principles and framework of the FRY stabilization and development policy.

The federal government adopted the basic principles for the participation of the FRY delegation in the ministerial conferenece on implementation of the Dayton Agreement, to be held on 13 and 14 June in Florence.

The basic aim of the conference is to review the results of six months of the application of the Dayton Agreement, as well as agreement on its further implementation and the realization of the set deadlines.

The participants will concentrate on the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the return of refugees, and regional arms control.

Special attention will be devoted to efforts to secure full freedom of movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a precondition for the elections.

In line with our peace policy, the Yugoslav delegation, to be headed by Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, will insist on the comprehensive implementation of the Dayton Agreement and on all sides being treated on an equal footing.

The federal government decided that Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, will lead a FRY delegation to the signing ceremony for the agreement on subregional arms control to be held in Oslo tomorrow.

This agreement reflects the position advocated by our country in Dayton and the obligations set by the peace agreement. [passage omitted]

The government also adopted the program for the visit of Federal Trade Minister Djordje Siradovic to Great Britain between 17 and 19 June.

During his visit, Minister Siradovic will take part in a seminar on the FRY in which over 100 British and Yugoslav businessmen are expected to participate, the statement says.

The session was chaired by Radoje Kontic.

FRY: Government Outlines Strategy for Talks With IMF

AU0706145496 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a report from the federal Secretariat for Information on the joint meeting of government commissions.

The federal Secretariat for Information has announced that in accordance with the determination and decision of the Federal Government to normalize relations between the FRY and the international financial and economic institutions as soon as possible, the FRY delegation and representatives of the IMF will hold talks—or, more precisely, continue them—in Geneva on 13 and 14 June.

On the occasion of the upcoming experts' talks in Geneva, a joint session, chaired by Radoje Kontic, was held today at the Federation Palace between the Federal Government's commission for relations with the IMF and international financial institutions and the commission for the supervision of working groups to the council for the implementation of peace. The meeting participants discussed activities and platforms for the two-day talks, which the FRY delegation will attend at the IMF seat in Geneva on 13 and 14 June.

At the meeting with IMF representatives, the five-member FRY delegation, led by Oskar Kovac, will act in accordance with unanimously agreed upon principles of the federal government. In that sense, it is expected that our delegation in Geneva will concentrate on the legal and economic aspects of regulating the status of the FRY in the IMF.

Expecting the Geneva talks to be a working meeting, the two government commissions have reiterated their readiness to work toward an optimal solution for the normalization of relations with the IMF by separating economic and financial issues from political questions linked to the succession of the former SFRY. The Yugoslav side will endeavor to resolve the question of its status in the IMF in a pragmatic way that will satisfy both sides and that will not be disadvantageous for either of the interested parties. Keeping in mind that the proposed platform for the Geneva talks is founded on some previously adopted documents concerning (?legal) grounds and guidelines of the stabilization and development policy of the Federal Government, the FRY delegation is prepared to discuss all questions regarding the procedure for regulating the FRY's status in the IMF, which also means discussing economic conditions on the basis of previous financial arrangements and obligations, concludes the statement of the federal Secretariat for Information.

FRY: Army Court Denies War Crimes Charges Against Officers

LD0706151596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1225 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 June (SRNA)—Colonel Radomir Gojovic, president of the Yugoslav Army's military court in Belgrade, has denied the statement by Hague Tribunal President Antonio Cassese that charges have been brought against three officers of the former Yugoslav People's Army, today's DNEVNI TELEGRAF writes.

"The military prosecutor has brought no charges in this court against Veselin Sljivancanin, Mile Mrksic, or Miroslav Radic, because there is so far not the necessary evidence for an indictment," Gojovic said.

Cassese had talks yesterday with Colonel Milos Gojkovic, chairman of the supreme military court, and said the procedure for handing over the three officers of the former Yugoslav People's Army has begun.

FRY: Russian Ambassador Sees Scope for Improving Relations

LD1106231196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2231 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 11 (TANJUG)—The Russian ambassador in Belgrade said Tuesday that all conditions existed for stepping up the development of bilateral political, economic and cultural relations.

Speaking at a reception he gave to mark Russian national day, Ambassador Yuriy Kotov said that the leaders of Russia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had the political will to make this happen.

The Russian and Yugoslav peoples feel the same, said Kotov, adding that this made him confident that Russian-Yugoslav relations had a bright future.

The reception [words indistinct] high [words indistinct] Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its Republic of Serbia, the Armed Forces, prominent businessmen and cultural workers, church dignitaries and members of the diplomatic corps.

Kotov said that Russia and Yugoslavia had a tradition of good bilateral relations, even in hard times, such as during the operation of the international sanctions against Yugoslavia.

He said that Russia and the Russian people marked June 12 as their new national holiday, to commemorate Russia's sovereignty declaration of 1991.

Kotov said that all the republics of the former Soviet Union except Russia had been independent, a state of affairs which was rectified with the adoption of the declaration on June 12, 1991.

FRY: General Expects No Substantial Arms Reduction

AU0906151896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1019 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 8 June (BETA)—Major-General Radoslav Martinovic, assistant commander of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, stated that the FRY was reckoning with any possible traps of the Dayton accord in the part referring to the establishment of the military balance in the region and that it definitely would not allow itself to be brought into an unfavorable position.

In the interview to Podgorica-based POLIS Martinovic said that pursuant to the Vienna agreement on the establishment of the balance of military potential by the Dayton accord signatories, "The FRY will not reduce its military potential significantly, and in the areas where it will be completed to do so, it is possible that the purpose of certain hardware will be altered," MONTENA-FAX conveys.

He emphasized that any possible reduction in the quantity of the FRY's military potential will be compensated by a greater quality of all "relevant Yugoslav Army elements and other components of the armed struggle."

Serbia

Serbia: SRS Says Milosevic Planning Karadzic Assassination

AU1106190196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1219 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Sad, 11 June (BETA)—Milorad Mircic, chairman of the County Committee of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) for south Backa region, stated today that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic "is preparing the assassination of Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, because he is afraid that Karadzic might go to The Hague and tell many unpleasant things there."

"The assassination was supposed to be organized by Jovica Stanisic, head of the State Security of Serbia, but he refused to do it and was, therefore, removed from his post," Mircic said at a news conference in Novi Sad.

Drawing upon "reliable radical sources" in the State Security, Mircic said that Marko Nicovic alias Baron, member of the Directorate of the Yugoslav Left, will replace Stanisic.

Mircic said that in Backa Palanka preparations are underway for opening a news border passage and a customs office, "which confirms that Milosevic has sold out Slavonia and Baranja."

"Criminals and smugglers, led by Goran Hadzic and Mihalj Kertes, are now bringing in everything that has any value in that region and are selling it throughout Serbia," he said.

Mircic said that "machines from the Borovo and Vuteks companies [based in Slavonia] are being smuggled across the Danube River, as well as lumber, oil and winepresses."

Serbia: Professor Calls Isolation of Karadzic 'Senseless'

LD1106132696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1204 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 11 June (SRNA)—An international law professor, Smilja Avramov, said today in Belgrade that the aim of the declaration to halt the proceedings at the Hague tribunal against the president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, Radovan Karadzic, was for him to return to the negotiating team and the political stage of the Serb Republic. "It is in this way that the 24 signatories of the declaration wish to help President Karadzic," Avramov said.

She explained that the declaration was completely separate from the committee for the defense of the rights against the Hague tribunal which groups a large number of Serbian intellectuals, and whose president is Mrs Avramov.

"The committee is defending Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, while the declaration is demanding a halt to the proceedings against the president of the Serb Republic," Professor Avramov said, adding that "Karadzic is a Serb leader and the leader of the people, necessary in the new policy and his isolation is absolutely senseless."

According to her, the leadership of the Serb Republic made a mistake when it handed to Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, all powers in negotiations on the outcome of which the survival of Serbs and the Serb Republic depends.

Serbia: Academicians Raise Possibility of Kosovo Secession

AU1206125896 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 8 Jun 96 p 12

[Unattributed report: "What Did the Serbian Academicians Say?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the regular annual conference of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts the problem of the birthrate was the topic of the day.

Academy President Aleksandar Despic said that the most strategic problem for the future of the Serbian nation is definitely the Kosovo problem. Speaking about the high birthrate among the Albanians, he said: "When the Albanians have the majority in the Kosovo Parliament, and when they begin to have a significant number in the Serbian and Yugoslav parliaments, and then become dominant, it will not make any difference to us which category the Albanians belong to, that is, whether they are a minority or a nation, because the question will be merely academic."

According to Despic, "if the problem of the ethnic, language, religious, and cultural division is pushed aside, if in the future Serbia becomes a civic state, and if that state is recognized by the Albanians, the survival of Kosovo within the framework of Serbia will become a reality. Not only would our cultural resources remain in Serbia, but Serbia would have a great potential of energy resources in Kosovo."

Later Aleksandar Despic said that if it is assessed that this situation does not benefit the Serbian nation, that the ethnic problems that caused the war in the former Yugoslavia to break out cannot be overcome, one should start talks with those who insist on the secession of Kosovo about a peaceful and civilized separation, in order to avoid a repetition of the tragic experience of the past.

Another Serbian academician, Predrag Palavestra, said that according to hints being received from abroad, the Serbs will be faced with a prolonged period of semi-isolation and isolation from European culture. He said that "we are in the position of the defeated." If Germany solves the problem of migrants by returning them to Kosovo, he said, what is Serbia doing to return its refugees.

According to Milos Macura, an academician, there are two alternatives for the solution of the Kosovo problem. One envisages the number of Serbs and Albanians becoming equal. According to this academician, this alternative is a matter of demographics. The other alternative envisages a lower birthrate among the Albanians, that is, a birthrate at a "modern" level.

Academician Pavle Ivic said: "The Kosovo problem is a problem of survival. It is a problem that I am very much concerned with. The birthrate among the Albanians is increasing very rapidly, while ours is declining. The Albanians can become a dominant force in the Assembly and the Serbian ruling party will be the one that will be supported by the Albanians. All this can only be resolved with concessions." "With the colonization of Kosovo," Ivic said, "nothing will be changed demographically because it is just a case of moving people from one region in Serbia to another."

Academician Nikola Colebic said: "The problem of the birthrate is the nation's number one problem. As a nation we are declining in number. We will only be half the number by the year 2,000 regardless of the Kosovo problem."

According to Kosta Mihajlovic, "discussions about Kosovo could stir up unpleasant public reactions. We do not have a consensus on this question."

Miroslav Pantic, secretary of the Academy, said that the Academy should not be asked for competences that it does not have.

Serbia: Academy President Analyzes Kosovo's Future

AU1206105796 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 6

[Report by D.T.: "'The Most Important Problem of the Serbian People'(?!)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Assessing the problem of Kosovo-Metohija as "the most important strategic problem of the Serbian people's future," Aleksandar Despic, president of the SANU [Serbian Academy of Science and Arts], said at the regular annual SANU conference that, to judge from the expectations of the science of demography and on the basis of the population explosion among the Kosovar Albanians, it can be expected that in a couple of decades, Serbia will become a bilingual country of Serbian and Albanian people.

Despic pointed out that Kosovar issue must not be approached with hurried and insufficiently grounded policies and that it is SANU's duty "clearly to present to our people the grave dilemma with which it will be ever more harshly confronted," particularly "when and if the Albanians decide to join in the political life in Serbia in a massive way."

"When they have a large majority in the Kosovo-Metohija parliament and begin to have a significant and then also a dominant place in the Serbian and Yugoslav assemblies, it will be completely the same to us what category they belong to and the terms national minority and nation will be of mere academic significance," Despic pointed out.

"If the problems of ethnic, and therefore linguistic, religious, and cultural duality could be pushed aside, if Serbia in the future becomes a real civic state, and if such a state is accepted by the Albanians, Kosovo-Metohija remaining within Serbia's borders would be of unquestioned value. Not only would the sources of our culture and spirit thereby remain in Serbia, but with Kosovo-Metohija, a significant potential of energy and raw materials would also remain here with Kosovo-Metohija.

"If, however, it is assessed that such a situation is not good for the Serbian people, that ethnic duality contains insoluble problems, which caused the former Yugoslavia to break apart, one should then start talks with those people, who in fact insist on the secession of Kosovo, about a peaceful and civilized separation and creating borders, lest the tragic experiences from the recent past are repeated," Despic concluded.

[Box, p 6]

Politicians' Mistakes

Despic said that, viewing the past that has led to our present situation, it may be concluded that, since 1814, Serbia's politicians have been making cardinal errors, one after another.

The last mistake, made in 1990, was to defy the great powers in creating the RSK [Republic of Serb Krajina] and the divisions in Bosnia that ended in a terrible war, he said, remarking that however, "the development of national awareness, as well as national intolerance, as a complex phenomenon characteristic of primitive and dark sections of the psyche, appeared first in intellectual circles, before the motor powers that ensued were taken up by the politicians."

Serbia: Academy Member on Declaration Supporting Karadzic

LD1006135996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1250 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 10 Jun (SRNA)—Nikola Milosevic, member of the Academy of Science and Arts and one of the signatories of the declaration calling for a halt to further proceedings against Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, said today in Belgrade that the aim of the declaration was to remind everyone that people cannot be taken to court on the basis of political logic, but only on the basis of legal considerations.

In a statement to SRNA, member of the academy Milosevic said that The Hague tribunal should be guided by legal principles and not by the current needs of a big power.

Assessing the range of the declaration, signed in Belgrade by 24 leading intellectuals, Milosevic said that "those who are behind the initiative to bring President Karadzic to The Hague tribunal will not renounce their intention because of the declaration."

According to him, the nature of the declaration is more symbolic, and it is difficult to imagine that it could be of practical significance.

"The only person who could have a bigger influence on the future fate of President Karadzic is Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. However, because his acts are governed only by his own power-holding interests, I sincerely doubt that he would be willing to undertake any decisive action in this case," Milosevic said.

Serbia: Historian Suggests Belgrade Wants Separation of Kosovo

LD1106164396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 11 Jun (SRNA)—Milan Protic, a historian in the Serbian Studies Center in Belgrade, said today that "the initiative to separate Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, launched by some academics in the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU), was on the orders of the Serbian authorities."

Protic, in a statement to SRNA, said that "there were good reasons to doubt that what was said in the Academy was the product of independent ideas of individual academics."

"The problem of the Shiptars [ethnic Albanians] in Kosovo-Metohija over the past 10 years has not changed in any major way so it is surprising that individual academics are now raising the question of the separation of a part of FRY territory. After all, they could have considered this possibility, in the same way, 10 years ago," Protic said.

Serbia: Academic's Views on Kosovo Criticized

LD1106203896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1308 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 11 Jun (TANJUG)—Goran Latinovic, chairman of the Serbian committee of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, said today that the standpoints of Aleksandar Despic, president of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, on Kosovo-Metohija are "very irresponsible" and dangerous for interethnic relations in this province.

Latinovic said at a news conference that Despic's standpoint that the Serbian people are at yet another historic crossroads, at which there are two ways forward—insistence on territorial integrity which leaves no room for any new secession, or agreement to the aspiration of Albanians to create an independent country—"plays into the hands of extremists among the Serbian people" and makes the work of Albanian separatists easier. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Democratic Party Endorses Joint Appearance at Elections

AU0906205496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1820 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 Jun (BETA)—The Democratic Party executive committee at today's session endorsed the party policy aimed at pooling the democratic political forces in Serbia and the FRY in view of a joint appearance at this year's elections, the Democratic Party has reported today.

The session of the committee was chaired by Democratic Party President Zoran Djindjic and was attended by the top party officials and the representatives of all Serbian districts.

Montenegro

Montenegro: UNHCR 'Not Satisfied' With Census Response

AU1006164796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0919 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 10 June (BETA)—Francesco Nata, head of the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] office in Podgorica, stated for

MONTENA-FAX agency that the UNHCR is not satisfied with the response to the census of refugees in Montenegro.

Since the start of the census on 27 May, organized by the UNHCR and the Commission for Displaced Persons of Montenegro, around 10,000 refugees have registered so far.

There is no real reason for refugees and displaced persons not to respond to the census, because the goal of the entire action is to help them, Nata said.

"The census is carried out on a voluntary basis, and they do not even have to answer all the questions in the questionnaire, while one of the basic goals is to motivate refugees to help us in the realization of plans that are precisely in their interest," Nata said.

He pointed out that, if the response happens to be weak, even until the end of the census of refugees on 15 June, the UNHCR will not be able to ensure any considerable aid in the next period. In the course of this week, talks will be held with the Commission for Displaced Persons on the prolongation of the census.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Bukoshi on 'Further Dimension' of USIS in Pristina

AU1206100196 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Interview with Kosovar Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi by correspondent Bujar Muharremi; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Muharremi] Mr. Bukoshi, the U.S. information office [USIS] was recently opened in Prishtina [Pristina]. Can you please tell us what role the office will play and its importance for the Kosova issue in the future?

[Bukoshi] This office has a great importance because Kosova has needed and still needs to be increasingly understood by the international community, and by the great powers in particular, regarding the potential danger it poses to stability in the Balkans. Kosova also needs to be assisted in an adequate way. Of course, for our part, we should create conditions for this aid to be as effective as possible.

The opening of this office at these moments and circumstances is of greatest assistance to the Kosovar people. The Government of the Republic of Kosova considers the role of this office as very significant and important and hopes that this office will play not only the role of an observer and informer or a simple rapporteur, but will also have a further dimension, more significant and meaningful than this. It is precisely here that we should insist. With the assistance of our friends and by cooperating with the office, we should enable the U.S. office in Prishtina to play precisely this role.

[Muharremi] The prime minister, Chairman Rugova, Ambassador Kornblum, and other U.S. top officials were present at the opening ceremony of the U.S. Information Office in Prishtina. How do you see the perspective of this office in the future?

[Bukoshi] It is indicative, there is a message here. It is an honor for us Albanians and the people of Kosova, and we welcome the presence of the U.S. assistant secretary of state, Ambassador Kornblum, and his direct associates at the opening ceremony of the office. This fact itself shows that indeed, the office will have widely effective roots for Kosova and its perspective. Of course, it is our duty and a chance given to the people of Kosova to exploit the opening of this office to the maximum in order to accomplish their goal through their right to self-determination.

Kosovo: Milosevic Interview Described as 'Grotesque'

AU1206101496 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 11 Jun 96

["Milosevic's Fresh Attempt To Mislead the World Over Kosova in DER SPIEGEL"—KOSOVA DAILY REPORT headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, the man who is at the root of the destruction of former Yugoslavia and the wars of aggression against non-Serbs, has made a fresh attempt to mislead the world about Kosova.

In a long interview with DER SPIEGEL magazine, Slobodan Milosevic not only plays the same propaganda tune over Albanians and Kosova, but also has the face to spread such slanders: "Albanians (in Kosova) have their radio and TV programs" or, the "Albanians have their own schools" and some 20 outlets.

The Albanians in Kosova, more than 90 percent of the entire population, have had their schools, radio and TV programs and press closed by Milosevic's regime itself since 1990. This is what the Albanians have had under the state of occupation Milosevic has instituted in Kosova. Yet he ventures to say "Albanians are free here and live in a free country" (sic!). This is not only hollow rhetoric. It is also grotesque.

The truth is the Albanians of Kosova have their schools in Albanian, but theirs is the educational system—involving almost 350,000 students and teachers—which has been branded illegal and constantly persecuted and obstructed by Serbian police and military in the past five years.

The Radio and Television of Prishtina, broadcasting in Albanian, was closed down on 5 July 1990 by Milosevic's police. Scenes of the putsch were seen on TV screens all over the world. The programs Milosevic may be referring to as Albanians are a few Serbian TV news programs translated from Serbian into Albanian. Radio Bulgaria, Radio Beijing, Radio Moscow also emit programs in Albanian.

There is only one Albanian daily in Kosova, BUJKU, with a rather limited circulation exactly because Milosevic's people have closed down RILINDJA daily six years ago and appropriated its printing house and assets, as well as the distributing network.

The people of Kosova have been living under Serbian occupation since 1990. They have been struggling to build their institutions and life.

It is only in an independent Kosova, outside the range of Milosevic's "generous policies," where the Albanians will be able to be free and pursue a decent life.

Only when Serbian rule in Kosova, be it under Milosevic or whomever else, becomes a thing of the past and the people of Kosova exercise their right to self-determination, there can be talk of any freedom here.

Kosovo: Report Lists Serb Police Repression in May

AU1206110296 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 11 Jun 96

["Excerpts from the Human Rights Council Monthly Report on Serbian Police Practices in Kosova"—KOSOVA DAILY REPORT headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At least 1,423 persons were subjected to various forms of Serbian police practices during May 1996, said the Prishtina-based Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms [KMLDNj] in a monthly report issued on 10 June. In the Gllogovc [Glogovac] area alone, a 99-percent Albanian-inhabited municipality in central Kosova, as many as 173 persons were ill-treated, of whom 72 women and 66 children, the report notes.

The Human Rights Council carries a long register of human rights abuses committed by the Serbian regime/police in Kosova: 229 persons were arbitrarily arrested; 80 families had their homes raided on, commonly under the pretext of arms searches; 340 persons were ill-treated in connection with alleged arms possession; 203 persons were physically maltreated, of whom 29 suffered serious body injuries; 369 persons were harassed and intimidated either at homes or in public; 127 persons were ordered to report to the Serbian police stations for the so-called "informative conversations," etc.

The report notes that while the 1995/96 school year is about to end the Serbian police has further stepped up violence against Albanian schoolchildren and people involved in Albanian-language education. During May, the Serbian police has raided on Albanian-language schools on a number of occasions. Twenty teachers were maltreated by the Serbian police over the last month, the KMLDNj says.

The KMLDNj further carries a list of illustrative cases of people being severely tortured, harassed, arbitrarily arrested, looted by the Serbian police, forceful evictions Albanians from apartments, etc.

Kosovo: Serbian Renewal Movement on Kosovo Question

LD1106192396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1406 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 11 Jun (TANJUG)—Ivan Kovacevic, spokesman of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], said today that last week's address by Aleksandar Despic, president of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU), at a SANU assembly meeting on ways of resolving the problem of Kosovo-Metohija, was a sign that the Kosovo issue would soon be opened up.

"Despic merely analyzed the possible options for the resolution of the Kosovo question," Kovacevic said at a news conference, and added that "this speech was a kind of pulse-taking."

Kovacevic repeated the SPO standpoint which says that Kosovo-Metohija is an indivisible part of Serbia, and that the problem can only be solved "within Serbia" and on the basis of "international principles and the highest standards for national minorities." [passage omitted]

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